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INTRODUCTION 
As with most human practices, American bankruptcy law is rife with myth and 
misconception. One of them is the idea that honest debtors are entitled to a bankruptcy 
discharge and a fresh start. 1 This myth was promulgated by Local Loan Co. v. Hunt,2 
where, Hesiod-like, Justice Sutherland wrote the following oft-quoted words: 
[The] purpose of the [Bankruptcy] act has been again and again 
emphasized by the courts as being of public as well as private interest, 
in that it gives to the honest but unfortunate debtor who surrenders for 
distribution the property which he owns at the time of bankruptcy, a 
new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered 
by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt. 3 
Although Local Loan does not actually use the phrase "fresh start, "4 the case is 
usually cited in connection with the concept.5 Technically, Local Loan involved 
avoidance of a pre-petition wage assignment as security for a loan. This assignment 
1 E.g., Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 127 S. Ct. 1105, 1107 (2007) ("The principal purpose of the 
Bankruptcy Code is to grant a 'fresh start' to the 'honest but unfortunate debtor."'). 
2 292 U.S. 234 (1934). 
3 Id. at 244. 
4 It does, however, refer to debtors "starting afresh." Id. at 244 ("One of the primary purposes of the 
Bankruptcy Act is to 'relieve the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness, and permit him to 
start afresh free from the obligations and responsibilities consequent upon business misfortunes."' (quoting 
Williams v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554-55 (1915))). 
5 E.g., Cent. Va. Cmty. College v. Katz, 126 S. Ct. 990,996 (2006) (citing Local Loan and noting Bankruptcy 
Code gives debtor an ultimate discharge and a new start); Grogran v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286-87 (1991) 
( citing Local Loan and stating central purpose of Bankruptcy Code is for debtors to make ~peace with creditors to 
enjoy new opportunity in life). 
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was valid under Illinois law, yet Justice Sutherland ruled as a matter of non-statutory 
bankruptcy policy, that the lien was automatically dissolved by the very fact of a 
bankruptcy discharge. 6 Discharge of a debt has no such effect on other types of security 
interests.7 So Local Loan strongly stands for the proposition that the debtor has an 
inalienable ownership of his post-petition wages following a bankruptcy discharge. 
The principle of Local Loan was ratified by Congress forty-three years later in the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.8 The spirit of the fresh start is embodied within 
section 54l(a), which defines the bankruptcy estate. Preliminarily, section 54l(a)(l) 
establishes that the bankruptcy estate consists of "all legal or equitable interests of the 
debtor in property as of the commencement of the case .. "9 Without more, it would 
appear that a worker's "job" is part of the bankruptcy estate, since a job is an executory 
contract and these routinely go into the bankruptcy estate, where section 365 of the 
Bankruptcy Code governs them at great length. But section 54l(a)(6) goes on to 
specify that the bankruptcy estate includes "[p ]roceeds, product, offspring, rents, or 
profits of or from property of the estate, except such as are earnings from services 
pe,formed by an individual debtor after the commencement of the case." 10 Here is 
where the concept of Local Loan manifests itself. Post-petition wages belong to the 
debtor, not to the bankruptcy estate. 11 
So, gazing at section 54l(a)(6), one might get the impression that individuals, if 
they file for bankruptcy, can disencumber their wages from any pre-petition debts. 
True, they may have to give up their non-exempt assets (if any), but, so long as they 
qualify for a discharge, they have a right to a fresh start, do they not? The "fresh start" 
is all about disencumbering the post-petition wage income stream from any pre-petition 
claim. To use a notorious example, in 1987 Dr. Denton Cooley, the innovative heart 
surgeon, reported income of $9,747,599. 12 Nevertheless he filed for bankruptcy 
liquidation in 1988 and from his prodigious wages enjoyed a very fresh start indeed. 
In spite of this example, the fresh start has not been possible for ordinary mortals 
since 1984. 13 In that year, at the behest of the consumer finance industry, Congress 
6 Local Loan, 292 U.S. at 242-43. See generally Matthew Frankie, Wage Garnishments in Bankruptcy: 
Riddervold Revisited, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 927 (1999) (arguing while Illinois allowed assignment of wages 
earned after bankruptcy, United States Supreme Court rejected concept noting its inconsistency with purpose of 
Bankruptcy Act). 
7 See Chandler Bank of Lyons v. Ray, 804F.2d 577,579 (10th Cir. 1986) (holding discharge will not preclude 
enforcement of valid lien). 
8 Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 541, 92 Stat. 2549, 2558-59 (codified in 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6)). 
9 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(l) (2006). 
10 Id. § 541(a)(6) (emphasis added). 
11 Oddly, the job belongs to the trustee, even if the proceeds of the job do not. Presumably, a malicious trustee 
could resign the debtor from a too-lucrative job. On this peculiarity, see Louis M. Phillips & Tanya Martinez 
Shively, Ruminations on Property of the Estate-Does Anyone Know Why a Debtor's Postpetition Earnings, 
Generated by Her Own Earning Capacity, Are Not Property of the Bankruptcy Estate?, 58 LA. L. REV. 623, 
630-39 (1998) (suggesting debtor can receive post-petition wages even if trustee could assert debtor had vested 
contractual right to employment that would allow trustee to exercise debtor's rights and perform debtor's 
obligations). 
12 In re Cooley, 87 B.R. 432,436 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1988). 
13 See Green v. Staples (In re Green), 934 F.2d 568, 570 (4th Cir. 1991) ("Prior to 1984, debtors enjoyed a 
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enacted a new provision, section 707(b), which authorized dismissal of consumer 
bankruptcy cases for "substantial abuse." 14 After 1984, courts have defined substantial 
abuse as the condition of having surplus income that could be used to pay creditors. 15 
In other words, the fresh start was denied to any consumer debtor who had even 
modest surplus income after expenses. At this point, or perhaps in 1986, when the 
United States trustee was given standing to make motions to dismiss, the untrammeled 
right to a fresh start essentially ended. 16 
What section 707(b) became was a procedure whereby the intimate details of a 
debtor's life were subject to scrutiny by a bankruptcy judge. If the judge did not like 
what he or she saw, the judge could deny the debtor a fresh start. Most dramatically, 
section 707(b) has become a means for extorting future wages and other forms of 
exempt property in exchange for access to a bankruptcy discharge. The past deeds of a 
debtor might also be used to dismiss a case, even though the bad conduct is not listed 
as grounds to deny a discharge under section523(a) or727(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. 
Even admittedly honest debtors could be barred from a fresh start, if they had net 
surplus wages or if a court has disapproved of their life style. 17 
In 2005, Congress finally passed the ironically named Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act ("BAPCPA"). 18 Most famously, this 
legislation, "a side car to the existing bankruptcy vehicle," 19 vastly expands section 
707(b) to provide a mechanical means test.2° Consumer advocates in particular have 
been overwrought about the massive elongation of section 707(b) to include means 
testing of consumer debtors.21 These advocates somehow imagine that fewer 
virtually unfettered right to a 'fresh start' under Chapter 7, in exchange for liquidating their nonexempt assets for 
the benefit of their creditors."). 
14 See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 312(2), 98 Stat. 
333, 355 (codified in 11 U.S.C. § 707 (b) (2000)). The idea can be traced back to President Herbert Hoover, 
sponsor of the Grea_t Depression. See Ann Morales Olazabal & Andrew J. Foti, Consumer Bankruptcy Reform 
and 11 U.S.C. § 707(b): A Case-Based Analysis, 12 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 317, 325-26 (2003). 
15 Doctor Cooley escaped this regulation since his debts were business-related, not consumer debts. See infra 
text accompanying notes 86-87. 
16 See infra text accompanying notes 102-05. 
17 See Price v. U.S. Trustee (In re Price), 280 B.R. 499,505 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2002) (holding debtor honest but 
not unfortunate); In re West, 324 B.R. 45, 49-50 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2005) (dismissing chapter 7 relief as 
"substantial abuse" where debtors were honest but unable to point to inability to support themselves); In re Hill, 
328 B.R. 490, 496-97 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005) (finding debtors honest but nevertheless dismissed in light of 
surplus income); In re Zuehlke, 298 B.R. 610, 615-16 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2003) (concluding stroke victim and 
schizophrenic spouse living on social security and disability insurance with no extravagant expenses were 
bankruptcy abusers). 
18 Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005) [hereinafterBAPCPA] (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
11 U.S.C.). The tortured legislative history ofBAPCPA is set forth in Susan Jensen,A Legislative History of the 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 485 (2005) ("The 
enactment of the BAPCPA in 2005 brought to a close a tumultuous legislative initiative .... "). 
19 In re Murray, 350 B.R. 408, 411 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2006). 
20 Judge Jeff Bohm protests that means test "is a misnomer in the sense that the 'test'-being conducted is not 
whether the debtor has means to pay, but rather whether the debtor has no means to pay." In re Singletary, 354 
B.R. 455, 459 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006). 
21 See, e.g., Robert J. Landry, III & Nancy Hisey Mardis, Consumer Bankruptcy Reform: Debtors' Prison 
Without Bars or "Just Desserts" for Deadbeats?, 36 GOLDEN GA TE U .L. REV. 91, 92 (2006) (stating means test 
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consumers will be e11titled to the fresh start the bankruptcy supposedly represents. 22 
It is a mistake, however, to think that the 2005 amendments are anything new or 
revolutionary. The real revolution occurred in 1984, or perhaps 1986. If anything, the 
2005 means test encourages bankruptcy abuse, as that term was defined in the pre-
BAPCPA case law. It is more generous to high-income debtors than the old case law 
of section 707(b ).23 The mechanical test is counter-productive in its effect on 
bankruptcy abuse, defined as seeking a discharge in the face of surplus future wages. 
Because this is so, courts have begun (though not unanimously) to ignore the 
means test of 2005 as too debtor-friendly. Significantly, BAPCPA invites courts to be 
harder on debtors than the mechanical test BAPCP A institutes. The tools for ignoring 
the means test are fully provided for in the BAPCP A amendments, although this 
requires courts to deny the preemptive quality that a highly specific mechanical test 
might be expected to have. 
So courts have discretion to prevent the increase in bankruptcy abuse that 
BAPCPA invites. But they also have an excuse to find that Congress intended to 
increase abuse by overruling harsh pre-BAPCPA case law. The one thing that is not 
true about BAPCPA ~s that it will make chapter 7 less accessible to high-income 
debtors than it had previously been. 
The conclusion of my study is that the means test either encourages bankruptcy 
abuse or has no effect. To be sure, BAPCPA adds a great amount of detail and is rife 
with bad draftsmanship, dumbfounding contradictions, and curious, even comical, 
special interest exceptions. It is hard to choke out any words of admiration for the 
quality of BAPCPA's draftsmanship. Judges and scholars have not hesitated to pour 
scorn on Congress for the details of BAPCP A. 24 But, insofar as the fresh start is 
concerned, the end result is a consumer bankruptcy law that is not much changed (in 
substance) compared to the days before 2005. 
"places a host of challenges and problems'for those seeking relief'); Henry J. Sommer, Trying to Make Sense Out 
of Nonsense: Representing Consumers Under the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 
2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 19 i, 193 (2005) ( decrying complicated nature of amended section 707 (b) means test). 
22 Empirical studies disagree how prevalent such cases are in chapter 7. Compare Bankruptcy Ref orin Act of 
1998; Responsible Borrower Protection Act; and Consumer Lenders Borrowers and Bankruptcy Accountability 
Act of 1998 - Part 11: Hearing on H.R. 3150, H.R. 2500, and H.R. 3146 Before the Subcomm. on Commercial 
and Administrative Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 25-31 (1998) (statement of Thomas S. 
Neubig, Ernst & Young, LLP) ( claiming 15% of bankruptcies filed by above-median debtors), with Marianne B. 
Culhane & Michaela M. White, Taking the New Consumer Bankruptcy Model For a Test Drive: Means-Testing 
Real Chapter 7 Debtors, 7 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 27, 31-34 (1999) [hereinafter Culhane & White, 
Means-Testing Real Chapter 7 Debtors] (explaining only 3.6% of chapter 7 debtors would be adversely affected 
by means testing as opposed to 11 % as claimed in Ernst & Young study). 
23 See, e.g.,ln re Hill, 328 B.R. 490,499 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005)(dismissing pre-BAPCPA case even though 
it was "ambiguous" whether the debtors would flunk new means test). 
24 Indeed, against my intention, I am apparently unable, in this paper, to resist this temptation. See Catherine E. 
Vance & Corinne Cooper, Nine Traps and One Slap: Attorney Liability Under the New Bankruptcy Law, 79 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 283, 284 (2005) ("It's a behemoth of bad policy, an illiteracy of ill-conceived provisions, an 
underbelly of unintended consequences."); Jean Braucher, Rash and Ride-Through Redux: The Terms for 
Holding on to Cars, Homes and Other Collateral Under the 2005 Act, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 457,457 
n.3 (2005) ("Because it is so complex and badly drafted and makes so many dubious policy choices, experts have 
taken to calling it by the fanciful acronym BARF (BAnkrutcy Reform Act)."). 
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If BAPCPA has an impact, it is by requiring more paperwork of consumer debtors, 
thereby driving up the cost of going bankrupt.25 Accordingly, Part I of this Article 
describes the new disclosures that BAPCPA imposes on individuals. Part II describes 
means testing prior to 2005, showing that the law was already severe in denying 
consumer debtors a fresh start ( even as it was unbelievably generous to Dr. Cooley and 
other wealthy business debtors). Part III describes the mechanical test that BAPCPA 
now imposes. Part IV describes the effect means testing has on defining disposable 
income in chapter 13 cases. No chapter 13 plan can be confirmed unless all disposable 
income is paid into the plan. At least for above-median debtors, disposable income is 
arguably defined by reference to BAPCPA means testing (though this too is subject to 
great ambiguity). Means testing is basically designed to force consumer debtors out of 
chapter 7 liquidation and into chapter 13, where post-petition income is dedicated to 
paying creditors. Part IV assesses how well the chapter 7 means test actually matches 
with the disposable income definition in chapter 13. This part reveals that there are 
many discrepancies, each one of which testifies to the imprecision of a chapter 7 test 
that is supposed to predict the chapter 13 result. That the chapter 7 test fails to predict 
the chapter 13 payout represents a fundamental theoretical failure of BAPCPA means 
testing.26 Finally, Part V speculates on the future of chapter 13 cases q;mverted to 
chapter 7, given the means test. 
I. DISCLOSURES 
My main point is that the mechanical means test is either counterproductive or 
meaningless in terms of preventing bankruptcy abuse ( defined as having surplus post-
petition wages). If BAPCPA has any substantive effect on consumer bankruptcy, it is 
to increase the paperwork burden and hence the cost of filing for bankruptcy. 
As originally enacted, the Bankruptcy Code only required that debtors "file a list of 
creditors, and unless the court orders otherwise, a schedule of assets and liabilities, and 
a statement of the debtor's financial affairs .... "27 None of these was helpful for means 
testing,28 which initially was not provided for by the Bankruptcy Code. In 1984, 
Congress empowered bankruptcy courts to dismiss consumer chapter 7 cases for 
substantial abuse. 29 As this was conceived as a surfeit of net income that should be 
25 See Marianne B. Culhane & Michaela M. White, Catching Can-Pay Debtors: Is the Means Test the Only 
Way?, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 665, 677-78 (2005) [hereinafter Culhane & White, Catching Can-Pay 
Debtors] ("We are frustrated that Congress imposed so much cost and administrative burden for so little 
benefit."). 
26 According to the earliest commentator on BAPCP A means testing, the very purpose of means testing in 
chapter 7 is "to measure the ability of Chapter 7 debtors to repay debt and then, if they have sufficient 
debt-paying ability, to make them repay at least some of their debt-likely through Chapter 13-in order to 
receive a bankruptcy discharge." Eugene R. Wedoff, Means Testing in the New§ 707(b), 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 
231, 231 (2005). 
27 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 521, 92 Stat. 2549, 2586. 
28 The statement of financial affairs is currently modeled in Official Form 7. See Official Form 7, Statement of 
Financial Affairs (Oct. 2005), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Revised_Rules_and_Forms/BK_Form_B7.pdf. 
29 Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 312(2), 98 Stat. 333, 
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used to pay creditors a substantial dividend in chapter 13 or perhaps in chapter 11, 
Congress also required more disclosures: a schedule of current income and 
expenditures. 30 
BAPCPA further burdens debtors with paperwork in aid of means testing. After 
October 17, 2005, the debtor must perform the complicated means testing calculation 
required by section 707(b)(2) and disclose it as part of her section 521 filings. 31 This 
entails filing Form B22A32 in chapter 7 cases and B22C33 in chapter 13 cases. What 
these forms entail will be examined in due course. In large part, the law of means 
testing in chapter 7 and disposable income in chapter 13 is a matter of what these forms 
mean-though we will see that in chapter 13 a majority of courts have already ruled 
that Form B22C is all but irrelevant in defining disposable income.34 
In addition to Form B22A or B22C, debtors must now include a certificate from 
the lawyer or bankruptcy petition preparer who signs the bankruptcy petition stating 
that the lawyer or preparer delivered to the debtor the notice required in section 342(b ). 
This is a description supplied by the clerk of the court of the alternatives to filing for 
chapter 7 bankruptcy. The debtor must also supply pay stubs froni her employer 
covering the sixty days prior to the bankruptcy petition, 35 an itemized statement of 
monthly net income, 36 and a statement disclosing any expected increase of income 
355 (codified in 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2000)) ("[T]he court ... may dismiss a case filed by an individual debtor 
under this chapter ... if it finds that the granting of relief would be a substantial abuse of the provisions of this 
chapter."). 
30 See id. § 305, 98 Stat. at 352 (codified in 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(l)(B)(ii)); see also Fonder v. United States, 974 
F.2d 996, 999 (8th Cir. 1992). In addition, after 1984, within thirty days after the bankruptcy petition, an 
individual debtor had to declare, with regard to property encumbered by security interests (i.e., cars), whether she 
would retain it as exempt, redeem it, surrender it, or pursue reaffirmation of a security agreement relative to the 
property in question. See 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(2)(A) (2006). This last requirement was fraught with history. 
Debtors began to claim that, beyond surrender, exemption, reaffirmation, or redemption, there was another 
option-unilateral reinstatement of the security agreement. Circuit courts were deeply split as to whether this 
additional option existed. BAPCPA intervenes to prohibit this additional option. See, e.g., In re Steinhaus, 349 
B.R. 694, 707-08 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2006) (reading additional remedy of immediate order of possession into 
section 521 as beyond intentions of Congress); see also generally Braucher, supra note 24 (discussing debtor's 
ability to opt for ride-through of secured debts). 
31 See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(C) (2006). 
32 See Form B22A, Statement of Current Monthly Income and Means Test Calculation (Oct. 2006), 
http://www.u sdoj.gov/ust/eolbf1pcpa/defs/docs/sarnples/BK_Form_B22A_ Vl.pdf. Rule 1007(b)(7) of the 
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure requires Form B22A to be filed. FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007(b)(7). This 
form was created in conformance with section 1232 of BAPCPA. See BAPCPA, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 1232, 119 
Stat. 23, 202 (2005). 
33 See Form B22C, Statement of Current Monthly Income and Calculation of Commitment Period and 
Disposable Income (Oct. 2006), 
http://www.usdoj.gov/ust/eo/bapcpa/defs/docs/sarnples/BK_Form_B22A_ Vl.pdf. Rule 1007(b)(6) of the Federal 
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure requires this form to be filed. FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007 (b )( 6). There is also Form 
B22B for individual chapter 11 cases. 
34 See infra Part IV. 
35 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(l)(B)(iv) (2006). The lack of even a single pay stub (even though every pay stub has a 
"year-to-date" report of wages paid included within it) can lead to a dismissal of the case. See In re Bartholomew, 
No. 05-70116-B, 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 2648, at *2-3 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2005). 
36 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(l)(B)(v) (2006). 
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expected in the twelve months following the bankruptcy.37 
Individual debtors are also expected to file a certificate from a credit counseling 
agency that the debtor has heard the sales pitch of that dubious scandal-ridden 
industry, 38 and a copy of any debt repayment plan entered into with a credit counseling 
agency must be supplied. 39 A debtor must also file a record of any interest he or she has 
in an education individual retirement account ("IRA") or qualified state tuition 
program.40 
A debtor must now supply a federal income tax return for the most recent year 
ending before the bankruptcy petition to the court41 and to any creditor who timely 
requests such copy.42 If the debtor fails to comply with these requirements, the court 
must dismiss the case unless circumstances beyond the debtor's control are to blame.43 
Also, if a party in interest requests it, an individual must file new tax returns (including 
overdue returns)44 with the court at the same time the returns are made to the Internal 
Revenue Service'("IRS").45 
If the IRS does not receive any post-petition tax returns that are due, the IRS can 
move the court to dismiss or convert the case to some other chapter.'46 The court is 
obliged to grant this request if the tax return is not delivered within ninety days 
following the IRS's motion. All of this is required even though tax returns will provide 
little or no help with the means test.47 
If the United States trustee or other bankruptcy trustee requests it, the debtor must 
supply proof of identity-" a driver's license, passport, or other document that contains 
a photograph .... "48 
If some of these items are not supplied within forty-five days of the bankruptcy 
petition, "the case shall be automatically dismissed effective on the 46th day after the 
date of the filing of the petition. "49 This rule, however, applies only to the disclosures 
37 Id. § 52l(a)(l)(B)(vi). 
38 Id. § 521(b)(l). For details on credit counseling's sad record, see generally In re Elmendorf, 345 B.R. 486 
(Bankr. S.D.N. Y. 2006). For ana).ysis on what is a "certificate," see Jeffrey A. Deller & Micholas E. Meriwether, 
Putting Order to the Madness: BAPCPA and the Contours of the New Prebankruptcy Credit Counseling 
Requirements, 16 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 101, 104-06 (2007). 
39 11 U.S.C. § 521 (b)(2) (2006). 
40 Id. § 52l(c). 
41 Id. § 521(e)(2)(A)(i). 
42 Id. § 521(e)(2)(A)(ii). ,, 
43 Id. § 521(e)(2)(B)-(C) (2006); see also In re Ring, 341 B.R. 387, 388 (Bankr. D. Me. 2006) (refusing to 
dismiss case for failure to provide tax return based on facts and not on statutory construction involving bright-
line test). 
44 11 u.s.c. § 521(f)(2) (2006). 
45 Id.§ 521(f)(l). There is also a strange reference to an uncodified portion ofBAPCPA, which requires the 
Administrative Office of the United States Courts to establish procedures to provide confidentiality for tax 
returns. Section 521(g)(2) enjoins any trustee or creditor obtaining a tax return to follow these regulations. Id.§ 
521(g)(2). 
46 Id. § 521 (j). 
41 See Gary Neustadter; 2005: A Consumer Bankruptcy Odyssey, 39 CREIGHTONL. REV. 225, 305-11 (2006) 
(describing relationship between filing of tax returns and means test calculation as too attenuated). 
48 11 U.S.C. § 521(h) (2006). 
49 Id. § 521(i)(l). 
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required in subparagraph (a)(l) of section 521.50 A few of the above disclosures are 
required in other subsections. For example, the certificate from the credit counseling 
agency certifying that the debtor has suffered the sales pitch of that agency (for a fee), 51 
the copy of the debt repayment plan, if any,52 the debtor's interest in an education 
IRA,53 and tax retums54 are not called for in subparagraph (a)(l). Failure to file these 
items apparently does not automatically terminate the bankruptcy proceeding.55 
Interestingly, section 521(a)(l) nowhere requires that Form B22A or B22C be 
filed. Subparagraph (B)(ii) requires only a "schedule of current income and current 
expenditures. "56 But section 707(b )(2)(C) requires: 
As part of the schedule of current income and expenditures required 
under section 521, ... a statement of the debtor's current monthly 
income, and the calculations that determine whether a presumption 
arises under subparagraph [707(b)(2)](A)(i), that show how each such 
amount is calculated. 57 
Typically, a section of the Bankruptcy Code incorporates by reference another section 
of the Bankruptcy Code. Section 707(b )(2)(C) is different in that it incorporates itself 
into section 521 ( a)(l )(B)(ii). Reflexive self-incorporation is one of the more Hegelian 
contributions to bankruptcy law instituted by BAPCP A. So presumably section 
707(b)(2)(C) is part of section 521; but is it part of subsection (a)(l) for purposes of 
the automatic dismissal rule of section 52l(i)(1)?58 Given the early hostility of the 
courts to the notion of automatic dismissal, 59 it is possible to predict that failure to file 
Form B22A or B22C will not trigger automatic dismissal. In support of this notion, the 
new definition of "current monthly income" in section 101 (1 0A)(A)(ii) commands the 
court to calculate income in cases where the debtor does not file Form B22A.60 
50 One completely overlooked issue with regard to automatic dismissals for failure to file documents is the 
involuntary petition in bankruptcy. See id. § 303. What if a debtor is involuntarily placed into bankruptcy and is 
adjudicated as not paying debts as they fall due? See id. § 303(h)(l). May this debtor escape a bankruptcy she 
does not want by failing to file pay stubs? Section 521 (i)(l) makes clear that automatic dismissal applies only in 
voluntary cases. Id. § 52l(i)(l). 
51 Id. § 52l(b)(l). 
52.Id. § 521 (b )(2). 
53 Id. § 52l(c). 
54 Id. § 52l(e)(2)(A). 
55 See In re Ring, 341 B.R. 387,389 n.4, 390 (Bankr. D. Me. 2006). 
56 11 U.S.C. § 52l(a)(l)(B)(ii) (2006). 
57 Id. § 707(b)(2)(C) (emphasis added). 
58 Section 521 (i) has been named "one of the most confusing of the sections added by BAPCP A." In re Parker, 
351 B.R. 790,800 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2006). 
59 In In re Riddle, 344 B.R. 702, 703 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2006), Judge Jay Cristo! sua sponte reviewed the 
debtor's file and proclaimed it complete. He then set forth angry poetry denouncing the concept of automatic 
dismissal. In In re Jackson, 348 B.R. 487, 494, 497 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 2006), Judge Lee Jackwig announced a 
cessation of sua sponte dismissals for incomplete files on the ground that it aided debtor fraud. Judge Jackwig 
admitted that "automatic" was thereby made "not automatic," but felt that the entire statutory scheme commanded 
such a conclusion. See id. at 497-98. 
60 11 U.S.C. § IOl(l0A)(A)(ii) (2006). 
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"Current monthly income" is a key concept in BAPCPA's means test.61 The invitation 
to fill in the gap caused by failure to file Form B22A implies that this failure cannot be 
grounds for automatic dismissal. 
In favor of this view is the point that all debtors must comply with section 521(a), 
whether they are individuals or corporations or whether they are in chapter 7 or chapter 
11. If section 707(b)(2)(C) has made itself part of section 52l(a), then section 
707(b)(2)(C) is applicable in any bankruptcy case, whether corporate or individual, 
whether chapter 7 or chapter 11. There is no use saying section 707(b )(2)(C) does not 
apply in chapter 11. Section 52l(a) does apply, and the premise is that section 
707(b)(2)(C) is within the text of section 521(a). Because this is absurd, section 52l(a) 
is best viewed as not encompassing section 707(b)(2)(C). 
But there is a contrary argument. One of the things section 52l(a)(l)(B)(ii) 
requires is "a schedule of current income and current expenditures. "62 Section 
707(b)(2)(C) makes a statement of the debtor's current monthly income (i.e., Form 
B22A) part of the schedule of current income. The reference in section 707(b)(2)(C) to 
"schedule of current incomes and current expenditures" implies that these words from 
section 52l(a)(l)(B)(ii) do encompass FormB22A. On this basis, automatic dismissal 
can follow if the debtor does not file the form. 
In In re Copeland,63 Judge Letitia Clark ruled that non-consumer individuals had to 
file Form B22A because section 521(a)(l)(B)(ii) required it. So not only did she rule 
that section 707(b)(2)(C) is part of section 52l(a)(l)(B)(ii); she also ruled that section 
707(b)(2)(C) applies to non-consumer debtors, even though section 707(b)(2) is a 
means test that applies only to consumers. On this view, even wage-rich business 
debtors who are not to be means-tested must fill out this burdensome form.64 
In In re Beacher,65 Judges Marvin Isgur and Wesley W. Steen, writing in tandem, 
avoided the issue of whether section 707(b)(2)(C) is in or out of section 52l(a) by 
pointing out that section 521(a)(l)(B) (which requires "a schedule of current income 
and current expenditures") applies only "unless a court orders otherwise."66 These 
judges seized upon this discretion to issue a legislative decree stating that non-
consumer debtors provisionally could dispense with Form B22A. 
If a party in interest moves to dismiss in light of the above failure to file, the court 
must grant it within five days.67 But this again is tied to filings required by section 
52l(a)(l). If the debtor has failed to file one of the 52l(a)(l) documents, a debtor may 
nevertheless request more time, provided this request is made during the first forty-five 
days during which the case is still pending.68 If a trustee is inclined, he may move the 
61 See infra Part III.A.6. 
62 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(l)(B)(ii) (2006). 
63 No. 06-32116-H3-7, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 2200, at *5 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Sept. 5, 2006). 
64 But see In re Moates, 338 B.R. 716, 718 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006) (holding non-consumer debtors need file 
only Schedules I and J). 
65 No. 06-37157-H2-7-X, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 240, at *13 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Jan. 26, 2007). 
66 See id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 521 (a)(l)(B) (2006)). 
67 11 U.S.C. § 52l(i)(2) (2006). 
68 Id. § 521(i)(3). 
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court to waive these disclosures if the debtor attempted in good faith to file and if the 
best interest of the ,creditors demands that the case continue.69 
Suppose a debtor has failed to file something required by section 521 generally but 
not one of the documents described in section 521(a)(l). Can a party in interest move 
to dismiss a chapter 7 case for the debtor's failure to file Form B22A-assuming this is 
not required by section 52l(a)(l)? This motion must be made pursuant to section 
707(a), which provides: 
The court may dismiss a case under this chapter only after notice and 
a hearing and only for cause, including-
( 1) unreasonable delay by the debtor that is prejudicial to 
creditors; 
(3) failure of the debtor in a voluntary case to file, within· fifteen 
days or such additional time as the court may allow after the filing 
of the petition commencing such case, the information required 
by paragraph (1) of section 521, but only on a motion by the 
United States trustee.70 
There are some limits on this alternative theory of dismissal. First, note that only the 
United States trustee has standing to dismiss under section 707(a)(3). Other parties in 
interest must proceed only under section 707(a)(l), where a creditor must show a delay 
is prejudicial. In a regime where most unsecured creditors obtain a zero dividend, 
prejudice will perhaps be hard to show. 
Furthermore, there is a cross-reference problem in section 707(a)(3). The trustee 
must show a failure to file information filed by paragraph (1) of section 521. In fact 
section 521 has eight different subparagraphs bearing the number (1). Four of these 
require the debtor to file documents. So one reading of the statute is that the trustee's 
right to a dismissal under section 707(a)(3) is broader than the automatic dismissal 
right in section 52l(i)(l) or the right of a party in interest to move to dismiss under 
section 521(i)(2). Two editors of the Bankruptcy Code, however, have suggested that 
the cross-reference in section 707(a)(3) should be to section 52l(a)(l), thereby limiting 
the trustee's ability to achieve a dismissal.71 
69 Id. § 521(i)(4). 
70 Id. § 707(a)(l), (3). 
71 See 2006 COLLIER PORTABLE PAMPHLET§ 707, at C-276 n.l (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 
Mathew Bender & Company, Inc. 2006). If these editors of the Bankruptcy Code are correct, then the trustee 
could not move to dismiss for failure to file a certificate attesting to credit counseling. Such a filing is required by 
section 521(b)(l), not section 521(a)(l). See 11 U.S.C. § 521(b)(l) (2006). Yet BAPCPA makes pre-petition 
credit counseling (or some valid excuse in lieu of counseling) a jurisdictional matter. See id. § 109(h)(l). So 
presumably, the trustee can move to dismiss a chapter 7 case on these jurisdictional grounds under section 307. 
See id. § 307 ("The United States trustee may raise and may appear and be heard on any issue in any case or 
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The new disclosures required by BAPCP A are designed to permit the United States 
trustee to administer the mechanical means test of new section 707(b )(2). If the debtor 
flunks the test, the case must be converted to chapter 13 (where all disposable income 
must be paid into the plan) or dismissed.72 
II. MEANS TESTING PRIOR TO 2005 
The thesis of this Article is that BAPCPA is not revolutionary; it arguably adds 
nothing to the ideas already implicit in the Bankruptcy Code prior to 2005. Or, if it 
adds anything, it preempts prior law and provides an expanded opportunity for abuse 
for high-income opportunistic debtors. 
The new means testing regulation is an outgrowth of an endeavor that began in 
1984, when Congress enacted section 707(b).73 As it existed after 1984 and before 
October 17, 2005 (BAPCPA's effective date), this section provided: 
After notice and a hearing, the court, on its own motion or on a 
motion by the United States trustee, but not at the request or 
suggestion of any party in interest, may dismiss a case filed by an 
individual debtor under this chapter whose debts are primarily 
consumer debts if it finds that the granting of relief would be a 
substantial abuse of the provisions of this chapter. There shall be a 
presumption in favor of granting the relief requested by the debtor.74 
As originally enacted, this section is "more impressive for what it does not contain than 
for what it does. "75 
A. "Primarily Consumer Debts" 
Section 707(b) has always applied to "an individual debtor ... whose debts are 
primarily consumer debts .... "76 Consumer debts are defined as "debt incurred by an 
proceeding under this title but may not file a plan pursuant to section 112l(c) of this title."). 
72 According to BAPCPA, as an alternative to dismissal, a court may "with the debtor's consent" convert the 
case to chapter 13. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b )(1) (2006). Although the conversion alternative is new with BAPCPA, the 
legislation reflects a practice of the courts to sign orders dismissing the case unless the debtor voluntarily 
converts the case to chapter 13. See Price v. United States (In re Price), 353 F.3d 1135, 1141 (9th Cir. 2003). 
BAPCPA also severely limits or even eliminates the automatic stay for multiple bankruptcy filers. But an 
exception is made for those who file again because their chapter 7 petition was dismissed under section 707 (b ). 
See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (c)(3), (4) (2006). 
73 See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 312, 98 Stat. 333, 
355. 
14 Id. 
75 In re Attanasio, 218 B.R. 180, 184 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1998). Attanasio is an extraordinary resource for the 
definition of" substantial abuse," as it stood in 1998. I will rely on it extensively in describing pre-BAPCP A law. 
76 See supra text accompanying note 74; see also 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(l) (2006). 
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individual primarily for a personal, family, or household purpose. "77 Basically, courts 
have interpreted the phrase "individual debtor ... whose debts are primarily consumer 
debts" to mean that more than 50% of the debts must be related to domestic purposes. 78 
The biggest debt an individual is likely to owe is the home mortgage. The home 
mortgage is.usually related to home acquisition-a purchase money mortgage. Courts 
have held that the purchase money home mortgage is a consumer debt, thereby 
guaranteeing most individuals will be found to owe primarily consumer debts. 79 This is 
so even though legislative history is to the contrary.80 The fact that most discharged 
unsecured debts are business debts carries no weight, where mortgage debt pushes a 
debtor over to the consumer side of the line. 81 Nevertheless, all courts agree that the use 
of the proceeds of the mortgage loan is the ultimate test. If the mortgage loan finances 
a business investment, then the mortgage is not a consumer debt after all. 82 
Alimony and the like are consumer debts. 83 Tort judgments are not.84 Intra-family 
debt is not consumer debt where used for tuition, but where student loans also existed 
and were used for household expenses and where the intra-family loan was diverted to 
tuition, the intra-family debt can be considered consumer debt.85 · 
Certainly one of the inequities of section 707(b), then and now, is that the 
individuals with high incomes and business debts are not subject to scrutiny for 
bankruptcy abuse. We have already seen that the bankrupt heart swapper, Dr. Denton 
Cooley, who in 1988 reported income of $9,747,599,86 was not regulated by section 
707(b), because his losses were investment-related. He is not expected to contribute 
post-petition wages to his unsecured creditors; only consumers are so burdened.87 
77 11 u.s.c. § 101(8) (2006). 
78 See, e.g., Stewart v. U.S. Tr. (In re Stewart), 175 F.3d 796, 807-08 (10th Cir. 1999); Zolg v. Kelly (In re 
Kelly), 841 F.2d 908,913 (9th Cir. 1988). 
79 See, e.g., Price v. United States Tr. (In re Price), 353 F.3d 1135, 1139 (9th Cir. 2004);In re Evans, 334B.R. 
148, 151 (Bankr. D. Md. 2004). One court has refused to reduce the debt by half where a non-debtor spouse is 
50% liable for the debt. In re Hayman, No. 03-17898, 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 135, at *3 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio Jan. 24, 
2005). A nonrecourse mortgage has been counted as a consumer debt. See In re Bryson, No. 05- 27009, Bankr. 
LEXIS 704, at *7 (Bankr. D. Kan. Mar. 6, 2007). 
80 See, e.'g., 124 CONG.REC. HI 1,909 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) & S17,406 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (statement 
of Sen. Dennis DeConcini) ("A consumer debt does not include a debt to any extent that the debt is secured by 
real property."). On the basis of this, a lonely court has held that a real estate acquisition is not a consumer debt. 
In re Restea, 76 B.R. 728, 734 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1987). 
81 See Price, 353 F.3d at 1140-41 ("Given the plain words of the statute, we cannot conclude that Congress 
meant 'primarily consumer debts' to refer only to those debts sought to be discharged rather than the aggregate 
debts listed on the bankruptcy schedules."). 
82 In re Booth, 858 F.2d 1051, 1055 (5th Cir. 1988) (rega.ding mortgage loans secured by debtor's residence as 
non-COl).sumer debt). 
83 Stewan, 175 F.3d at 807 (holding alimony is consumer debt when not motivated by profit); In re Hall, 258 
B.R. 45, 50 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2001). 
84 Deglin v. Keobapha (In re Keobapha), 279 B.R. 49, 54 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2002) ("In addition, the substantial 
abuse test under§ 707(b) can only be used for cases where there is primarily consumer debt. In the present case, 
the only debt at issue is not consumer debt, but a judgment debt."). 
85 Stewart, 175 F.3d at 807 (categorizing student loans as "consumer debt" because money was used for dual 
family and personal purposes). 
86 In re Cooley, 87 B.R. 432, 436 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1988). 
87 Judge Edith Jones, whose dissenting opinion in the Bankruptcy Review Commission was an important 
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The inequity has led debtors to suggest that the singling out of abusive consumer 
debtors for chapter 7 dismissal is a violation of the equal protection clause of the Fifth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution. Section 707 (b ), however, has survived 
equal protection challenge. According to one court, consumer debtors consume; 
business debtors sometimes acquire hard assets. 88 On this basis, the discrimination has 
a rational basis and so is constitutional. 89 
There is, however, a provision that permits dismissal of non-consumer chapter 7 
cases. According to section 707(a), which BAPCPA does not amend:90 
The court may dismiss a case under this chapter only after notice and 
a hearing and only for cause, including-
( 1) unreasonable delay by the debtor that is prejudicial to 
creditors; 
(2) nonpayment of any fees or charges required under chapter 123 
of title 28; and 
(3) failure of the debtor in a voluntary case to file, within fifteen 
days or such additional time as the court may allow after the filing 
of the petition commencing such case, the information required 
by paragraph (1) of section 521, but only on a motion by the 
United States trustee. 91 
In section 707(a), "cause" for dismissal is not exclusively defined. Courts have 
split on whether cause includes bad faith filing of the bankruptcy petition. 92 Some 
influence in BAPCPA, favored extending section 707(b) to non-consumer individuals. See NAT'L BANKR. 
REVIEW COMM'N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TwENTY YEARS 1169-70 ( 1997) ( explaining limitation of section 
707 (b) to consumer debt is arbitrary, unjust, and complicated). For some reason, this recommendation, in spite of 
its wisdom and soundness, was never followed. 
88 See In re Copeland, No. 06-32116-H3-7, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 2200, at *2-5 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Sept. 5, 2006) 
(noting debtor was bankrupt because she guaranteed debts of corporation). 
89 See Stewart, 175 F.3d at 813 ("A rational relationship exists between Congress singling out consumer 
debtors for dismissal for substantial abuse under § 707 (b) and the government's legitimate purpose in preventing 
consumer abuse .... "). A recent attempt to ground the bankruptcy discharge in some over-arching purpose holds 
that the bankruptcy discharge exists to encourage entrepreneurship. See John M. Czametzky, The Individual and 
Failure: A Theory of the Bankruptcy Discharge, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 393, 398-99 (2000) (hypothesizing bankruptcy 
discharge is part of institutional framework vital to fostering entrepreneurship in the market). Of course, 
consumers who live beyond their means are not entrepreneurs. But if those with primarily business debts are 
viewed as entrepreneurs, then one could argue that awarding entrepreneurs surplus post-petition income 
constitutes a reduction in the cost of entrepreneurship (at the expense of creditors, of course). Non-entrepreneurs, 
in contrast, must pay more for their discharge, on this view. For a defense of discrimination in favor of the 
wealthy on the grounds that the rich pay for bankruptcy discharge as a form of insurance, see Richard M. Hynes, 
Non-Procrustean Bankruptcy, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 301,333. 
90 It should have. The cross-reference therein to paragraph (1) of section 521 is now obsolete and should refer 
to section 521(a)(l). There are now four different paragraph (l)'s. 
91 11 U.S.C § 707(a) (2006). 
92 See Katie Thein Kimlinger & William P. Wassweiler, The Good Faith Fable of 11 U.S.C. § 707(a): How 
Bankruptcy Courts Have Invented a Good Faith Filing Requirement for Chapter 7 Debtors, 13 BANKR. DEV. J. 
61, 62 (1996) ("Despite the fact the text of the Code does not require chapter 7 debtors to file bankruptcy in good 
faith, courts have conjured a good faith in filing requirement under the auspices of§ 707(a) .... "). 
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courts think so, citing a motive to evade obligations to an ex-spouse93 or a single 
creditor94 as justifying dismissal, or evading enforcement of an anti-competition 
covenant in state legislation.95 Other courts hold bad faith is not cause to dismiss a 
chapter 7 proceeding, even if it is cause to dismiss cases in chapters 11 or 13.96 
In any event, it is far from clear that the presence of surplus wages is cause to 
dismiss a chapter 7 petition where the debtor owes mostly non-consumer debtors. 97 In 
Sherman v. SEC (In re Sherman),98 the Ninth Circuit reversed a district court decision 
dismissing a chapter 7 case under section 707(a) because the debtor sought to sustain a 
lifestyle funded by bilking investors in a Ponzi scheme. The Sherman court conceded 
that "cause" exceeds the confines of section 707(a), but an asserted cause could not be 
something specifically addressed by other Bankruptcy Code sections. Since the movant 
could not cite a reason for dismissal that was not addressed by other Code sections, 
dismissal was inappropriate. A stylish life specifically did not suffice as cause to 
dismiss.99 As one appellate court put it, with regard to a non-consumer debtor earning 
$454,000 a year: 
The result reached here may understandably offend some on the 
ground that this debtor, given his income and lifestyle, is a member of 
a class of people who are undeserving of the privileges and benefits of 
the Bankruptcy Code. [sic] i.e. the class of people who can pay their 
debts, but choose instead to spend their substantial incomes on what 
most would consider luxuries. Importantly, however, § 707(a) does 
not embody this sentiment. Any dissatisfaction with this result should 
therefore be addressed to Congress for it is that body, and not the 
courts, that has the power to alter the result reached here. 100 
In 2005, Congress responded to this challenge by perpetuating the discrimination in 
favor of business debtors, for whom high life is no impediment to the fresh start. 
93 Huckfeldt v. Huckfeldt (In re Huckfeldt), 39 F.3d 829,832 (8th Cir. 1994). 
94 Keepper, 329 B.R. 693, 696-97 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2005). 
95 Indus. Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Zick (In re Zick), 931 F.2d 1124, 1129 (6th Cir. 1991). 
96 E.g., Neary v. Padilla (In re Padilla), 222 F.3d 1184, 1191 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Shangraw v. Etcheverry 
(In re Etcheverry), 242 B.R. 503,506 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1999). The Padilla court defended bad faith as "cause" 
under sections 1 l 12(b) and 1307(c), because, in those proceedings, the debtor has an ongoing relation with the 
creditors. See In re Padilla, 222 F.3d at 1192-93. 
97 See In re Mottilla, 306 B.R. 782, 787 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2004) (discussing how disposable income can be 
considered, but only if debtor has dishonestly reported inflated expenses). 
98 441 F.3d 794, 819 (9th Cir. 2006). 
99 Accord Huckfeldt v. Huckfeldt (In re Huckfeldt), 39 F.3d 829, 832 (8th Cir. 1994) (indicating dismissal "for 
cause" under section 707(a) cannot be founded solely on the ability to pay); Novak v. Wagnitz (In re Wagnitz), 
No. 03C516, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5010, at *30 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 2004); In re Wiedner, 344 B.R. 321,326 
(Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2005); In re Goulding, 79 B.R. 874,876 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1987) (citing legislative history and 
noting "it is difficult to contemplate how Congress could more emphatically have stated that the debtor's [ability 
to repay his debts] is not 'cause"' under section 707(a)). 
100 McDow v. Smith, 295 B.R. 69, 82-83 (E.D. Va. 2003) (footnotes omitted). 
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B. Standing 
Former section 707(b) was restrictive on standing. As originally enacted in 1984, 
only the court on its own motion, "but not at the request or suggestion of any party in 
interest," could dismiss a chapter 7 debtor. 101 In 1986, the United States trustee was 
given standing to make this motion. 102 This probably should be considered the exact 
point in which the doctrine of the fresh start came to an end. 
Prior to 2005, neither a chapter 7 trustee appointed for the case nor a creditor could 
make this motion. 103 The chapter 7 trustee is not to be confused with the United States 
trustee. The chapter 7 trustee is elected by the creditors at the first creditor's meeting 
and has the duty to liquidate assets, object to claims, etc. 104 The United States trustee is 
a member of the executive branch under the U.S. Department of Justice ("Justice 
Department" or "United States Trustee"), charged with the duty of representing the 
public in any given bankruptcy case. 105 
As originally enacted, section 707 (b) stated that a court could dismiss a chapter 7 
case sua sponte, but "not at the request or suggestion of any party in interest .... "106 
When standing expanded to include the United States trustee, these words were 
retained, leading debtors to claim that a trustee's motion to dismiss must be denied 
where "tainted" by the suggestion of a creditor that the chapter 7 case be dismissed. 
Courts have ruled, however, that the motion of the United States trustee is not tainted, 
where parties in interest whispered encouragement in his ear. Rather, taint is prohibited 
only with regard to sua sponte actions by the court. 107 
101 See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub L. No. 98-355, § 312, 98 Stat. 333, 
355. 
102 See Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 
99-554, § 219, 100 Stat. 3088, 3101. The United States trustee must make this motion within sixty days after the 
first creditors' meeting. FED. R. BANKR. P. 1017 ( e )( 1 ). Motions under section 707 ( a), however, are not subject to 
this limitation. See In re Weeks, 306 B.R. 587,589 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2004) (denying section 707(b) motion on 
merits). If the United States trustee loses the motion, the debtor may be entitled to attorney's fees and costs under 
the Equal Access to Justice Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (2000); In re Terrill, No. 05-87180-BJH-7, 2006 Bankr. 
LEXIS 1890, at *2-3 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. July 27, 2006). 
103 Creditors could, however, move to convert a chapter 7 case to chapter 11, but such motions were 
unsuccessful. One court ruled that, since a consumer debtor would have to commit wages to a chapter 11 plan, 
forcing a debtor into chapter 11 was inappropriate. In re Lenartz, 263 B.R. 331,335 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2001). This 
same court also ruled that where the debtor was ineligible for chapter 13, a dismissal under section 707(b) for 
substantial abuse was warranted because chapter 11 was a viable option for the debtor. Id. at 342. Another court 
ruled that section 706( a) motions by creditors could not be based on substantial abuse of chapter 7, as that would 
deprive meaning to the United States trustee's unique standing to seek dismissals under section 707(b). In re 
Ryan, 267 B.R. 635,638 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2001). 
104 11 U.S.C. §§ 702(b); 704(a) (2006). Prior to the first creditors' meeting there is an interim trustee. Id. § 
702(a). 
105 See generally Dan J. Schulman, The Constitution, Interest Groups, and the Requirements of Uniformity: The 
United States Trustee and the Bankruptcy Administrator Programs, 74 NEB. L. REV. 91 (1995) (discussing 
uniformity of United States Trustee throughout federal judicial districts). 
106 Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act§ 312, 98 Stat. at 355. 
107 See Stewart v. U.S. Tr. (In re Stewart), 175 F.3d 796, 804 (10th Cir. 1999) ("[T]he court could dismiss a 
petition sua sponte, but arguably not at the request or suggestion of a party in interest."); U.S. Tr. v. Clark (In re 
Clark) 927 F.2d 793, 797 (4th Cir. 1991); In re Praleikus, 248 B.R. 140, 143-44 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2000). 
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C. "Substantial Abuse" 
Former section 707 (b) required a finding that the bankruptcy petition constitutes a 
"substantial abuse" of chapter 7. BAPCPA, however, strikes the word "substantial" 
from newly numbered section 707(b)(l). 108 Today even modest abuse, however 
blushing and demure, warrants dismissal. It is far from clear, however, whether this 
amendment will make any difference, as courts, prior to 2005, were quite willing to 
boot the humble as well as the egregious debtor from chapter 7. 
In defining the phrase "substantial abuse," all courts agreedthat a debtor's ability to 
repay debts out of post-petition wages was the principal factor justifying dismissal of a 
chapter 7 case.109 These holdings ignore a vigorous 1984 legislative history against 
dismissing cases because post-petition surplus income existed. 110 
Some courts thought that surplus income, without more, was enough to justify a 
dismissal. 111 "Fresh start, not a head start" has been an inspirational slogan.112 Others 
have put the matter somewhat differently: the ability to fund a chapter 13 plan is the 
primary factor for substantial abuse of chapter 7,113 though courts also denied that 
eligibility for chapter 13 is required for a section 707(b) dismissal;114 for those 
exceeding the debt limit for chapter 13 jurisdiction, 115 chapter 11 is an altemative. 116 
Chapter 11, prior to BAPCPA, had no rule requiring the dedication of surplus 
108 See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(l) (2006). According to the legislative history of the 2000 bill: "Dismissal under 
707(b) is also authorized when there is 'abuse.' It is intended that by changing the standard for dismissal from 
'substantial abuse' to 'abuse,' stronger controls will be available ... to limit the abusive use of chapter 7 based on 
a wide range of circumstances." 146 CONG. REC. 26,468 (2000) (emphasis added). 
109 See, e.g., U.S. Tr. v. Harshaw (In re Harshaw), 345 B.R. 518, 521-23 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2006). 
110 See In re Walton, 866 F.2d 981, 987 (8th Cir. 1989) (McMillian, J., dissenting) ("[T]he express intent of 
Congress with the enactment of§ 707(b) was not to impose a future income test."). 
111 See Behlke v. Eisen (In re Behlke), 358 F.3d 429,438 (6th Cir. 2004); U.S. Tr. v. Harris, 960 F.2d 74, 75-
76 (8th Cir. 1992); In re Walton, 866 F.2d at 985; Zolg v. Kelly (In re Kelly), 841 F.2d 908, 913-14 (9th Cir. 
1988). 
112 Accord In re Krohn, 886 F.2d 123, 128-29 (6th Cir. 1989); In re Ontiveros, 198 B.R. 284,290 (C.D. Ill. 
1996) (citing In re Pilgrim, 135 B.R. 314,317 (C.D. Ill. 1992) (quoting Senator Orrin Hatch)); In re Glenn, 345 
B.R. 831,835 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2006); In re Beitzel, 333 B.R. 84, 88 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2005); In re Godios, 
333 B.R. 644,647 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2005);ln re Laman, 221 B.R. 379,382 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1998) (citing In 
re Krohn, 886 F.2d at 127-28). 
113 See Stuart v. Koch (In re Koch), 109 F.3d 1285, 1289 (8th Cir. 1997); In re Jones, 335 B.R. 203, 208 
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2005). 
114 See Fonder v. United States, 974 F.2d 996, 999 (8th Cir. 1992); In re Krohn, 886 F.2d at 127. 
115 Section 109( e) requires a chapter 13 debtor to have "regular income" and non-contingent unsecured debts of 
less than $307,675 and non-contingent secured debts of $922,975. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (2006). These unrounded 
numbers are subject to automatic adjustment for inflation under section 104 of the Code. 
116 See Scheinberg v. U.S. Tr. (In re Scheinberg), 134 B.R. 426, 429-30 (D. Kan. 1992); In re Lenartz, 263 
B.R. 331,342 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2001) ("[W]hile they cannot be compelled to do so, if Debtors genuinely desire 
bankruptcy relief, they could explore a voluntary conversion and offering a repayment plan under Chapter 11. "); 
In re Mastromarino, 197 B.R. 171, 177-78 n.10 (Bankr. D. Me. 1996). Some courts have disagreed and have 
refused to dismiss unless the debtor is eligible for chapter 13. See In re Williams, 155 B.R. 773, 774-75 (Bankr. 
D. Idaho 1993) ("[W]here chapter 13 is unavailable and relief under chapter 11 would not be a meaningful 
alternative, the dismissal of a chapter 7 case under section 707(b) is inappropriate."); In re Mastroeni, 56 B.R. 
456, 459-60 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
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disposable income, but it did have the absolute priority rule, which barred distributions 
to the individual debtor if a class of unsecured creditors voted against the plan. 117 Thus, 
individual debtors would have to win creditor support with sufficient payments in order 
to retain title to a house with valuable equity. BAPCPA, however, now repeals the 
absolute priority rule for individual debtors. 118 Oddly, it does not require, as chapter 13 
does, that all disposable income be dedicated to the plan. 119 
Under the banner "totality of the circumstances"-words borrowed by BAPCPA 
for section 707(b)(3)(B)-the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in Green v. 
Staples (In re Green),120 found surplus income alone insufficient for dismissal. The 
Green court added an array of other considerations that must supplement this fact, such 
as (1) the debtor's health, 121 (2) the debtor's pre-petition conduct in borrowing and 
spending on luxury items, (3) the excessiveness of the debtor's family budget, (4) the 
accuracy of net income, and (5) the good faith of the debtor. in filing for bankruptcy in 
the first place. 122 An even more diffuse list of factors was sponsored in the Sixth 
Circuit, which mentioned (1) the "need" 123 of a debtor for a discharge, (2) the debtor's 
honesty, candor, eve-of-bankruptcy behavior, (3) catastrophic events, 124 (4) stable 
source of income, (5) eligibility for chapter 13, (6) the existence of state remedies to 
ease the debtor's burden, and (7) the ability of the debtor to lower expenses to fund 
117 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (2000)(instituting absolute priority rule and stating junior holders may 
. not receive property under plan for reorganization on account of junior claim or interest). BAPCPA now requires 
individual debtors to contribute disposable income to the plan. Id. § 1129(a)(15). 
118 Id. § 1123(b )(2)(B)(ii). 
119 Section 1123(a)(8) of the Code, new with BAPCPA, only requires an individual debtor to provide for "the 
payment to creditors under the plan of all or such portion of earnings from personal services performed by the 
debtor ... as is necessary for the execution of the plan." Id.§ 1123(a)(8). 
120 934 F.2d 568, 572 (4th Cir. 1991). 
121 Cf In re Beitzel, 333 B.R. 84, 90-91 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2005) (noting debtor's responsibility for health of 
family members influenced debtors decision to file chapter 7). 
122 See Green, 934 F.2d at 572; see also Stewart v. U.S. Tr. (In re Stewart), 175 F.3d 796, 809-10 (10th Cir. 
1999); Kornfield v. Schwartz (In re Kornfield), 164 F.3d 778, 787 (2d Cir. 1999); First USA v. Lamanna (In re 
Lamanna), 153 F.3d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 1998); Kestell v. Kestell (In re Kestell), 99 F.3d 146, 149-50 (4th Cir. 
1996). 
123 In re Krohn, 886 F.2d 123, 126-27 (6th Cir. 1989). There, the court stated: 
Among the factors to be considered in deciding whether a debtor is needy is his ability 
to repay his debts out of future earnings. That factor alone may be sufficient to warrant 
dismissal. For example, a court would not be justified in concluding that a debtor is needy 
and worthy of discharge, where his disposable income permits liquidation of his consumer 
debts with relative ease. Other facts relevant to need include whether the debtor enjoys a 
stable source of future income, whether he is eligible for adjustment of his debts through 
Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, whether there are state remedies with the potential to 
ease his financial predicament, the degree of relief obtainable through private negotiations, 
and whether his expenses can be reduced significantly without depriving him of adequate 
food, clothing, shelter and other necessities. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
124 Cf In re Mastromarino, 197 B.R. 171, 180 (Bankr. D. Me. 1996) (being hoodwinked by yacht repairman 
does not constitute "calamity"). 
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repayment of creditors. 125 Under these cases: 
[A] chapter 7 case may be dismissed even without evidence of 
culpable behavior of a debtor who does not need chapter 7 relief. Such 
lack of need will be evidenced by financial resources which should be 
adequate to avoid bankruptcy if a debtor were either more prudent in 
his lifestyle or more disciplined in his financial choices. 126 
241 
Taxonomists have placed the Eighth and Ninth Circuits at the anti-debtor extreme and 
the Fourth Circuit at the pro-debtor extreme, with the Sixth Circuit in the middle. 127 
One study, however, concludes that, rhetoric aside, courts look only to whether surplus 
disposable income exists; if it does, they dismiss the case. 128 
Even modest ability to pay unsecured creditors with post-petition wages has 
justified a dismissal. One court dismissed a chapter 7 case because a hypothetical 14 % 
dividend was foreseen in chapter 13. 129 Yet a 16% dividend was held insufficient to 
justify dismissal. 130 It was reversible error not to dismiss where 56% payment was 
possible over a three-year period. rn On the other hand, it was in the discretion of a 
court to find no abuse in light of a 53% possible payout (even though the debtor had 
scheduled secured debt payments on a horse trailer and a large truck to haul lazy 
Dobbin about). 132 These cases have judged "substantial abuse" based on the percentage 
125 See Behlke v. Eisen (In re Eisen), 358 F.3d 429, 436-38 (6th Cir. 2004); In re Krohn, 886 F.2d at 126-27; 
In re Hill, 328 B.R. 490, 496 (Bankr. S.D. Tex, 2005) (stating "the 'honesty'-prong is backwards looking and the 
'need'-prong is forward looking"). 
126 In re Goddard, 323 B.R. 231,234 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2005). 
127 See In re Harshaw, 345 B.R. 518,523 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2006) ("The difference between the approach of the 
Sixth Circuit and that of the Fourth Circuit, however, is that a finding that a debtor is not in need of a Chapter 7 
discharge, by itself, may be sufficient to warrant a dismissal .... The Sixth Circuit approach thus represents a 
much more limited version of the 'totality of the circumstances' approach."). 
128 See Carl Felsenfeld, Denial of Discharge for Substantial Abuse, Refining-Not Changing-Bankruptcy Law, 
67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1369, 1391 (1999). According to this study, 139 reported cases existed as of 1999, 107 
resulted in dismissal because of surplus income, and " [ a] review of other circumstances may or may not be a part 
of the analysis." Id. at 1392-93. Six cases were dismissed based solely on surplus income, and "[o]nly seven 
cases find that, although there was enough surplus income to make a meaningful payment to creditors, the 
Chapter 7 case should not be dismissed because a review of the 'totality of the circumstances' ... failed to 
uncover some equitable abuse of the Code." Id. at 1393. Bui see In re Smith, 354 B .R. 787, 790-92 (Bankr. W.D. 
Va. 2006) (showing in spite of surplus disposable income, lack of aggravating factor led to court's denial of 
motion to dismiss). 
129 Behlke, 358 F.3d at 436-37; see also In re Mastromarino, 197 B.R. at 176 (stating Ninth Circuit "can be 
read to mandate dismissal given sufficient ability to pay .... [The Sixth Circuit] permits but does not require that 
result."). 
130 In re Drillman, No. 03-10814, 2004 Bankr. LEXIS 369, at *4-5, *17-33 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2004). 
131 See generally U.S. Tr. v. Harris (In re Harris), 960 F.2d 74 (8th Cir. 1992) ("The district court correctly 
rejected the bankruptcy court's holding that dismissal for substantial abuse under§ 707(b) requires the moving 
party to show 'egregious behavior' by the debtor."). 
132 See McDow v. Fulcher (In re Fulcher), No. 306-CV-0040, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74564 (W.D. Va. Oct. 
16, 2006); see also Harris v. U.S. Tr. (In re Harris), 279 B.R. 254,262 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2002) (stating 2.5% 
payout is not substantial abuse); In re Vansickel, 309 B.R. 189, 193 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2004) (noting 6.5% payout 
is not abuse, but when pension contribution added in, debtor could have paid 16.6%); In re O'Neill, 301 B.R. 
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payout. This implies that, where two debtors have the same surplus income, the one 
who most abused his credit cards is more likely to be the one who is entitled to chapter 
7 relief.133 BAPCPA amends this bias in part, though a shadow of it lingers. 134 Then as 
now this shows the perversity of means testing-it rewards the grasshopper and 
punishes the frugal-but-unfortunate ant. 
Other courts, however, defined "ability to pay" as ability to pay in full over the 
standard three-year term of a chapter 13 plan. 135 At least one other court required a 
70% payout of non-priority creditors. 136 
Some courts took up the lash of the slave driver in demanding hard work from 
would-be chapter 7 debtors. Some went so far as to hold a past penchant for overtime 
against a debtor, in effect condemning the debtor to future overtime in order to pay 
creditors in a chapter 13 plan. 137 Quitting high-paying jobs and taking lower pay has 
been held a substantial abuse (in light of high credit card debt used for buying 
luxuries). 138 One court demanded that minor children be put to work in order to benefit 
the creditors. 139 
In their search for surplus net income, pre-BAPCP A courts attacked expenses 
claimed by debtors on Schedule J, required to be filed under section 52l(a)(l)(B)(ii).140 
898, 901 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2003) (holding no abuse in spite of 36% payout); In re Balaja, 190 B.R. 335, 336 
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996) (declaring debtors could pay 60% over thirty-six month period, or almost 100% over 
sixty-month period, in chapter 13); In re Butts, 148 B.R. 878,881 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1992) (holding no dismissal 
where debtors could pay 42% of their unsecured debts over thirty-six month period, or 75% in sixty months, in 
chapter 13); In re Beles, 135 B.R. 286,287 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1991) (noting debtors could pay 35% ofunsecured 
debt over three years). Courts disagree on whether one might ignore intra-family debt for the purpose of these 
payouts. Compare In re Weber, 208 B.R. 575,577 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997) (ignoring loan from family), with In 
re Attanasio, 218 B.R. 180, 183 n.2 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1998) (stating such debts must be counted, absent 
evidence of fraud). 
133 See Olazabal & Foti, supra note 14, at 341 n.136 (hypothesizing situation wherein debtor with higher 
percentage of debt owed would likely be discharged for substantial abuse). 
134 See infra Part III.B. l. 
135 See In re Zaleta, 211 B.R. 178, 181 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1997); In re Edwards, 50 B.R. 933, 937 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 1985). But see In re Gomes, 220 B.R. 84, 88 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998) (upholding dismissal based on 43% 
payout in hypothetical chapter 13 case). 
136 In re Messenger, 178 B.R. 145, 149 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1995). 
137 See In re Reeves, 327 B.R. 436,443 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2005); In re Harger, 267 B.R. 848,850, 852 (Bankr. 
N.D. Iowa 2001); In re Carlton, 211 B.R. 468,480 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding substantial abuse where 
debtor contended that "at 45-years-old he can no longer work the overtime that he previously did to maintain a 
higherlevel of income"); In re Stallman, 198 B.R. 491,497 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1996); In re Dubberke, 119 B.R. 
677,680 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1990) (concluding single mother abused system by quitting her second job in order 
to stay home with her son); In re Helmick, 117 B.R. 187,190 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990).But see Com. Credit Corp. 
v. Killough (In re Killough), 900 F.2d 61, 65-66 (5th Cir. 1990) (determining overtime should not be included in 
"disposable income" for chapter 13 purposes); McDow v. Fulcher, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74564, at *10; In re 
Attanasio, 218 B.R. at 215; In re Hampton, 147 B.R. 130, 131 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1992). 
138 See In re Manske, 315 B.R. 838, 842 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2004) ("The biggest sticking point in this case 
involves the circumstances under which these debtors voluntarily decided to leave their high-paying jobs in 
Wisconsin and move to Tennessee .... The debtors' self-imposed termination of employment, sudden move to 
Tennessee, and the timing of a series of events starting in September of 2003 and continuing over a short period 
of time are extremely suspect."). 
139 See In re Carlton, 211 B.R. at 481. 
140 See Schedule I-Current Expenditu~es of Individual Debtor(s), 
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Extravagant or unnecessary school tuition was not allowed. 141 A car for the daughter, 142 
cell phones, 143 high cable and internet bills, 144 high mortgage payments, 145 maid 
service,146 life insurance (where an adult daughter was the beneficiary), 147 mortgage 
payments on behalf of mother, 148 a car149 or college150 for an adult child, an expensive 
car for the debtor, 151 the desire to reaffirm a security agreement regarding a luxury 
camping vehicle, 152 lawn care in excess of $29 per month, 153 recreational boating 
expenses, 154 and country club dues155 were cause to find substantial abuse. Ice 
skating156 and tennis lessons157 for children were not justifiable. Monthly student loan 
payments could not be too high, on the assumption that the lender will agree to a 
longer amortization and a lower monthly payment. 158 Excessive pet food and veterinary 
expenses for aged pets159 and time share rentals are out. 160 Spending more than $15 a 
day on food161 or $28.33 for a family of six162 is a gluttonous waste. 163 The need to 
http://www.uscourts.gov/bkforms/official/b6j. pdf. 
141 Kornfield v. Schwartz (In re Kbmfield), 164 F.3d 778, 784 (2d Cir. 1999); In re Hand, 323 B.R. 14, 19 
(Bankr. D.N.H. 2005); U.S. Tr. v. Welch (In re Welch), 344 B.R. 50, 55 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2005). In tuition cases, 
the debtor has the burden to prove necessity. See Watson v. Boyajian (In re Watson), 309 B.R. 652, 664 (B.A.P. 
1st Cir. 2004). 
142 Shaw v. U.S. Bankr. Adm'r, 310 B.R. 538,541 (M.D.N.C. 2004). 
143 Id. 
144 In re Hill, 328 B.R. 490,497 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005); In re Cohen, 246 B.R. 658,669 (Bankr. D. Colo. 
2000) (stating no HBO, HBO-2 allowed). 
145 Shaw, 310 B.R. at 541; In re Jones, 335 B.R. 203,210 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2005); In re Welch, 344 B.R. at 
55;Inre Music, 310B.R. 359,362 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2004);In re Mooney, 313 B.R. 709, 714-15 (Bankr.N.D. 
Ohio2004). 
146 In re Haddad, 246 B.R. 27, 35 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding education credentials of debtor did not 
justify maid service); In re Summer, 255 B.R. 555, 563 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2000). 
147 In re McReynolds, 253 B.R. 54, 63 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 2000); see also In re Heffernan, 242 B.R. 812,817 
(Bankr. D. Conn. 1999) (holding life insurance with cash value trade-in inappropriate for deduction from 
disposable income). 
148 In re Miller, 302 B.R. 495, 502 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2003) ("Thus, while paying off s~ch debt is certainly a 
moral obligation of the Debtors, it is not one that Section 707(b) recognizes."). 
149 In re Welch, 344 B.R. at 55. 
150 In re Shaw, 311 B.R. 180, 184 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2003), aff'd, 310 B.R. 538 (M.D.N.C. 2004) ("While 
supporting a daughter in college is an admirable goal, debtors propose to do so at the expense of their 
creditors."); In re Staub, 256 B.R. 567,571 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2000). 
151 In re Butler, 277 B.R. 917, 922 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2002). 
152 Nelson v. Siouxland Fed. Credit Union (In re Nelson), 223 B.R. 349,351 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 1998). 
153 In re Wood, 92 B.R. 264,266 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988). 
154 In re Engskow, 247 B.R. 314,317 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2000). 
155 In re Walsh, 287 B.R. 154, 157 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2002). 
156 In re Stout, 336 B.R. 138, 143 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2006). 
157 In re Rathbun, 309 B.R. 901, 904-07 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2004). 
158 See In re Lenartz, 263 B.R. 331,337 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2001). 
159 In re Miller, 335 B.R. 335, 344 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2005); In re Cohen, 246 B.R. 658, 669 (Bankr. D. Colo. 
2000) (allowing $100 monthly maximum for pet care). 
160 In re Hand, 323 B.R. 14, 19 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2005). 
161 In re Ontiveros, 198 B.R. 284, 291 (C.D. Ill. 1996). 
162 Kornfield v. Schwartz, 214 B.R. 705, 710-11 (W.D.N.Y. 1997). 
163 Contra In re Messenger, 178 B.R. 145, 147 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1995) (holding no substantial abuse where 
debtor and spouse budgeted $26.66 per month for food). For a taxonomy of cases on expenses such as food, 
clothing, housing, transportation, home maintenance, utilities, telephone, recreation, cable TV and laundry, see In 
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repay parents for a loan is not permitted. 164 One court dismissed debtors because they 
took "for granted a sizable home which they are able to maintain, r,eliable 
transportation, the ability to give substantial gifts and help their daughter through 
school, and health and dental care. Many chapter 13 debtors are not so fortunate and 
still manage to pay disposable income to their creditors." 165 
A debtor with low expenses because he lived with his parents was notoriously 
considered an abuser, where he did not anticipate a change of living situation.166 This 
condemned the debtor to his parent's basement for the duration of the chapter 13 plan, 
so that the creditors could reap the benefits of parental inconvenience. 167 Similarly, 
debtors with old cars which would soon need replacement were abusers if they spent 
money on new car debt, instead of paying creditors. 168 On the other hand, one court 
(from a tobacco state) found no bankruptcy abuse where the debtor spent $200 a month 
on cigarettes for himself and his children. 169 In this exercise, a court is authorized to 
use its own value judgment as to what expense is an extravagance. 170 Accordingly, it is 
very easy to find contradictions in the case law. According to one commentator: 
One court affirmed dismissal for substantial abuse partially because 
debtors spent more than $75 per month for clothes for a family of 
four. But another found that expenses of $200 per month for clothing 
for a family of four were reasonably necessary. One judge ruled that a 
couple should spend no money for recreation. But another decision by 
the very same bankruptcy court held that substantial abuse was not 
indicated where a couple spent $125 a month on recreation. In many 
cases, any amount of money spent on cable television is deemed 
excessive. A few courts, however, find money for cable television is 
reasonable. One court indicated that $50 per month would be a 
reasonable amount to spend to hire someone to clean the debtor's 
home, but another found substantial abuse where the debtor's family 
re Attanasio, 218 B.R. 180, 201--07 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1998). 
164 In re Praleikus, 248 B.R. 140, 142 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2000). 
165 In re Beckel, 268 B.R. 179, 184--85 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2001). 
166 See First USA v. Lamanna (In re Lamanna), 153 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1998); see also In re Matias, 203 B.R. 
490,492 n.1 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1996); In re Andrus, 94 B.R. 76, 77 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1988); In re Brady, 95 B.R. 
1004, 1004 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1987). 
167 Similarly, courts have found that any attempt of a debtor to improve his housing situation near the time of 
bankruptcy is an abuse. See In re Buntin, 161 B.R. 466, 468 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1993) ("I find that Chapter 7 
relief is not intended to allow debtors to 'upgrade their current low standard of housing,' at the expense of their 
creditors.") (citation omitted); In re Ploegert, 93 B.R. 641,643 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1988) (noting substantial abuse 
indicated where debtor moved into larger apartment after filing bankruptcy so that his expenses were increased 
each month by $300). 
168 In re Attanasio, 218 B.R. at 197 & n.17 (gathering cases describing new car debt as substantial abuse). 
169 Waites v. Braley, 110 B.R. 211, 216 (E.D. Va. 1990). Contra In re Buntin, 161 B.R. at 468 (holding 
substantial abuse where debtors would spend $262 each month on tobacco products for family of two). In 
comparison, under BAPCPA the presence of $160 per month in net income is per se evidence of bankruptcy 
abuse, if the debtor is above the median in income. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i)(Il) (2006). 
170 See Voelkel v. Naylor (In re Voelkel), 322 B.R. 138, 146 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005). 
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of five spent seventy-five dollars on household supplies each 
month. 171 
245 
Courts disagreed on 401 (k) contributions. Some courts insist on a complete ban on 
401(k) contributions. 172 Others suggest that contributions for a person near retirement 
or minimal contributions are acceptable. 173 Typically, BRISA contributions-even 
repayment of loans from the BRISA plan-have not been viewed as valid expenses, 174 
though contrary instances can be found. 175 Oddly, once wages hit the 40l(k) account, 
they cannot be reached by creditors. 176 Nevertheless, the intent to deposit funds in the 
401(k) plan has been held evidence of abuse, for purposes of section 707(b). 177 The 
heavy hand of the AARP, however, is readily visible throughout BAPCPA, so it is 
unclear whether this bias against pension contributions by insolvent consumers can be 
sustained. Nevertheless, as we shall see, BAPCPA invites dismissal on the "totality of 
the circumstances." 178 This invitation suggests that all of the case law of prior section 
707(b) is at the disposal of bankruptcy judges anxious to defeat a congressional intent 
to increase bankruptcy abuse. 179 
In individual cases, courts have considered the joint income of debtors and their 
non-debtor spouses in their search for surplus income. 180 This does not sit well with the 
171 Harriet Thomas Ivy, Note, Means Testing Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999: A Flawed Means to a 
Questionable End, 17 BANKR. DEV. J. 221, 241-42 (2000) (citations omitted). 
172 See In re Hand, 323 B.R. 14, 18 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2005); In re Leung, 311 B.R. 626,631 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 
2004). 
173 See In re Hill, 328 B.R. 490,499 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005); In re Drillman, No. 03-10814, 2004 Bankr. 
LEXIS 369, at *26 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2004) (holding continuing contribution to 401(k) reasonable 
because debtor was close to retirement age and facing decline in disposable income); In te King, 308 B.R. 522, 
532-33 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2004) (determining repayment reasonable because house needed repair and 401(k) 
account likely source of funds); see also New York City Employees' Ret. Sys. v. Sapir (In re Taylor), 243 F.3d 
124, 129 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding in chapter 13, 401(k) contributions not per se included in disposable income). 
174 See Hebbring v. U.S. Tr., 463 F.3d 902, 908 (9th Cir. 2006) (indicating, in pre-BAPCPA case, debtor could 
not deduct 401 (k) payments or repayments of loan from 401 (k) plan, based on totality of circumstances); Behlke 
v. Eisen (In re Behlke), 358 F.3d 429, 435-36 (6th Cir. 2004) (stating debtor's voluntary 401(k) contributions 
should be included in disposable income); In re Jones, 335 B.R. 203, 209 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2005); In re 
Fauntleroy, 311 B.R. 730, 737 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2004); In re Porter, No. 02-70904, 2002 Bankr. LEXIS 1025, at 
*3-4 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. May 28, 2002) (disallowing repayment ofloan); In re Mills, 246 B.R. 395, 402-03 (Bankr. 
S.D. Cal: 2000); In re Rubio, 249 B.R. 689,697 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2000). 
175 See In re Vansickel, 309 B.R. 189,210 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2004) (permitting loan repayments to be excluded 
from disposable income while mandating voluntary contributions to 40l(k) plan be included); In re Aiello, 284 
B.R. 756, 762, 765 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2002) (noting $300 monthly contribution would have been allowed but for 
debtor increasing pension contributions just before bankruptcy); In re Scobee, 269 B .R. 678, 681 (Bankr. W.D. 
Mo. 2001) (providing 3% contribution acceptable). 
176 See 11 U.S.C. § 541(c) (2006). 
177 Taylor v. United States (In re Taylor), 212 F.3d 395, 396-97 (8th Cir. 2000). 
178 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(3)(B) (2006). 
179 See infra Part III.C. 
180 See In re Keepper, 329 B.R. 693, 694 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2005); In re Bicsak, 207 B.R. 657, 658, 662 
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1997) (indicating child support received by debtor's partner from her ex-husband for support 
of two children had to be added to debtor's income); In re Stewart, 201 B.R. 996, 1007 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1996) 
("And he can afford to pay what he owes, to them and to all his other creditors-if not all at once, then certainly 
over time, within the near and foreseeable future, entirely from his own earnings if need be, but certainly with the 
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premise that non-debtor spouses are typically not liable for the debts of their life mates. 
Probably a better approach is for the courts to consider the extent to which the non-
debtor spouse's income actually covers the expense of the debtor. 181 
Apart from surplus income, assets could be considered. One court cited the 
possibility that valueless stock options and modest real estate equity might increase in 
the future as grounds to dismiss a case. 182 This, of course, overlooks the nature of 
valuation as a weighted average of upside and downside market changes. If a valuation 
is a true weighted average, there is no reason to believe that values will ever appreciate, 
when adjusted for inflation. 
Too much exempt property has been held an abuse. 183 This holding punishes a 
debtor for exercising a right expressly provided for in section 522(b) of the Bankruptcy 
Code. On the other hand, post-petition wages cannot be reached by creditors either, and 
section 707(b) is routinely used to force debtors to share this "exemption." It was no 
great stretch from here to insist that debtors also liquidate pre-petition exempt property. 
Indeed, section 707(b) could be viewed as the power of a bankruptcy court to extort 
help of his current wife, whose own considerable earnings can support them while Stewart pays his just debts."); 
In re Duncan, 201 B.R. 889, 895 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1996); In re Dempton, 182 B.R. 38, 40 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 
1995) (concluding $700 in child support received by non-debtor spouse had to be added to debtor's income); In 
re Wilkinson, 168 B.R. 626,628 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1994) ("This Court finds that Debtor has the ability to pay 
the debt to Fidelity Guaranteed Mortgage in twenty (20) months if her husband contributes to the payments."); In 
re Smith, 157 B.R. 348, 350-51 (Bankr. N.D, Ohio 1993); In re Bacco, 160 B.R. 283,286 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 
1993) (noting $880 in monthly worker's compensation received by debtor's unemployed, non-debtor spouse); In 
re Gyurci, 95 B.R. 639, 644 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1989); In re Bryant, 47 B.R. 21, 24 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1984). 
181 See In re Rysso, 321 B.R. 522,526 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2005); In re Falke, 284 B.R. 133, 139 (Bankr. D. Or. 
2002) (stating debtor could not allocate all expenses to self where spouse had income); In re Attanasio, 218 B.R. 
180, 234-35 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1998) (explaining non-debtor spouse's share should never exceed 50% ). But see 
In re Reeves, 327 B.R. 436,442,445 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2005) (rejecting this approach, but claiming it made no 
difference on facts of case). Judge Cohen raises a difficult ethical question: if a debtor with a working spouse is 
coerced into chapter 13, is not the spouse condemned to continuing her perhaps unpleasant job so that the 
debtor's spouse can-benefit? In re Attanasio, 218 B.R. at 198. 
182 Behlke v. Eisen (In re Behlke), 358 F.3d 429, 436 (6th Cir. 2004). 
183 Accord Kornfield v. Schwartz, 214 B.R. 705, 712 (W.D.N.Y. 1997), ajfd, 164 F.3d 778 (2d Cir. 1999) 
(acknowledging debtors had $390,000 in retirement funds); In re Heller, 160 B.R. 655, 656 (D. Kan. 1993) 
(considering exempt property valued at $8,573, including $6,323 accumulated in pension plan); In re Snyder, 
332 B.R. 641, 644 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2005) (discussing exempt house); In re Mitman, No. 00-12995, 2001 
Bankr. LEXIS 865, at *6 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio Feb. 28, 2001) (deciding ERISA account too large);In re Dorwarth, 
258 B.R. 293,294,296 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2001) (reporting $279,000 in retirement account while total debts were 
only $66,000); In re Carlton, 211 B.R. 468, 478-80 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1997), ajfd, 214 B.R. 705 (W.D.N.Y. 
1997), ajf d, 164 F.3d 778 (2d Cir. 1999) (observing debtors had $10,000 in retirement funds); In re Duncan, 201 
B.R. at 897-98 (remarking debtor had between $25,000 and $131,000 in exempt equity in residence owned by 
him and his non-debtor spouse); In re Fitzgerald, 155 B.R. 711, 712 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1993) (recognizing 
debtor accumulated over $30,000 in retirement funds); In re Wray, 136 B.R. 122, 125 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1992) 
(providing debtors "claimed as exempt virtually all of their assets which could be liquidated to make at least 
partial distribution to those creditors"); In re Stratton, 136 B.R. 804, 805-06 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1991) 
(contemplating $28,000 in retirement account); In re Palmer, 117 B.R. 443, 445-(Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1990) 
(realizing homestead valued at $58,000, retirement account of$19,000, and only $35,018 in unsecured debts); In 
re Higginbotham, 111 B.R. 955, 965 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1990) (assessing exempt "superfluous vehicles and 
expensive toys"); In re Helmick, 117 B.R. 187, 190-91 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990)(evaluating exempt Kawasaki Jet 
Ski); In re Gyurci, 95 B.R. at 640 (noting $57,000 of equity in homestead); In re Bryant, 47 B.R. at 24 (finding 
exempt equity in home that could have been used to pay creditors). 
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anything whatsoever from debtors as the price of admission to chapter 7. 
Bad deeds separate and apart from surplus income have warranted dismissal. 
Hiding assets and desiring to prevent an ex-wife from recovering justified a 
dismissal.184 So did pre-petition credit card bingeing, 185 incurring debt that could never 
be repaid, 186 inaccurate reporting, 187 using non-exempt assets to buy exempt assets, 188 
refusing to sell an engagement ring, 189 living beyond one's means via credit cards, 190 
amending Schedule J to show increased expenses, 191 the "brazen" purchase of two new 
184 Kesten v. Kestell (In re Kestell), 99 F.3d 146, 147 (4th Cir. 1996); In re Traub, 140 B.R. 286,291 (Bankr. 
D.N.M. 1992); In re Palmer, 117 B.R. at 448; In re Shands, 63 B.R. 121, 124 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985). Judge 
Cohen protests such cast>:s on the ground that the ex-spouse's claims are non-dischargeable under sections 
523(a)(5) and (15). In re Attanasio, 218 B.R. at 223. Why, then, deprive the debtor of a discharge of other 
creditors? 
185 Wilson v. U.S. Tr. (In re Wilson), 125 B.R. 742, 743 (W.D. Mich. 1990); In re Uddin, 196 B.R. 19, 21 
(Bankr. S.D .N. Y. 1996) ( demonstrating debtor had $170,418 in consumer debts, misrepresented his income on 
unsolicited credit card applications during unemployment, then purchased $60,000 in jewelry, clothes, airline 
tickets, toys, radios, televisions, perfume and cosmetics, and $60,000 on gambling trips to Atlantic City); In re 
Bacco, 160 B.R. at 288 (indicating during three years preceding bankruptcy, debtor bought $95,000 in guns 
which he contends were stolen just before bankruptcy); In re Andrus, 94 B.R. 76, 77 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1988) 
(noting eleven televisions, eight VCR's, and one stereo given away as gifts); In re Newsom, 69 B.R. 801, 805 
(Bankr. D.N.D. 1987) (discussing "consumer spending spree"). 
186 In re Braithwaite, 192 B.R. 882,884 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1996); In re Gavita, 177 B.R. 43, 47 (Bankr. W.D. 
Pa. 1994) (acknowledging.debtors knew "when the debts were incurred that they could not or would not pay 
them or they chose to ignore the obvious"); In re Bacco, 160 B.R. at 288-89; In re Nolan, 140 B.R. 797, 803 
(Bankr. D. Col. 1992) (reporting debtor continued to incur consumer debt after suffering $50,000 judgment 
against him); In re Gyurci, 95 B .R. at 644 ( explaining debtor showed "complete disregard for an eventual ability 
to repay"); In re Peluso, 72 B.R. 732, 738 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1987) (indicating debtor "voluntarily incurred 
consumer debts beyond his ability to pay them"). A notable case is In re Wolniewicz, 224 B .R. 302,303 (Bankr. 
W.D.N.Y. 1998) (noting debtors' annual interest on debt to fifty-nine credit card companies exceeded their 
annual income). 
Against this criterion, Judge Cohen points out that such debts were incurred under false pretences and therefore 
are not dischargeable under section 523(a)(2). In re Attanasio, 218 B.R. at 218-19. In light of this, there is no 
reason also to dismiss the chapter 7 case in order to defeat the discharge. Judge Cohen remarks: 
If there was no intent to repay, upon proof of those facts, the debtor may not receive a 
discharge of those debts. But if no non-dischargeability complaint is filed, then why should 
a court presume that there was fraud and consequently abuse? Dismissal of a debtor's case 
under 707(b) then for the reason that the debtor has incurred debts without the ability to 
repay them becomes a de facto 523(a)(2)(A) judgment without evidence of actual fraud or 
intent or the usual due process safeguards attendant to an adversary proceeding. 
Id. at 219 n.56. 
187 U.S. Tr. v. Harrelson, 323 B.R. 176, 179 (W.D. Va. 2005) (holding debtors' schedules and statement of 
income did not reasonably and accurately reflect true financial position); In re Meyn, 330 B.R. 286,291 (Bankr. 
M.D. Fla. 2005) (inferring debtor's failure to accurately report true financial condition was not inadvertent); In re 
Luikart, 319 B.R. 1, 4 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2003). For a BAPCPA case, see generally Haney v. Clippard, No. 
4:06CV-150, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17295, at *1 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 9, 2007). 
188 In re Lenartz, 263 B.R. 331,340 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2001). 
189 In re Gotham, 327 B.R. 65, 77 n.12 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2005) (noting sale would have funded 2% repayment 
of unsecured debt). 
190 In re Uddin, 196 B.R. at 21. 
191 In re Pier, 310 B.R. 347,351 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2004). 
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automobiles on the eve of bankruptcy, 192 arranging a nonrecoverable preference for a 
relative, 193 leaving select creditors off the schedule in order to prefer them with post-
petition wages after the discharge, 194 enrolling in college courses solely to defer the day 
on which student loan payments must be made, 195 and failing to negotiate debts down 
before filing for bankruptcy. 196 One early court said that section 707(b) "does not give 
a license to the court to adopt an ad hoc, free-wheeling approach to sift out debtors the 
court finds distasteful." 197 But subsequent developments proved that this was precisely 
what section 707(b) would become. 
D. Pro-Debtor Presumption 
Former section 707(b) provided, "There shall be a presumption in favor of granting 
the relief requested by the debtor." 198 BAPCPA has eliminated these words. A leading 
case importuned bankruptcy courts to pay attention to it.199 Indeed, where the debtor 
survives dismissal, it is usually mentioned.200 Nevertheless, one gets the impression 
from pre-2005 case law that courts were quick to dismiss cases if surplus net income 
was discovered, notwithstanding this preemption.201 Nevertheless, at least one appellate 
panel has reversed a sua sponte dismissal where the court did not expressly address this 
192 In re McLaughlin, 30513.R. 505,509 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2004); see also In re Logan, No. 02-39177-SAF-7, 
2003 Bankr. LEXIS 600, at *15 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. June 17, 2003) (noting truck was purchased with funds that 
could have gone to creditors); In re Rodriguez, 228 B.R. 601, 604-05 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1999) (indicating debt 
incurred by purchase of new truck could have gone to creditors). 
193 In re Evans, 334 B.R. 148, 152 (Bankr. D. Md. 2004). 
194 In re Attanasio, 218 B.R. 180, 223-24 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1998); In re Gavita, 177 B.R. 43, 48 (Bankr. W.D. 
Pa. 1994) (demonstrating debtors did not list one credit card on their schedules so that they could keep the 
account open and continue to use it); In re Bryant, 47 B.R. 21, 23-24 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1984) (finding seven or 
eight credit cards omitted for the apparent purpose of continuing to incur consumer credit following bankruptcy). 
195 In re Lenartz, 263 B.R. 331,339 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2001). 
196 In re Fitzgerald, 155 B.R. 711, 716-17 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1993) (stating "evidence that chapter 7 was the 
debtor's first solution to their financial problems coupled with evidence that other solutions were available but 
not tried ... , " debtors had not "exhausted all the available routes for repaying their debts"); In re Veenhuis, 143 
B.R. 887, 889 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1992) (noting no sincere effort to repay his debt). But see In re McCormack, 159 
B.R. 491, 495-96 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1993) (acknowledging substantial abuse even though credit counselor told 
them their debts were too large to be adjusted through negotiations with creditors and debtors presented 
documented evidence that they had attempted to negotiate with creditors prior to filing bankruptcy); cf In re 
Attanasio, 218 B.R. at 226 (remarking failure to negotiate should not be a factor justifying dismissal). 
197 In re Edwards, 50 B.R. 933,937 n.3 (Bankr. S.D.NY. 1985). 
198 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2000). 
199 See Green v. Staples (In re Green), 934 F.2d 568, 572 (4th Cir. 1991) (pointing out, pre-BAPCPA, the 
statutory presumption in favor of granting discharge). 
200 See McDow v. Fenster, No. 7-05-CV-00592, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10707, at *5 (W.D. Va. Mar. 17, 
2006); In re Ray, 325 B.R. 193, 196 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2005) (noting former section 707(b) placed burden of 
proof on trustee to show substantial abuse); In re Gotham, 327 B.R. 65, 68-69 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2005) 
(discussing application of former section 707(b) in instant case); In re Boyer, 321 B.R. 457, 460-61 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ohio 2004); In re Vansickel, 309 B.R. 189, 213 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2004); In re Marcoux, 301 B.R. 381, 384 
(Bankr. D. Conn. 2003). 
201 See In re Walton, 866 F.2d 981,987 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding words meant nothing if surplus post-petition 
income existed). 
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presumption.202 
BAPCPA repeals this presumption. The words of Judge Benjamin Cohen in In re 
Attanasio203 thereby become ironic: 
This Court does not believe that Congress intended for 707(b) to be 
invoked, if doing so would reduce a low or middle income debtor to 
living on the kind of harsh budget that might be required for 
confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan, thereby depriving that debtor of 
the "clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and 
discouragement of pre-existing debt" envisioned by Justice Sutherland 
in Local Loan. [2041 Had Congress intended to disregard that 
pronouncement, it would have done so and would not have included 
the very specific language of the last sentence of 707(b), which 
requires the court to presume favorably, not that the debtor cannot pay 
debts, and not that the debtor is entitled to a Chapter 7 discharge of all 
debts, but that the debtor is entitled to be in Chapter 7, as opposed to 
Chapter 13. That presumption, along with the historic purpose of 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy, as described in Local Loan, mandates that the 
disposable income threshold of 707(b) be more generous than the 
disposable income threshold of 1325(b) and that a case be dismissed 
from Chapter 7 only if the debtor will have a "clear field for future 
effort" even if the debtor is not granted a Chapter 7 discharge. The 
proper question to ask under 707(b) therefore should be, can the 
debtor fund a Chapter 13 plan and still have a clear field of effort, not 
whether the debtor can fund a Chapter 13 plan. 205 
Now that Congress has taken up Judge Cohen's invitation, it is time to recognize that 
the myth of Local Loan has been laid to rest. 
E. Charitable Contributions 
Whatever bankruptcy abuse was prior to 2005, the all-powerful televangelist 
movement persuaded Congress in 1998 to append this clause to section 707(b): 
In making a determination whether to dismiss a case under this 
section, the court may not take into consideration whether a debtor has 
made, or continues to make, charitable contributions (that meet the 
definition of "charitable contribution" under section 548(d)(3)) to any 
202 Voelkel v. Naylor (In re Voelkel), 322 B.R. 138, 149 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005) ("[T]he court's discretion is 
bounded by the [section 707(b)] presumption, which must be applied expressly.") .. 
203 218 B.R. 180 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1998). 
204 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934). 
205 In re Attanasio, 218 B.R. at 195-96. 
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qualified religious or charitable entity or organization (as that term is 
defined in section 548(d)(4)).206 
Section 548(d)(3) defines "charitable contribution" to mean whatever it means under 
section 17O(c) of the Internal Revenue Code.207 The Internal Revenue Code in tum 
defines "charitable contribution" to mean a gift to a United States governmental entity 
for exclusively public purposes208 or a gift to any corporation, trust, community chest, 
fund, or foundation organized under United States or local law and operated 
"exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes or to 
foster national or international amateur sports competition ... or for the prevention of 
cruelty to children or animals .... 11209 
This provision has not been amended and perhaps provides a loophole in means 
testing, to which we will soon tum. Harder it may be for a camel to pass through the 
eye of a needle than for a rich man goes to heaven, but it is positively easy for a 
bankrupt prankster to defeat means testing by upping his monthly contribution to the 
televangelist du jour. It is a bankruptcy abuse for a debtor to support his aging 
mother210 but debtors are invited to overlard the fat-already wallet of Jerry Falwell with 
fraudulent conveyances. 211 
This last observation must be tempered with the observation that section 7O7(b) 
protects a debtor for contributions he has made or continues to make. New 
contributions proposed going forward can apparently be considered an abuse.212 The 
debtor will have to establish a history of contributions before taking shelter under this 
clause. 
III. MEANS TESTING AND BAPCPA 
BAPCPA does not expressly make high income debtors ineligible for chapter 7 
liquidation. Chapter 7 eligibility as such is governed section 109(b) of the Bankruptcy 
Code, which BAPCPA leaves unchanged, insofar as individuals are concemed.213 
206 Religious Liberty and Charitable Donation Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-183, § 4(b), 112 Stat. 
517,518 (codified as amended in 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2000)). 
207 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(3) (2006). 
208 I.R.C. § 170(c)(l) (West Supp. 2006). 
209 Id. § 501(c)(3). 
210 See U.S. Tr. v. Miller (In re Miller), 302 B.R. 495, 502 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2003) ("Thus, while paying off 
such debt is certainly a moral obligation of the Debtors, it is not one that Section 707(b) recognizes."). 
211 For a defense of the televangelists, see Todd J. Zywicki, Rewrite the Bankruptcy Laws, Not the Scriptures: 
Protecting a Bankruptcy Debtor's Right to Tithe, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 1223, 1247. Oddly, Professor Zywicki is a 
great proponent of means testing when religion is not involved. See Judge Edith H. Jones & Todd J. Zywicki, It's 
Time For Means Testing, 1999 BYU L. REV. 177, 183. 
212 See In re Hill, 328 B.R. 490,499 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005) (holding payments to retirement account in post-
petition bankruptcy indicates substantial abuse pursuant to section 707(b) of Bankruptcy-Code); In re Smihula, 
234 B.R. 240, 242-43 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1999) (asserting post-petition charitable contributions may be considered 
abuse under section 707(b) of Bankruptcy Code). 
213 Of course, section 109(h) adds the irksome credit counseling requirement, but this is an eligibility matter for 
chapter 7 and chapter 13 cases alike. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(l) (2006) (requiring debtors to obtain credit 
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Nothing bars the bankruptcy petition by an above-median debtor. 
What section 707(b) did, prior to 2005, and what it still does, is to provide the 
vehicle for dismissing validly commenced chapter 7 cases for abuse. BAPCP A does, 
however, make various, mostly procedural, changes in the law. It is, of course, my 
thesis that the substantive effect of means testing is either nil or supportive of increased 
abuse by high income debtors. 
A. Standing 
Before 2005, only the United States trustee or the courtsua sponte could dismiss a 
consumer chapter 7 case. BAPCPA's new version of section 707(b)(l) has opened 
standing to any party in interest.214 But new subparagraphs (6) and (7) proceed to 
restrict and perhaps eliminate standing in certain cases involving below-median 
debtors.215 So universal standing exists only in the case of an above-median debtor. 
Before we examine the means test per se, it will serve us well to consider the standing 
question in below-median cases. The rules pertaining to these cases have already 
proved perplexing. 
1. United States Trustees 
According to section 707(b)(6), only a judge,216 the United States trustee or 
bankruptcy administrator217 may move to dismiss if the debtor's current monthly 
counseling 180 days prior to filing bankruptcy petition). 
214 Id. § 707(b)(l) ("After notice and a hearing, the court, on its own motion or on a motion by the United 
States trustee, trustee (or bankruptcy administrator, if any), or any party in interest .... "). 
215 See id. § 707(b)(6)-(b)(7) (limiting ability to dismiss case under section 707(b) to judge or United States 
trustee when debtor's monthly income is below median income of applicable state). 
216 One court notes that judges do not file motions with themselves. Judges don't file motions. See In re Paret, 
347 B.R. 12, 14 n.4 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006). Rather, they issue orders to show cause why a sua sponte order 
should not be issued. See, e.g., Scott v. U.S. Tr. (In re Doser), 412 F.3d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004) (discussing 
issuance of sua sponte order to show cause why debtor should not be found in violation of section 110 of 
Bankruptcy Code). 
217 Prior to BAPCP A, bankruptcy administrators appeared in the codified version of the Bankruptcy Code only 
once-in former.section 1112(b ). See 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) (2000). Thanks to BAPCPA, references to bankruptcy 
administrators abound. See generally BAPCPA, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.). Bankruptcy administrators exist only in North Carolina and Alabama, pending 
the decision of the judges of those districts to participate in the United States Trusteeship program. See 
Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, § 
302(d)(3), 100 Stat. 3088, 3119-23. The existence of bankruptcy administrators was to terminate on October 1, 
1992, but Congress extended this deadline first to October 1, 2002. See Federal Courts Study Committee 
Implementation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 317(a)(l), 104 Stat. 5104, 5115. In 2000, the deadline was 
entirely omitted. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-518, § 501(1), 114 Stat. 2410, 
2421-22. As a result, bankruptcy administrators still roam the hills of North Carolina and Alabama. See FED. R. 
BANKR. P. 9035. Oddly, BAPCPA eliminates bankruptcy administrators from section l 112(b) but freely alludes 
to them in numerous bankruptcy provisions. Meanwhile, an uncodified statute provides, "A bankruptcy 
administrator may raise and appear and be heard on any issue in any case under title 11, United States Code, but 
may not file a plan pursuant to section 1121(c) of such title." See Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and 
Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act § 317 ( a)( 1 ), 104 Stat. at 5115-16. This uncodified law closely resembles section 
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income (times twelve) is below the relevant median family income of the state. This is 
a continuation of old section 707(b)'s standing rule, which was (after 1984) limited to 
sua sponte court action and (after 1986)218 motions by the United States trustee for 
consumer bankruptcy abuse.219 
With regard to the United States trustee or bankruptcy administrator, BAPCPA 
requires their prompt attendance to section 707(b) motions. According to section 
704(b )(1 )(A), these officials, within ten days of the first creditors' meeting, must file a 
report on whether the debtor's bankruptcy petition constitutes an abuse. The 
bankruptcy court must then send this report to all of the creditors.220 In addition, the 
United States trustee must, within thirty days after filing the above statement, either 
move to dismiss a case involving an above-median debtor or explain why this is not 
being done.221 
As to these new burdens, anyone reading the advance sheets will have noticed the 
extreme increase of section 707(b) cases after 2001. It has been suggested that this 
increase stemmed from the Justice Department's frustration with Congress's inability to 
pass a bankruptcy reform act during the early years of the decade and the affirmative 
decision to use existing section 707(b) to police the bankruptcy courts.222 New section 
704(b)(l) can therefore be read to commit future Justice Departments to this policy of 
increased vigilance. 
307 of the Code, pertaining to the power of United States trustees. See 11 U.S.C. § 307 (2006). 
In St. Angelo v. Victoria Farms, Inc., 38 F.3d 1525, 1528 (9th Cir. 1994), the United States trustee sought a fee 
in a chapter 11 case. The debtor resisted on the grounds that the United States Trusteeship is unconstitutional, 
since this institution does not exist in Alabama and North Carolina. The United States Constitution, it seems, 
requires a uniform national bankruptcy law. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. The Ninth Circuit permitted the fee but took 
the trouble to advise those two states that their bankruptcy administrator program was unconstitutional. St. 
Angelo, 38 F.3d at 1531-32. Congress, however, has chosen to ignore the studied advice of the Ninth Circuit and 
has perpetuated this unconstitutional regime. See Dan J. Shulman, The Constitution, Interest Groups, and the 
Requirements of Uniformity: The United States Trustee and the Bankruptcy Administrator Programs, 74 NEB. L. 
REV . .91, 127-28 (1995). 
218 Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act§ 219(b ), 100 Stat. at 3100-
01. 
219 BAPCPA also requires the United States trustee or bankruptcy administrator to review the debtor's 
submissions and file a statement with the court as to whether the debtor is a presumed abuser. 11 U.S.C. § 
704(b )(l)(A) (2006). The court must send this report to all creditors within five days of receiving the report. Id. § 
704(b)(l)(B). There follows a very dense provision in section 704(b)(2), which I read as requiring the trustee to 
do nothing if her report of section 704(b )(1 )(A) reveals the debtor to be a non-abuser. See id. § 704(b )(2). If, 
however, the debtor is an abuser, the trustee must, within thirty days following her report, either "file a motion to 
dismiss or convert under section 707(b) or file a statement setting forth the reasons ... [the] motion is 
inappropriate." Id. Oddly, the statement is required only if the trustee determines the debtor is an above-median 
debtor. Id. § 704(b)(2)(A)-(B). Apparently, if the debtor is an abuser but below the median, the United States 
trustee has discretion not to file a motion or a report. 
220 11 U.S.C. § 704(b)(l)(B) (2006). 
221 See In re Close, 353 B.R. 915,918 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2006) (dismissing United States trustee's motion where 
trustee filed within ten days of a rescheduled creditors' meeting). 
222 See Bradley R. Tamm, Substantial Abuse Dismissal under 11 U.S. C.A. § 707(b ): Evolution or Malignancy, 
13 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 47, 50 (2004). In 2002, the United States trustee's office filed 2,750 substantial abuse 
motions, about half of which were granted. Id. at 55; cf ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. CTS., PERSONAL 
BANKRUPTCY FILINGS CONTINUE To RISE IN FISCAL YEAR 2003, at 1 (2003), available at 
http://www.txnb.uscourts.gov/release/FY03BK.pdf (asserting 1,547,669 bankruptcies filed in 2002). 
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2. Partial Immunity 
Section 707 (b )( 6) provides consumer debtors with a partial immunity in the sense 
that it bars parties in interest (other than the judge or the United States trustee) from 
moving to dismiss. 223 The immunity applies to any "motion under section 707(b)." 
Certain crime victims, however, may still move to dismiss a chapter 7 case under 
section 707(c).224 
In joint cases, the income of both spouses taken together must fall below the 
median to justify partial immunity. But even where one spouse is bankrupt and the 
other not, the impact of the non-debtor's income, as we shall see, influences the 
determination of the debtor's current monthly income.225 
3. Total Immunity 
BAPCP A provides an even more stringent standing rule if the current monthly 
income ( times twelve) of the debtor and her spouse is below the median. In such cases, 
" [ n ]o judge, United States trustee ( or bankruptcy administrator, ifany ), trustee, or other 
party in interest" may move to dismiss.226 But this near-totaI227 immunity rule applies 
only to a motion under section 707(b)(2). 
This cross-reference is the central mystery of BAPCPA means testing. Section 
707(b )(2) describes the presumption of bad faith for debtors with too much surplus net 
income. In fact, motions to dismiss are filed under section 707(b)(l), not section 
707(b)(2). What is this cross-reference struggling to say? 
One possibility is that the cross-reference is a mistake. The reference should have 
been to section 707(b)(l). If this is true, then consumer debtors who qualify for section 
707 (b )(7) total immunity indeed are per se eligible for chapter 7, provided they do the 
paperwork required by sections 521 and 707(a). 
A second possibility is that the cross-reference is an unartful way of saying that 
qualifying below-median debtors are not subject to the means test of section 707(b )(2). 
Thus, Form B22A excuses debtors from filling out the expense portion of the form if 
223 Two usually astute commentators write as if the means test applies only to above-median debtors. See 
Culhane & White, Catching Can-Pay Debtors, supra note 25, at 672 ("Only the small group of above-median 
debtors must proceed to the more detailed parts of the means test, computation of allowed deductions and then 
comparison of remaining income to the abuse threshold, to see if the presumption of abuse arises."). But this is 
definitely not so for those debtors who qualify for the partial immunity but not for the total immunity; the United 
States trustee can and even must move to dismiss. 
224 See infra note 227 & Part III.A.5. 
225 See infra Part III.A.6.a. 
226 11 U.S.C. § 707(b )(7)(A) (2006) This strange rule requires the aggregation of the "current monthly income 
of the debtor, including a veteran ... and the debtor's spouse .... " Id. It is highly unclear what this phrase 
"including a veteran" is supposed to mean. 
227 Once again, crime victims can move to dismiss under section 707(c). Id.§ 707(c). With this in mind,! shall 
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debtors qualify for the (b)(7) immunity.228 Nevertheless, the United States trustee, 
bankruptcy administrator or the court sua sponte can move to dismiss. In this regard, as 
we shall see, a suggestive new subparagraph invites the court to dismiss cases for all 
the reasons cases were dismissed prior to 2005. According to section 7O7(b)(3): 
In considering under paragraph (1) whether the granting of relief 
would be an abuse of the provisions of this chapter in a case in which 
the presumption in subparagraph (A)(i) does not ariser2291 or is 
rebutted, the court shall consider-
(A) whether the debtor filed the petition in bad faith; or 
(B) the totality of the circumstances (including whether 
the debtor seeks to reject a personal services contract and 
the financial need for such rejection as sought by the debtor) 
of the debtor's financial situation demonstrates abuse.230 
Putting section 7O7(b)(3) together with the reference to subparagraph (2) in the total 
immunity section of section 7O7(b )(7), one interpretation of total immunity is that the 
United States trustee can bring a motion under section 7O7(b)(l) against (b)(7) debtors, 
but it cannot cite the presumption of subparagraph (2)'s means test in pursuit of this 
goal.231 
So what grounds can be cited? First, section 7O7(b )(3)(A) mentions "whether the 
debtor filed the petition in bad faith."232 We have seen that, prior to 2005, courts 
dismissed consumer cases where commencement was considered revenge against a 
particular creditor, especially an ex-spouse.233 Section 7O7(b)(3)(A) guarantees that 
those authorities remain good law. 
More interestingly, the motion is invited to address whether "the totality of the 
circumstances ... of the debtor's financial situation demonstrates abuse. "234 This 
phraseology seems directly borrowed from Green v. Staples (In re Green),235 which 
held that the presence of surplus net income was not enough to justify dismissal. 
Rather, the standard required the addition of some bad fact related to ( 1) the debtor's 
health, (2) the debtor's pre-petition conduct in borrowing and spending on luxury 
items, (3) the excessiveness of the debtor's family budget, (4) the accuracy of net 
income, and ( 5) the good faith of the debtor in filing for bankruptcy in the first place. 
This raises the issue of whether a debtor qualified for total immunity under section 
228 Form B22A, supra note 32, Line 13. 
229 This is another mis-reference. There is no subparagraph (a)(i) to "such paragraph"-i.e., paragraph (1). 
Presumably Congress meant to refer subparagraph (a)(i) to paragraph (2). For literalists, no harm is done, since 
the nonexistent presumption of subparagraph (l)(A)(i) never arises, as it does not exist. The statute works 
perfectly well with the bad cross-reference. 
230 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(3) (2006). 
231 See In re Singletary, 354 B.R. 455,460 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006). 
~~~ 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(3)(A) (2006). 
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707(b)(7) can be booted from chapter 7 (plus a bad fact per the Green test) for having 
surplus income which could fund a chapter 13 plan. Keep in mind, however, that the 
premise, for the moment, is that the reference in section 707(b )(7) to subparagraph (2) 
does not disempower the United States trustee entirely, but simply repeals the 
presumption of abuse that subparagraph (2) imposes. On this assumption, the trustee is 
not entitled to rely on this presumption. ~ 
To be concrete, we will discover that any debtor with $160 in net monthly income 
is per se an abuser of chapter 7. Any debtor with net income below $100 per month 
passes the means test.236 Suppose a debtor who qualifies for total immunity has $99 in 
net monthly income according to the official means test, but, according to Schedules I 
and J, actually has a greater net income. Has this debtor abused the Bankruptcy Code 
by filing in chapter 7? 
Surely, under our premise that the cross-reference in section 707(b)(7) to 
subparagraph (2) means something, a United States trustee cannot refer to the 
presumption of abuse. But "totality of the circumstances" used to mean surplus income 
plus a bad fact. Accordingly, what "totality of the circumstances" means is that the 
United States trustee can still boot the qualifying debtor for surplus income; it's just 
that there is no presumption and also some additional bad fact must be shown. 
Alternatively, it could mean that, in the totality of the circumstances, net income 
cannot be considered at all. This would accord with what President Bush declared 
when he signed this provision into law: 
In recent years, too many people have abused the bankruptcy laws. 
They've walked away from debts even when they had the ability to 
repay them. This has made credit less affordable and less accessible, 
especially for low-income workers who already face financial 
obstacles. 
The bill I sign today helps address this problem. Under the new law, 
Americans who have the ability to pay will be required to pay back at 
least a portion of their debts. Those who fall behind their state's 
median income will not be required to pay back their debts. This 
practical reform will help ensure that debtors make a good-faith effort 
to repay as much as they can afford.237 
At this early stage, a few courts have taken the position that total immunity under 
section 707(b )(7) means no immunity at all.238 That is, a United States trustee can move 
to dismiss a qualifying debtor with any sort of net income. The trustee may want the 
236 See infra text accompanying notes 315-17. 
237 Press Release, White House Press Office, President Signs Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention, Consumer 
Protection Act (Apr. 20, 2005), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/04/20050420-5.html (emphasis 
added) [hereinafter Press Release, President Signs BAPCPA]. 
238 See In re Richie, 353 B.R. 569, 574-81 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2006); see also In re Pak, 343 B.R. 239, 246 
(Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2006); In re Paret, 347 B.R. 12, 16 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006); In re Pennington, 348 B.R. 647, 
649-50 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006). 
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aid of the mandatory presumption of subparagraph (2), but the court still has discretion 
to dismiss for net income alone. On this view, the import of means testing is to make 
dismissal mandatory where there is no total immunity and the debtor flunks the 
BAPCPA means test. Beyond this, the court has discretion to boot any debtor it 
perceives to be a bankruptcy abuser. 
To summarize, the total immunity provision, section 707(b )(7), has an ambiguous 
cross-reference to section 707(b)(2). Courts will have to choose between one of the 
following interpretations of this total immunity: 
(a) The cross-reference was a scrivener's error. It should have been a 
reference to (b)(l). Qualifying debtors can never be booted from 
chapter 7 under section 707(b). Any dismissal would have to be 
justified under section 707(a) (where high living and ability to pay 
cannot be considered, according to some courts),239 or section 707(c) 
(which pertains only to crime victims).240 
(b) The cross-reference means that a United States trustee can still 
move to dismiss a qualifying debtor, in spite of section 707(b )(7), but 
the trustee will have to show either bad faith in the commencement of 
the case or abuse under the totality of the circumstances, which is 
defined as surplus net income plus some other bad fact. 
4. The Qualifications for Partial and Total Immunity 
Partial immunity under section 707(b )(6) means that only the United States trustee, 
bankruptcy administrator or the court sua sponte can bring a motion to dismiss under 
section 707(b). Total immunity may mean nothing or it may indeed be a near-total 
immunity, depending on the meaning of the cross-reference in section 707(b)(7). 
Assuming that total immunity means something, there is a different qualification 
for partial as opposed to total immunity. In the case of partial immunity, the debtor 
must show that her own current monthly income (times 12) is below the yearly median 
for the state. Or, in a joint case, 241 the married couple must show that their joint income 
is below the median. So where a debtor's non-debtor spouse has a high income but the 
debtor is below the median, the debtor qualifies for partial immunity but not total 
immunity. 
To warrant total immunity (whatever that may mean) a debtor will have to show 
that "current monthly income of the debtor, including a veteran (as that term is defined 
in section 101 of title 38), and a debtor's spouse combined"242 (times twelve) is less 
239 See supra text accompanying notes 97-100. 
240 See infra text accompanying notes Part III.A.5. 
241 Section 302(a) permits a voluntary petition by an individual debtor and spouse. 11 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2006). 
242 Id. § 707 (b )(7)(A). The reference to veterans is a complete mystery. Would any court have ruled against the 
total immunity because the debtor is a veteran? 
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than the median. The difference in these standards raises some interpretive questions. 
Can an unmarried individual ever qualify for total immunity? One could, I 
suppose, argue that section 707(b )(7)(A) requires that there be a spouse. But this seems 
unreasonable. If there is no spouse, then the spouse and her income should count as a 
zero. So any unmarried debtor qualifying for section 707(b )(6)'s partial immunity also 
automatically qualifies for total immunity under section 707(b)(7). 
But if this is so, Congress has created yet another marriage tax. If a single person 
lives in sin with a high income non-debtor lover, whether gay or straight, that person is 
able to qualify for the total immunity. Wedding bells, however, would constitute a 
bankruptcy abuse, for which the debtor is booted from chapter 7. 
BAPCPA also promotes legal separation and the breakup families. Congress has 
provided that, for debtors trying for the full immunity, "current monthly income of the 
debtor's spouse shall not be considered" if the couple is legally separated or living 
apart "other than for the purpose of evading subparagraph (A). "243 
"[S]eparated under applicable nonbankruptcy law" implies a judicial declaration 
that a married couple is separated. 244 There is no requirement that separated married 
couples live apart. So it is open for a strategic debtor to obtain legal separation, live 
with his spouse and apply for the total immunity. Since those merely living apart must 
not be doing so "for the purpose of evading subparagraph (A), "245 the implication is 
that married couples can legally separate and live together (or apart) for the sole 
purpose of gaming the system. Of course, this judgment assumes that the total 
immunity means something, rather than nothing. 
Where the debtor is not legally separated but is living apart from the spouse, the 
debtor must swear under penalty of perjury that the debtor is separated or living apart 
for purposes other than evading subparagraph (A).246 In addition, the debtor must give 
the "best estimate of the aggregate [ ] amount of cash or money payments received 
from the debtor's spouse attributed to the debtor's current monthly income. "247 This is 
included, in any case, as part of the definition of current monthly income. According to 
section lOl(lOA)(B), income "includes any amount paid by any entity other than the 
debtor . . . . "248 BAPCP A therefore discourages marriage and encourages married 
couples to separate or live apart. 
In joint cases, the two debtor spouses are expressly given partial immunity under 
section 707(b)(6)-only the judge or the United States trustee or bankruptcy 
administrator may initiate a motion under section 707(b). To qualify they must together 
be below the median. But if they qualify for the partial immunity, do they not also 
automatically qualify for the total immunity? While section 707 (b )(6) mentions joint 
cases, section 707(b)(7) does not. It refers only to the debtor and the debtor's spouse. 
Nevertheless, in a joint case, if both together are under the median, each spouse 
243 Id. § 707(b)(7)(B)(i)(I)-(b)(7)(B)(i)(II). 
244 See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW§ 200 (McKinney 2003) (listing grounds for separation). 
245 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(7)(B)(i)(II) (2006). 
246 Id. 
247 Id. § 707(b)(7)(B)(ii)(II). 
248 Id. § 101(10A)(B). 
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presumably can individually claim the total immunity, which they would then enjoy 
jointly. 
5. Crime Victim Standing 
Overriding the partial and even the (perhaps) total immunity of below-median 
debtors is section 707( c )(2), which invites victims of violent or drug-trafficking crime 
to move to dismiss a case "[e]xcept as provided in paragraph (3) .... "249 The partial 
immunity accorded the below-median debtors is immunity for a motion to dismiss 
"under section 707(b)."250 The total immunity may or may not refer to motions under 
section 707(b). Neither of these bars motions by crime victims under section 707(c). 
Therefore, the immunities of below-median debtors can never be complete, as 
dismissals under subparagraph ( c) are always possible. 
The crime victim, however, will have to show a criminal conviction and that 
dismissal "is in the best interest of the victim. "251 It will not be necessary, however, for 
· the victim to be a creditor of the debtor, though it is hard to imagine how the dismissal 
of the case helps the victim unless the victim is a creditor. Even so, the criminal debtor 
can defend herself by showing "by a preponderance of the evidence" that a chapter 7 
case is "necessary to satisfy a claim for a domestic support obligation. "252 For example, 
a domestic support claimant is entitled to a high priority under section 507 ( a)( 1 ). If this 
claim could be paid in chapter 7 but not outside it, then the criminal debtor can resist 
the dismissal. Outside bankruptcy, the domestic support claimant may have no priority 
compared to the crime victim. 253 
So, if Congress punishes marriage under the partial and total immunity criteria, 
here we see Congress promoting family values by allowing deadbeat dads to stay in 
chapter 7 at the expense of the victims of their violent or drug-induced crimes. 
Why crime victims should have standing to move for dismissal is questionable in 
light of section 523(a)(6) since claims "for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to 
another entity or to the property of another entity" are never dischargeable.254 One 
answer might be that drug trafficking harms may not be malicious (though typically 
they will be willful). Another answer is that, even if the crime is malicious and willful, 
the automatic stay still applies to prevent the victim from enforcing a tort judgment 
during the pendency of the case. Therefore, early dismissal would be in the interest of 
the victim because it frees the victim from the stay. 
6. Current Monthly Income 
In order to determine whether debtors qualify for the partial or total immunities, a 
249 Id. § 707(c)(2). 
250 Id. § 707(b)(6). 
251 See id. § 707(c)(2). 
252 Id. § 707(c)(3). 
253 Some states, however, do provide such a priority. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5234(b) (McKinney Supp. 2007). 
254 11 U.S.C. § 523 (a)(6) (2006). 
2007] THE FAILED BANKRUPTCY REVOLUTION OF 2005 259 
court must determine I' currentmonthly income," multiply it by twelve, 255 and compare 
it to the median family income of the state wherein the debtor resides. In a joint case, 
the two combined current monthly incomes must be considered. "Current monthly 
income" is a historic look at what happened in the six months prior to the bankruptcy 
petition. The assumption is that "what's past is prologue, what's to come is yours and 
my discharge. "256 Critics have complained that this new concept is rather like that of 
the Holy Roman Empire: It is "neither current (as it deals with the income the debtor 
receives in the six months prior to the month in which he filed for bankruptcy) nor 
monthly (as it is an average of six months) nor income (as the debtor may no longer be 
receiving it). "257 
BAPCP A sets forth a new definition of this term, and it serves as a key concept for 
chapter 7 means testing and chapter 13 disposable income. Under section lOl(lOA), 
the term is defined as average monthly income from all sources, whether taxable or 
not.258 According to section lOl(lOA)(A), current monthly income 
means the average monthly income from all sources that the debtor 
receives ( or in a joint case the debtor and the debtor's spouse receive) 
without regard to whether such income is taxable income, derived 
during the .6-month period ending on-
(i) the last day of the calendar month immediately preceding the 
date of the commencement of the case if the debtor files the 
schedule of current income required by section 521(a)(l)(B)(ii) .. 
259 
To find this average, we are to take a six month period stretching backward260 from the 
last day of the month preceding the bankruptcy petition. 261 But this rule applies only if 
the debtor has filed a schedule of current income under section 521(a)(l)(B)(ii). 
Interestingly, section 521(a)(l)(B)(ii) requires only a "schedule of current income and 
current expenditures. "262 There is no requirement of a monthly schedule here. But, as 
we have seen, section 707(b)(2)(C) requires "[a]s part of the schedule of current 
income and expenditures required under section 521, ... a statement of the debtor's 
255 The presence of this multiplicand has already had jurisprudential consequences for the interpretation of 
some new chapter 13 provisions. See infra text accompanying notes 567-72. 
256 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TEMPEST act 2, SC. 1. 
251 In re Balcerowski, 353 B.R. 582,589 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2006); see also Voltaire, Essai sur l'histoire generale 
et sur les moeurs et l'esprit des nations ch. 70 (1756) (declaring Holy Roman Empire as "ni saint, ni romain, ni 
empire"). 
258 Those debtors who are paid weekly must calculate their gross income by 4.3 times the weekly paycheck, 
except for February. In re Welch, 347 B.R. 247,249 n.2 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2006). 
259 11 U.S.C. § 101(10A)(A) (2006). 
260 As Judge William Sawyer has remarked, "One may readily see that the term 'current monthly income' is 
something of a misnomer in that it is historical data and not a projection of the amount of income that the debtor 
may expect to receive in the future." In re Love, 350 B.R. 611, 613 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 2006). 
261 See 11 U.S.C. § lOl(lOA)(A)(i) (2006). 
262 Id. § 521 (a)(l)(B)(ii). 
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current monthly income, and the calculations that determine whether a presumption 
arises under subparagraph [707(b)(2)](A)(i), that show how each such amount is 
calculated. "263 
Oddly, if the debtor has not made this filing, the court is authorized by section 
101(10A)(A)(ii) to calculate six months back from the "date on which current income 
is determined .... "264 Earlier, we suggested that a debtor's failure to file Form B22A is 
perhaps not grounds to dismiss the case, because Form B22A is not required by section 
521(a)(l)-a predicate that both section 52l(i)(2) and (arguably) section 707(a)(3) 
dismissals require.265 The fact that the court does not need this form to accomplish 
means testing is further evidence on this inability to dismiss the debtor for not filing 
Form B22A. On the other hand, according to section 52l(i)(A), if it is agreed section 
707(b)(2)(C) is "under" section 52l(a)(l) (in spite of no cross-reference there), the 
debtor's bankruptcy case is automatically dismissed after forty-five days. One of the 
things section 52l(a)(l)(B)(ii) requires is "a schedule of current income and current 
expenditures," and this plausibly includes Form B22A under section 707(b)(3)(C). If 
the above reasoning follows, there will be little need for the court to establish the six 
month reach-back period.266 
In any case, if the debtor survives dismissal for failing to file Form B22A, the test 
for current monthly income in section lOl(lOA)(A)(ii) implicates post-petition income 
of a debtor, when a court is called to fill in the gaps because the debtor has not filed 
Form B22A.267 Form B22A itself entails pre-petition income only. 
a. Non-Debtor Spousal Income 
In addition to this six-month test, "current monthly income" must also include "any 
amount paid by any entity other than the debtor (or in a joint case the debtor and the 
debtor's spouse), on a regular basis for the household expenses of the debtor or the 
debtor's dependents (and in a joint case the debtor's spouse if not otherwise a 
dependent) .... "268 So where a married debtor files without the spouse, some sort of 
calculation must be made with regard to the spouse's contribution to the household. 
This raises enormous allocational difficulties. For example, if the debtor has no 
children and the spouse contributes exactly 50% of the household expenses, are these 
contributions income for the debtor? Or is the spouse merely contributing toward his 
own 50% responsibility of the household? If there is one child and the non-debtor 
263 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(C) (2006) (emphasis added); see also supra text accompanying notes 57-61. 
264 Id. § 101 (lOA)(A)(ii). 
265 See supra text accompanying notes 58-72. 
266 Wedoff, supra note 26, at 248 ("However, the alternate six-month period will only rarely be applicable. If 
the debtor does not file schedules required by§ 521(a)(l)(B)(ii), it is likely that the case will be dismissed for 
cause under§ 707(a)(3), making it unnecessary to pursue dismissal under any of the provisions of§ 707(b)."). 
267 See In re Clemons, No. 05-85163, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 1366, at *12 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. June 1, 2006) ("If the 
statement of 'current income' is missing, the court determines 'current monthly income' for the six-month period 
ending on the date of the determination, thereby necessarily taking into account a debtor's post-petition 
income."). 
268 11 U.S.C. § lOl(lOA)(B) (2006). 
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spouse contributes all of the child's tuition expenses, has the debtor received income? 
And, with a bow to 1960's feminism, what if the non-debtor spouse is a homemaker; 
should not his uncompensated labor toward maintenance of the household be counted 
as outside income to the debtor?269 If so, BAPCPA punishes the stay-at-home parent by 
counting the monetary value of the homemaker's contribution as income. These are 
problems that will tie the courts in knots for years to come. 27° Fortunately for debtors, 
at least one court has ruled that it is the chapter 13 trustee's burden to show that the 
non-debtor spouse actually covers household expenses.271 Perhaps this holding will 
leach its way into chapter 7. 
The way Form B22A adjudicates spousal income is that a married debtor filing 
without the spouse is required to disclose all spousal income.272 Then a "marital 
adjustment" is invited. The debtor is to subtract from income "the amount ... that was 
NOT regularly contributed to the household expenses of the debtor or the debtor's 
dependents."273 This procedure invites double-dipping by a debtor who claims 
expenses against his own income and also who claims that the spouse does not, as a 
factual matter, contribute to the debtor's expenses. In In re Travis, 274 the debtor claimed 
a household of five and the associated automatic deductions for food, utilities and 
clothing.275 His non-debtor spouse was included in the household of five. The debtor 
then claimed that basically none of the spouse's income contributed to his expenses. If 
correct, the debtor successfully beat the means test. As Judge Marci Mclvor asks: 
A determination of the amount paid by a non-filing spouse on a 
regular basis for household expenses is necessarily fact specific and 
subj@ct to interpretation. For example, if the non-filing spouse has 
substantial income and chooses to spend that income on an expensive 
home, or a vacation home, or a luxury vehicle that is driven by the 
debtor and the non-filing spouse, are payments on those items 
"household expenses" of the debtor?276 
In Travis, the non-debtor spouse confessed that she spent $520 a month on expenses 
the debtor claimed against his income. To this extent, Judge Mclvor disallowed the 
269 See generally Symposium, Unbending Gender: Why Family and Work Conflict and What to Do About It, 49 
AM. U. L. REV. 943 (2000). 
270 Some courts mechanically allocate expenses according to an apportionment of income. See, e.g., In re 
McNichols, 249 B.R. 160, 172 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2000). Others reject any mechanical test. See, e.g., In re Pattison, 
No. 05-17994, 2006 WL 2086585, at * 1 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio July 6, 2006) (noting non-debtor spouse paid 
virtually all household expenses). 
271 In re Quarterman, 342 B.R. 647,652 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2006). 
272 Form B22A, supra note 32, Line 1. 
273 Id. Line 17. 
274 353 B.R. 520, 522-23 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2006). 
275 See infra Part III.B.2. 
276 In re Travis, 353 B.R. at 526. Judge Mclvor suggests that such non-debtor behavior proves that the debtor is 
committing bankruptcy abuse. See id. at 531. But in Travis, the non-debtor spouse spent her money on supporting 
her mother, her daughter and her daughter's children, which Judge Mclvor found not abusive. Id. at 530-3 L 
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exclusion and insisted that $520 be added back into "current monthly income."277 She 
also rejected the United States trustee's claim that, because the spouse was included in 
the household of five, the debtor could not claim that the spouse made no contributions 
to expenses. This leaves open the possibility that a debtor could cover all expenses 
with his income while the non-debtor spouse simply banked all of her income or spent 
it on sensuous luxury.278 
b. Child Support 
Child support must apparently be included in a debtor's current monthly income. 
As evidence, BAPCP A's new definition of disposable income in chapter 13 specifically 
excludes "child support payments, foster care payments, or disability payments for a 
dependent child . . .. "279 The. implication is that, if excluded from current monthly 
income for the purposes of chapter 13, child support and the like must be included in 
chapter 7's means test.280 The United States Trustee's office apparently agrees and 
includes it as an item on Form B22A.281 
c. Exclusions 
Whatever spousal income must be added, there are exclusions. Social security 
payments need not be added;282 here we perhaps see the fine hand of the AARP at 
work. Part of the social security system, then, is BAPCPA's invitation of old folks, 
time's doting chronicle, to commit bankruptcy abuse. 
Unemployment compensation is a state-provided benefit. Yet, under the Social 
Security Act, grants are provided to the states if states choose to offer unemployment 
benefits, provided the state complies with federal mandates.283 Do the indirect subsidies 
authorized by the Social Security Act make state unemployment benefits excludible 
under the definition of "current monthly income"? Judge Thomas Waldron, in In re 
Sorrell,284 found these benefits excludible. His major point is a "knew how to" 
argument. In several sections of BAPCPA, Congress knew how to invoke limited 
portions of the Social Security Act.285 But in defining "current monthly income," 
277 See id. at 527-28. 
278 Even though the debtor gets a clothing deduction in the means test, a spouse's choice to buy extra clothing for 
herself and her spouse did not interfere with the debtor's deduction for clothing. See id. at 527. 
279 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2) (2006). 
280 Wedoff, supra note 26, at 245 (contrasting treatment of contributions to household expenses as "disposable 
income" under chapter 7 and chapter 13). 
281 Form B22A, supra note 32, Line 8 (requiring information regarding "regular contributions to the household 
expenses of the debtor or the debtor's dependents, including child support"). 
282 11 U.S.C. § I0l(l0A)(B) (2006). This provision overrules cases like In re Shields, 322 B.R. 894, 898 
(Banlcr. M.D. Fla. 2005) ( characterizing "social security benefits, disability benefits, and retirement benefits" as 
income though acknowledging "such benefits are exempt from the claims of the debtor's creditors"). 
283 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101-05, 1321 (West 2002). . 
284 No. 06-31720, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 161, at *32-43 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio Jan. 26;2007). 
285 E.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(b)(2)(D)-(F), 704(c)(l)(A)(i) (2006). 
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section 101(10A) excludes "benefits received under the Social Security Act."286 
Congress must have intended, Judge Waldron concluded, that indirect benefits 
stemming from the Social Security Act were not to be included as currently monthly 
income under section lOl(lOA).287 
Also to be excluded are "payments to victims of war crimes or crimes against 
humanity on account of their status as victims of such crimes, and payments to victims 
of international terrorism or domestic terrorism .... "288 So, the scant consolation to the 
victims of man's inhumanity to man is an invitation to commit acts which, if performed 
by a non-victim, would constitute a bankruptcy abuse. Two wrongs ( one monumental, 
the other petty) make a right, according to Congress. Exclusions such as these imply 
that a debtor's real income may be higher than his BAPCPA income.289 Meanwhile, 
exempt income (such as worker's compensation payments in states like South 
Dakota, 290 or disabled veteran benefits291 ) is not excluded; the expectation is that these 
must be used to fund chapter 13 plans. 
d. Irregular Income 
As many have noticed, the six-month test gives rise to anomalies with regard to 
seasonal workers. For example, a teacher who is not paid in the summer may find that a 
bankruptcy petition filed in December is in good faith;292 the same petition filed in 
March is in bad faith. 293 For such workers, there is a seasonal aspect to bankruptcy 
abuse. High income workers who have been fired and who could easily find new 
employment may find that, by taking an unpaid leave, they can qualify for chapter 7 
bankruptcy, where they can walk away from their credit card debts. 294 Depending on 
286 Id. § lOI(lOA)(B). 
287 In re Sorrell, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 161, at *36-38. 
288 11 U.S.C. § lOl(l0A)(B) (2006). 
289 See In re Casey, 356 B.R. 519,521 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 2006) (explaining prior to BAPCPA, debtor "would 
have been considered to receive significantly greater income than after the enactment ofBf\PCPA"). It has been 
suggested that employer contributions to ERISA pension funds are not current monthly income because the 
debtor does not "receive" them. See Tedra Hobson, The Bankruptcy Abuse Creation Act?: Curing Unintended 
Consequences of Bankruptcy Reform, 40 GA. L. REV. 1245, 1257 (2006). This suggestion overlooks the fact that 
the debtor "receives" the beneficial interest in these dollars, even though a pension fund trustee has legal title. See 
id. 
290 Stuart v. Koch (In re Koch), 109 F.3d 1285, 1289-90 (8th Cir. 1997) (reasoning "chapter 13 contains no 
language suggesting exempt post-petition revenues are not chapter 13 'income' .... "); In re Georgiu, 344 B.R. 
47, 49 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2005) (including disability benefits as part of income to determine whether there is 
abuse by debtor). 
291 In re Shields, 322 B.R. 894, 898 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2005) (considering social security benefits, disability 
benefits, and retirement benefits in disposable income analysis to decide whether debtor was able to repay his 
debts). 
292 In re Beasley, 342 B.R. 280, 284-85 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2006). 
293 Neustadter, supra note 47, at 278 (pointing out pre-petition planning to avoid means test may constitute 
abuse); Wedoff, supra note 26, at 249 (noting arbitrariness of six-month averaging in light of debtors whose 
incomes vary from season to season). 
294 See In re Pak, 343 B.R. 239, 241 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2006) (stating debtor not subjected to means test 
because debtor was unemployed for most of the six months preceding bankruptcy). 
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whether they qualify for the total immunity and what that immunity means, such tricky 
debtors, however, can still be dismissed under section 707(b)(3)(B), which permits 
dismissal if "the totality of the circumstances ... of the debtor's financial situation 
demonstrates abuse. "295 Thus, in In re Quintana, 296 a striking worker could show a very 
low current monthly income and could still be invited out of chapter 7.297 Arguably, 
had the debtor qualified for the total immunity of section 707 (b )(7), the debtor would 
have survived this motion. But, again, this depends on what this near-total immunity 
means. 
Another difficulty with "current monthly income" is that "income from all 
sources"298 is not a defined term. So it presumably includes proceeds from the sale of 
assets. Judge Wedoff gives the example of a debtor who sells her home within six 
months of bankruptcy. 299 This sale might even constitute a capital loss. The sale would 
in general fund chapter 7 dividends for unsecured creditors. Perhaps it would fund a 
very high bankruptcy dividend indeed. Nevertheless, it must be included in income, 
thus raising the average for purposes of the sixty-month calculation and making a 
chapter 7 proceeding an abuse. 300 On the other hand, a debtor who sells the house seven 
months before the bankruptcy and then blows the proceeds on a luxury vacation is fully 
eligible for chapter 7, if the lower income allows the debtor to meet the means test. 
Similarly, a debtor may have received a bonus in the prior six months, but no 
adjustment is appropriate even though bonuses are, by definition, not mandatory.301 
7. Median Family Income 
The immunities discussed require that the debtor individually or in combination 
with a spouse fall below the "median family income." This term is defined in 
Bankruptcy Code section 101(39A) as the number calculated by the Bureau of the 
Census.302 If the data is stale, section 101(39A)(B) requires inflation adjustments per 
the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers, produced by the U.S. Department 
of Labor. The various state medians are easily retrievable on the internet. 303 
295 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(3)(B) (2006). 
296 No. 4:05-bk-08497-JMM, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 1973, at *6-7 (Bankr. D. Ariz. May 3, 2006). 
297 Cf U.S. Tr. v. Cortez (In re Cortez), 457 F.3d 448,455 (5th Cir. 2006) (concluding courts can consider 
post-petition employment as grounds to dismiss under second 707(b) in pre-BAPCPA case). 
298 11 U.S.C. § 101(10A)(A) (2006). 
299 Wedoff, supra note 26, at 251 (using an example reflecting "the situation of a debtor who earns $5,000 per 
month, realizes a $120,000 gain on.a sale in January, and files a Chapter 7 case in July"). 
300 On the other side of the coin, money withdrawn from a tax-deferred retirement account (although being 
taxed for the first time) is not income received within six months of bankruptcy. See In re Wayman, 351 B.R. 
808, 811 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2006) (noting IRA distribution is not component of current monthly income). 
301 See In re Oliver, 350 B.R. 294, 300 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2006) (refusing to adjust debtors income based on 
prospective bonuses). 
302 11 U.S.C. § 101(39A) (2006) ("The term 'median family income' means for any year [] the median family 
income both calculated and reported by the Bureau of the Census in the then most recent year .... "). 
303 State medians can be retrieved by going to the United States Trustee's Website, available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/ust/index.htrn, and clicking on the link "Means Testing Information" under the heading 
"Bankruptcy Reform." 
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If the debtor lives in a household of one, the relevant comparison is the median for 
a household of one. If the household has two, three or four persons, the relevant 
median is for households with the same or fewer individuals. For example, if a debtor 
has a household of four and if the median income is $55,000 for a household of four, 
$60,000 for a household of three and $65,000 for a household of two, the debtor is 
entitled to assert the highest number of $65,000. Also, where the household exceeds 
four, the debtor may enhance the median by $525 per month ($6,300 per annum) for 
every household member in excess of four. 
What is a household? This is an undefined term, and an opportunity for the courts 
to recognize (or refuse to recognize) the changing nature of American families. That 
the definition of "household" is expansive is hinted at in new section 541(e). That 
section regulates the concept of children, which is used in new sections 541 (b )( 5) and 
(6). These latter two provisions exempt from the bankruptcy estate funds in an 
education individual retirement account more than a year before bankruptcy. This 
exemption only applies on behalf of a "child, stepchild, grandchild, or stepgrandchild 
of the debtor," or funds used to buy a tuition credit under a qualified state tuition 
program.304 Section 54l(e) further elaborates that children who live in "the debtor's 
household" and who are "foster" children shall be deemed "a child of such individual 
by blood. "305 What this definition implies is that non-blood relatives can be part of a 
household. Therefore, the definition of "household" must be expansive (since section 
541(e) undertakes to contract it).306 
"Household" is the term needed to determine whether debtors are above or below 
the state median income. Oddly, the definition of expenses is not geared to households. 
Rather the debtor's expenses are deemed to be with regard to "the debtor, dependents of 
the debtor, and the spouse of the debtor in a joint case, if the spouse is not otherwise a 
dependent." 307 As a result, whether the debtor is above or below the median uses the 
expansive "household" definition; but should the debtor be above the median and 
therefore subject to the means test, she will not be able to deduct "household" 
expenses-only the expenses of the debtor and dependents of the debtor.308 
Further complicating the analysis is the fact that sections 707 (b )( 6) and (7) refer to 
"medianfamily income" for households of various sizes. Yet the census data reports 
only household incomes. According to the U.S. Census Bureau definition, a household 
is "all the people who occupy a housing unit" and defines householder as "the person 
( or one of the people) in whose name the housing unit is owned or rented (maintained) 
•••• 11309 A family, however, is "a group of two or more people ... related by birth, 
304 Id. § 541(b)(5)(A), (b)(6)(A). 
305 Id. § 54l(e). 
306 Contra In re Napier, No. 06-02464-JW, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 2248, at *3-4 (Bankr. D.S.C. Sept. 18, 2006) 
(rejecting definition of "household" as exceeding domain of "dependents"). 
307 11.U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) (2006); see also In re Jewell, No. 06-53976, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 811, at 
* 15-17 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio Mar. 16, 2007) (holding non-dependent adult son could not be counted in household). 
308 What is a dependent? This will be addressed in the context of deductible expenses, where the definition is 
most critical. See infra Part III.B.2.a.ii. 
309 U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey (CPS)-Definitions and Explanations (Jan. 20, 2004), 
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marriage, or adoption and residing together; ... "310 As Professor Gary Neustadter 
concludes, "Families are therefore a subset of all households."311 The opposite is also 
true; households can be a subset of a family, where jointly filing spouses live apart. 312 
So, to summarize, BAPCP A is most confusing on comparing current monthly 
income to the "median family income" for a "household." The former number seems to 
be a subset of the latter number. The good news is that the ambiguity perhaps does not 
matter. Since the United States trustee typically is the moving party in all section 
707 (b) controversies, the achievement of partial immunity is probably not important. In 
addition, the total immunity in section 707(b)(7) may be meaningless, depending on 
how the cross-reference to section 707(b)(2) is interpreted. 
B. The Means Test 
1. The Sixty-Month Test for Gross Income 
BAPCPA establishes a sixty-month means test for above-median debtors.313 In 
comparison, the test establishing the immunity of the below-median debtors is only a 
twelve-month test.314 Both tests, however, turn on multiplying "current monthly 
income," which is an average income for the preceding six months. 
The sixty-month means test applies only to historic gross income. This amount is 
reduced by hypothetical expenses, in a manner to be described. The result I will refer to 
as net income. Significantly, a debtor is not required to prove sixty months of expenses 
but can use snapshot pictures of those expenses at the time of the bankruptcy petition. 
The test to be applied is a kind of minimum-maximum test. 315 In order to avoid the 
connotation of bankruptcy abuse, the multiplicand (net monthly income times sixty) 
must be less than $10,000316 or the maximum of two criteria: 25% or $6,000. So, for 
example, suppose a debtor has net income of $40 per month. Multiplying by sixty 
produces $2,400. This is less than $10,000 and less than $6,000. Our debtor is not a 
bankruptcy abuser under the means test, although it apparently is open for the United 
States trustee to claim otherwise under section 707(b)(3).317 
http://www.census.gov/population/www/cps/cpsdef.html. This has been referred to as the "heads on beds" test 
for households. See In re Jewell, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 811, at *15-17. 
310 U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 308. 
311 Neustadter, supra note 47, at 282. 
312 See In re Graham, No. 06-54764, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 720, at *7-17 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio Mar. 6, 2007) 
(holding husband and wife could separately take household expense deduction). 
313 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i) (2006). 
314 Id. § 707(b)(6)-(7). 
315 The test, according to Professor Neustadter, "scales new heights of obscurity .... " Neustadter, supra note 
47, at 284. 
316 Any dollar amount to be found in section 707 (b) is subject to incre.ase according to the rules of Bankruptcy 
Code section 104(b ). This provision provides for automatic adjustments every three years to reflect the Consumer 
Price Index for All Urban Consumers, published by the U.S. Department of Labor. See 11 U.S.C. § 104(b )(l)(A) 
(2006). 
317 See infra Part III.C. 
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Suppose the debtor's net income is $ll0 per month. Now the multiplicand is 
$6,600 per month. This is less than $10,000 but more than $6,000. Our debtor must 
now show that unsecured claims against her exceed $26,600. In other words, the more 
bad debts such a debtor has, the more "good faith" she has-a counter-intuitive 
result.318 
Congress may have counteracted the bad incentive of section 707(b )(2)(A)(i)(I) by 
prohibiting lawyers from advising more debt as a way of beating the means test. New 
section 526(a)( 4) prohibits "advis[ing] an assisted person or prospective assisted person 
to incur more debt in contemplation of such person filing a case under this title .... "319 
This conclusion follows only if lawyers are "debt relief agencies" as that term is 
defined in section 101(12A).329 At least one court has ruled that lawyers are not within 
the definition. 321 Another court concludes they are in the definition, but the provision is 
an unconstitutional abridgement of free speech. 322 Either way, lawyers would be free to 
advise a debtor to rack up more debt in order to game the system. If neither premise is 
true, lawyers are obliged to withhold such good advice from their clients. 
Finally, suppose net income is $167.77 a month. Since the multiplicand exceeds 
$10,000, such a debtor is disqualified from a chapter 7 proceeding. 
What is the significance of the number 60? Presumably, this is related to the 
duration of a chapter 13 plan for households above the median. 323 The mandatory five-
year term324 is a BAPCPA innovation, and the chapter 7 test is premised on chapter 13 
being the principal alternative if chapter 7 is impossible. Yet only above-median 
debtors are required to maintain a Stalinist five-year plan. Below-median debtors can 
write three-year plans. The number 60 bears no relation to below-median debtors. 
The sixty-month test, however, turns on a monthly test, which in tum depends on a 
twelve-month average. One might suspect that the number 60 could have largely been 
dispensed with, but this is not so. Means testing boils down to this: if net current 
monthly income exceeds $167.77, the debtor's chapter 7 case will always be 
318 Wedoff, supra note 26, at 242 (noting debtor under chapter 7 has incentive to find ways to maximize 
allowable deductions in order to minimize current monthly income). 
319 11 U.S.C. § 526(a)(4) (2006). 
320 See Olsen v. Gonzales, 350 B.R. 906, 911 (D. Ore. 2006) (holding attorneys are debt relief agencies); see 
also Jean Braucher, A Fresh Start for Personal Bankruptcy Reform: The Needfor Simplification and a Single 
Portal, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1295, 1309 (2006) (highlighting uncertainty about whether the term "debt relief 
agency" includes lawyers); Neustadter, supra note 47, at 312-14 (noting consumer bankruptcy attorneys are now 
debt relief agencies); Vance & Cooper, supra note 24, at 289 (listing duties of attorney who falls under category 
of "debt relief agency"). 
321 In re Attorneys-at-Law, 332 B.R. 66, 69 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2005) (concluding Congress did not intend to 
include attorneys under definition of "debt relief agency"). 
322 Zelotes v. Martini, 352 B.R 17, 23, 25 (D. Conn. 2006); Hersh v. United States, 347 B.R. 19, 22, 25 (N.D. 
Tex. 2006) (employing plain meaning rule to conclude that "debt relief agency" includes attorneys, but holding 
such provision facially unconstitutional as applied to attorneys). 
323 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(4)(A)(ii) (2006) (limiting applicable commitment period to no less than 5 years); In re 
McPherson, 350 B.R. 38,45-46 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2006) ("The objective of the Means Test in Section 707(b) ... 
is to roughly estimate whether a debtor has sufficient disposable income to fund a chapter 13 plan, that is, to 
estimate the amount of residual income that the debtor has each month .... "). 
324 In 100% payout plans, the term may be less than five years. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(4)(B)(2006)(conditioning 
payout in less than five years if "plan provides for payment in full of all allowed unsecured claims ... "). 
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dismissed. 325 If it is under $ 100, the case will not be dismissed on the mechanical 
means test alone (though it still could be dismissed for other indicia of bad faith, 
including, perhaps, surplus net income).326 Only if monthly income is between $100 
and $167.77 does the multiplicand of 60 really become relevant. For such net monthly 
incomes, the debtor will have to satisfy the following inequality: 
CMI < u/240 
where lO0<CM/<166.67 is net current monthly income and u is the total amount of 
unsecured claims against the debtor. The denominator 240 is the product of 4 x 60. The 
4 represents the 25% requirement of section 707(b )(2)(A)(i)(I);327 that is, by 
multiplying both the numerator and denominator by 4, .25u becomes u, and 60 
becomes 240. The 60 in the denominator product comes from the sixty multiplicand of 
section 707(b )(2)(A)(i), and so 60 cannot entirely be eliminated from the calculation. It 
is relevant whenever lO0<CM/<166.67.328 
A related observation based on the above inequality is that $167. 77 for net current 
monthly income is the only relevant test where unsecured claims against the debtor 
exceed $40,264.80. One hundred dollars is the only relevant test where unsecured 
debts are less than $24,000.24. The multiplicand of 60 is relevant only where 
unsecured debt falls between these two numbers. 
2. Expenses 
The means test concerns net income, so expenses are all-important. Whereas 
"current monthly income" is based on a historic weighted average, expenses are not 
necessarily based on history. 
a. IRS Standards 
According to section 707(b)(2)(A)(ii), monthly expenses are "the debtor's 
applicable monthly expense amounts specified under the National Standards and Local 
Standards, and the debtor's actual monthly expenses for the categories specified as 
Other Necessary Expenses issued by the Internal Revenue Service for the area in which 
the debtor resides .... "329 These National and Local Standards can be found in the 
,. 
325 In the landmark pre-BAPCPA case of In re Attanasio, 218 B.R. 180, 239-41 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1998), 
Judge Benjamin Cohen found no abuse where something resembling current monthly income of $1,460 was 
available to pay creditors. 
326 See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(3) (2006). 
327 See id. § 707(b )(2)(A)(i)(I) ("Twenty-five percent of the debtor's non-priority unsecured claims in the case, 
or $6,000, whichever is greater .... "). 
328 For example, in In re Praleikus, 248 B.R. 140, 145 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2000), the debtor's current monthly 
income was $154. Her debt was about $13,894. Id. at 144. Therefore, u/240 =!32.89<154, so the debtor would 
be an abuser under BAPCPA (as she was prior to BAPCPA). 
329 See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b )(2)(A)(ii)(I) (2006). 
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Internal Revenue Service Financial Analysis Handbook, which itself is part of the 
Internal Revenue Service's Internal Revenue Manual ("Manual").330 Their purpose is to 
aid IRS tax collectors in assessing how much tax can be extracted from delinquent 
taxpayers.331 
i. National Standards 
National standards cover food, clothing, household supplies, personal care and 
miscellaneous. Totals are given by household, presumably, though this is not entirely 
clear. The allowable amounts also vary according to gross income of the debtor. On 
Form B22A, this is an easy amount to fill in.332 For instance, a two-person household 
with a gross income of $5,834 or more is entitled to deduct $1,306. The same 
household with a gross income of $578 is entitled to deduct $578. The poor are 
expected to sacrifice more than the rich, in terms of producing disposable income for 
the benefit of creditors.333 
We have seen, however, that a debtor's true income may not equate with the 
debtor's BAPCPA income, as the definition of "current monthly income" excludes 
certain sources such as social security or payments in settlement of war crimes.334 
Where a debtor has high real income and low BAPCP A income, may the debtor assert 
the low income and take the food-clothing allowance that accords with the higher real 
income? Courts so far have answered no. If the debtor asserts low BAPCPA income, 
the debtor is stuck with the lower food-clothing allowance associated with this 
artificially low amount.335 
If the debtor shows that it is necessary, she can have an additional 5 % of the food 
and clothing categories as specified by the National Standards of the Internal Revenue 
330 See H.R. REP. No. 109-31, at 13-14 (2005) ("[T]he debtor's monthly expenses ... must be the applicable 
monthly amounts set forth in the Internal Revenue Service Financial Analysis Handbook as Necessary Expenses 
under the National and Local Standards categories .... "). This handbook can be retrieved on the IRS website. 
See generally IRS, INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, PART V-FINANCIAL ANALYSIS HANDBOOK § 5 .15 .1.1-.36, 
available athttp://www.irs.gov/irm/part5/chl 5s0 I.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2006) [hereinafter IRM]. It can also 
be retrieved from LEXIS under the source "Internal Revenue Manual (IRM)." Id., available at http://lexis.com 
(follow "Legal" hyperlink; search "Internal Revenue Manual" under "Find a Source" hyperlink; search"financial 
analysis-handbook"). 
331 See IRM § 5.15.1.35, available at http://www.irs.gov/irm/part5/ch15s01.html (follow link "Making the 
Collection Decision"). Prior to BAPCPA, the IRS guidelines were informally used to determine expenses in 
connection with chapter 13's requirement that all disposable income must be dedicated to the plan. See In re 
Beckel, 268 B.R. 179, 184 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2001 ). But see In re DeGross, 272 B .R. 309, 314 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 
2001) (declining to use IRS standards for section 707(b) dismissal). 
332 See Form B22A, supra note 32, Line 19. At least one court has ruled that Form B22C, which contains an 
identical line to Form B22A line 19, is "entitled to considerable deference." Baxter v. Johnson (In re Johnson), 
346 B.R. 256, 266 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2006). 
333 Populists protest this phenomenon. Professor Tabb asks, "Do wealthier people have to eat more?" Charles 
Jordan Tabb, The Death of Consumer Bankruptcy in the United States? 18 BANKR. DEV. J. 1, 29 (2001). Of 
course they do not. They simply require a better grade of claret. 
334 See supra text accompanying notes Part III.A.6.c. 
335 See In re Casey, 356 B.R. 519,524 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 2006) ("Debtors may not 'mix and match' forms."). 
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Service.336 The 5% number is directly retrievable as provided in the IRS National 
Standards. For a family of two, food and clothing are designated to cost $1,000 out of 
the total $1,306 allocable if the household's gross income exceeds $5,834, and 5% 
yields an additional $50 deduction. This claim of necessity, however, must be 
documented, as Form B22A warns.337 Meanwhile, the fact that an extra amount is 
allowed for documented clothing expense suggests that extra deductions for other 
expenses, such as gasoline, are not permitted.338 
National standards do not refer to households or to families but rather to "one 
person" or "two persons. "339 There is an extra allowance for persons more than four. It 
appears that some debtors will fall through the cracks. In In re Barraza,340 the debtor 
paid the mortgage for his divorced spouse and their children; he lived with a friend 
with three children, towards which he contributed $400 per month. The debtor received 
no credit for this $400, yet, if the two households had been considered consolidated, 
the debtor could have had an additional $816 a month in National Standard 
deductions. 341 
The stipulation of the National Standards is the governing criterion even if the 
actual expenses of the debtor are different 342 "It doesn't matter if the debtor feels those 
amounts are unreasonably low, or if the trustee feels those amounts are unreasonably 
high-'-those are the amounts the debtor is allowed to deduct from her current m~mthly 
income to determine her 'disposable monthly income."' 343 Of course, dismissal under 
the totality of the circumstances is still permitted, giving the United States trustee a 
second chance to criticize the debtor for taking the full B22A deduction. 
ii. Dependents 
Household expenses will vary according to the number of people in the household. 
Accordingly, it is relevant that section 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) refers to the expenses "for 
the debtor, the dependents of the debtor, and the spouse of the debtor in a joint case, if 
the spouse is not otherwise a dependent." 344 In In re Napier,345 debtors sought to 
336 See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(l) (2006). 
337 See Form B22A, supra note 32, Line 39. 
338 See In re Tranmer, 355 B.R. 234, 241 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2006) (denying extra deduction for long commute 
to work). Some jurisdictions will permit an extra gas allowance for a long commute. See In re Oliver, 350 B.R. 
294, 302 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2006) ("The Court finds that the Debtor's actual gasoline expense is a necessary 
expense. The National local expenses are only guidelines .... "). 
339 See IRS, NATIONAL ,STANDARDS FOR ALLOWABLE LIVING EXPENSES (Feb. 1, 2006), 
http://www.irs.gov/bus iness/small/article//0,,id=104627,00.html [hereinafter IRS, NATIONAL STANDARDS]. 
340 346 B.R. 724, 727-28, 733-34 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006). 
341 This is based on $204 per extra "person" on the National Standards entry for additional persons, times four 
for the number of persons in the friend's household. See IRS, NATIONAL STANDARDS, 
http://www.irs.gov/businesses/sm all/article//O,,id=104627,00.html (allowing $204 per person above four-person 
total allowance of $1,203 for gross monthly salary between $4,167 and $5,833). 
342 See In re Demonica, 345 B.R. 895,902 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2006) (acknowledging debtornotobligatedon the 
mortgage agreement but could still claim the deduction). 
343 In re Fuller, 346 B.R. 472, 484 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2006) (addressing chapter 13 case and subsequent plan). 
344 11 U.S.C. § 707 (b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) (2006). 
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expand their deductible expenses in a chapter 13 case, but Judge John Waites ruled that 
the household, for purposes of choosing the National Standards, was defined by the 
number of dependents in the household, not the number of persons in the household. 
The debtors could therefore not claim more expenses due to the presence of boarders in 
the house. 346 "To the extent that Official Form B22C indicates that Debtors may 
include the boarders in the means test calculation, it must yield to the plain language of 
§ 707(b)(2), which only allows Debtors to include dependents."347 
The provision for the National Standards is one of many which invoke the concept 
of "dependents."348 As with "family" and "household," "dependent" is an undefined 
term. But section 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) contains a clue. The spouse of a debtor is 
includable in the household for the purposes of expanding the National Standard 
deduction if the case is a joint case and "the spouse is not otherwise a dependent."349 
This particular wrinkle suggests that Congress had in mind the Internal Revenue Code 
definition of dependent.350 At least where a married couple files a joint return, the 
spouse cannot be a dependent for tax deduction purposes.351 
The Internal Revenue Code defines two types of dependents: qualifying children 
and qualifying relative.352 Qualifying child means an individual who (i) bears a 
relationship to the taxpayer, (ii) has the same abode for more than half the year, (iii) is 
less than 19, 24 (if a student),353 or any age (if disabled),354 and (iv) has not provided 
more than half his own support. 355 "Bears a relationship" means being the child, sub-
child, sibling, step-sibling, descendent of a sibling or step-sibling. 356 A hierarchy exists 
as to who may claim the child, where multiple taxpayers compete for the deduction. 357 
A qualifying relative is one who (i) bears a relationship with the taxpayer,358 (ii) 
has less gross income than the exemption amount, 359 (iii) receives from the taxpayer 
over half of the individual's support,360 and (iv) is not a qualifying child.361 "Bears a 
345 No. 06-02464-JW, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 2248, at *3 (Bankr. D.S.C. Sept. 18, 2006). 
346 Id. at *4 ("While the debtor's acts are admirable, debtors should not be allowed to voluntarily put the needs 
of these non-dependents above their obligation ... to their unsecured creditors .... "). 
347 Id. 
348 See 11 U.S.C. §§ lOl(lOA)(B), 523(a)(2)(C)(ii)(II), 524(c)(3)(B), l 114(a), 1325(b)(2)(A)(i), 1329(a)(4) 
(2006). 
349 Id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I); see also id. § 522(a) ("In this section-(!) 'dependent' includes spouse, whether or 
not actually dependent .... "). 
350 See I.R.C. § 152(a) (West Supp. 2006) (qualifying "dependent" for purposes of deductions for personal 
exemptions). 
351 Id. § 152(b)(2) ("An individual shall not be treated as a dependent of a taxpayer ... if such individual has 
made a joint return with the individual's spouse ... for the taxable year .... "). 
352 Id. § 152(a). 
353 Id. § 152(c)(3)(A)(ii). 
354 Id. § 152(c)(3)(B). 
355 Id. § 152(c)(l). 
356 Id. § 152(c)(2). 
357 Id. § 152(c)(4). 
358 Id. § 152(d)(l)(A). 
359 Id. § 152(d)(l)(B) (referring to method of calculation in I.R.C. § 151(d)). The exemption amount is 
currently $3,300. Id. § 151(d). 
360 Id. § 152(d)(l)(C). 
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relationship" means a child, sub-child, sibling, step-sibling, ancestor, step-parent, niece 
or nephew, close in-law, or any individual living in the household with the taxpayer.362 
Particularly this last point contradicts Judge Waite's holding in In re Napier, 363 if the 
excluded boarders had virtually no gross income and are supported by the debtor. 
Pre-BAPCP A case law has addressed the concept of dependent. Offspring at 
college, 364 · adult children and the grandchildren, 365 mothers, 366 fathers in nursing 
homes, 367 and stepchildren368 have qualified as dependents, whose expenses may be 
deducted. Stepchildren,369 grandchildren,370 mother,371 fiance and children,372 girlfriend 
and her dependents, 373 illegitimate children living with the debtor, 374 and step-children 
have been disallowed. In United States Trustee v. Meler (In re Meler),375 the court 
emphasized that if the debtor was not legally obligated to support the dependent-
apparent, then the debtor could not deduct any expenses for their upkeep-a harsh 
conclusion that would certainly exclude aged grandparents and maiden aunts, for 
example. 
iii. Local Standards 
Local standards cover housing and transportation. They are not actually in the 
Manual but are available on the IRS and the United States Trustee's websites.376 To my 
361 Id. § 152(d)(l)(D). 
362 Id. § 152(d)(2). 
363 No. 06-02464-JW, 2006 Banla. LEXIS 2248, at *4 (Bankr. D.S.C. Sept. 18, 2006). 
364 In re Smith, 269 B.R. 686, 689-90 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2001). 
365 In re Tefertiller, 104 B.R. 513, 515 n.1 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1989) (citing In re Wegner, 91 B.R. 854, 859 
(Bankr. D. Minn. 1998)). 
366 In re Bauer, 309 B.R. 47, 51 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2004) (finding in chapter 13 case); In re Tracy, 66 B.R. 63, 
67 (Bankr. D. Md. 1986). 
367 In re Vansickel, 309 B.R. 189, 199 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2004). 
368 See, e.g., In re Dempton, 182 B.R. 38, 41 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1995). 
369 Shulz v. Gano (In re Gano), No. 99-14363, 00-5036, 2001 Banla. LEXIS 2167, at *10-13 (Bankr. D. Kan. 
Jan. 17, 2001); see also In re Beharry, 264 B.R. 398,404 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2001); In re Davidoff, 185 B.R. 631, 
635-36 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1995) (dismissing expenses claimed where debtor's wife received' child support 
payments). 
370 In re Richmond, 144 B.R. 539, 542 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1992). 
371 In re Cox, 249 B.R. 29, 32 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 2000). 
372 Id. 
373 U.S. Tr. v. Meler (In re Meler), 295 B.R. 625,631 (D. Ariz. 2003); In re Mastromarino, 197 B.R. 171, 178 
(Bankr. D. Me. 1996) ("This is not a moral judgment, but a legal one. Mastromarino has no obligation to support 
them. But he is legally obligated to his creditors. To grant such voluntary expenditures priority over existing 
legal obligations would be to pe~it Mastromarino unilaterally to subordinate his creditors to his personal 
lifestyle choices."). 
374 In re Meler, 295 B.R. at 630-31. 
375 Id. at 630-31. 
376 See U.S. TR. PROGRAM,MEANS TESTING: CENSUS BUREAU,IRS DATA AND ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES 
(2006), http://www.usdoj.gov/ust/eo/bapcpa/20061001/meanstesting.htm [hereinafter U.S. TR. PROGRAM,MEANS 
TESTING] (supplying Local Standards for "Local Housing and Utilities Expense Standards" and "Local 
Transportation Expense Standards"); see also IRS, COLLECTION FINANCIAL STANDARDS (2006), 
http://www.irs.gov/individuals/article/O,,id=96543,00.html (explaining "Collection Financial Standards are used 
to help determine a taxpayer's ability to pay a delinquent tax liability"). 
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knowledge, this is the first time the United States Code defers to the fluctuating content 
of internet websites. 377 
(a) Housing 
Form B22A first bids the debtor to record non-mortgage expenses.378 This is easily 
retrieved from the United States Trustee website. The Local Standards have two 
entries, one for "noh~mortgage." These are listed by county. In Manhattan (New York 
County), for example, the amount listed is $632. Form B22A refers to these expenses 
as "utilities. "379 
Form B22A then requires an entry for mortgage/rent expenses.380 This too is 
broken out in the Local Standards. Yet section 707(b )(2)(A)(ii)(I) also states that, 
"[n]otwithstanding any other provision of this clause, the monthly expenses of the 
debtor shall not include any payment for debts. "381 This overrides the Local Standards 
with regard to mortgages and car loans. Separately, however, the debtor is permitted 
average monthly payments to all secured creditors, under section 707(b)(2)(A)(iii)(I). 
Accordingly, Form B22A requires that mortgage payments be subtracted from the 
Local Standard amount.382 Numbers below zero are abolished for this purpose. The 
actual deduction permitted is the difference (if any) between the Local Standard 
amount and the actual mortgage payments. 
It has been suggested that the reference to the Local Standards, together with a 
deduction for mortgage payments under section 707(b )(2)(A)(iii)(I), constitutes a bias 
against renters in favor of home owners. 383 Indeed, worse than that, if a debtor has low 
mortgage payments and no rent expenses, Form B22A permits a deduction based in the 
absence of actual expenditure.384 Some courts, however, take the view that if there are 
absolutely no expenses, then the housing deduction is not "applicable" to the debtor 
and cannot be claimed. According to section 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I), the debtor is entitled 
377 Judge Bruce Markell cautions that it is the IRS website, not the United States Trustee website, that counts. 
In re Slusher, No. BK-S-06-10435-BAM, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 127, at *3 (Bankr. D. Nev. Jan. 17, 2007). This is 
so in spite of a disclaimer on the IRS website that "IRS Allowable Expenses are intended for use in calculating 
repayment of delinquent taxes. Expense information for use in bankruptcy calculations can be found on the 
website for the U.S. Trustee Program." See IRS, ALLOWABLE LIVING EXPENSES FOR TRANSPORTATION (2006), 
http://ww w.irs.gov/businesses/small/article/O,,id=104623,00.html (alteration in original) (citing U.S. TR. 
PROGRAM, MEANS TESTING, supra note 376). 
378 Form B22A, supra note 32, Line 20A. 
319 Id. 
380 Id. Line 20B. 
381 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) (2006). 
382 Form B22A, supra note 32, Line 20B(b); see also In re Hardacre, 338 B.R. 718, 726 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 
2006) (upholding this interpretation). 
383 Neustadter, supra note 47, at 287-94 ("This Act introduces sub silentio a distinction between mortgage 
payments and rent into judicial decisions about abuse and in so doing effectively prefers debtors who own homes 
to debtors who lease housing."). In In re Starkey, No. BK06-81473-TJM, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 155, at *3 (Bankr. 
D. Neb. Jan. 25, 2007), a debtor's rent far exceeded the Local Standard for housing. The debtor was not permitted 
to deduct the surplus, even though this would have been allowed if it had been mortgage debt. Id. at *5-7. 
384 See In re Farrar-Johnson, 353 B.R. 224, 226-27 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2006) (permitting deduction under Form 
B22C to debtors living free in military housing). 
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to "applicable monthly expense amounts specified under the ... Local Standards ... 
. "385 This interpretation will be discussed in connection with transportation expense, as 
debtors more commonly own cars outright, compared to housing. 386 
An enhancement is permitted to housing and utilities expense, but only with regard 
to "actual expenses for home energy costs .... "387 The debtor must also show that the 
additional amount is "reasonable and necessary." This gives an opening for the court to 
rule that debtors must adjust their thermostats on behalf of their creditors. 
If energy costs are to be enhanced, the debtor must know what percentage of non-
mortgage expenses are allocable to energy and what part to other expenses. Form 
B22A gives no help on this allocation question.388 Judge Wedoff, however, draws from 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics (which the IRS uses to devise its National and Local 
Standards) to suggest that 24% is an appropriate allocation.389 
(b) Transportation 
The Local Standards permit a debtor to own two cars.390 This is so even if the 
debtor is a single person with no family. So, for singles, it is possible to maintain a 
regular car and perhaps a motorcycle (assuming that a motorcycle qualifies as a 
"car").391 
There are two types of transportation expenses. The first is "Operating Costs & 
Public Transportation Costs. "392 The Local Standards organize this category by region. 
Within a region, high-expense urban areas are singled out for favored treatment. For 
the Northeast Census Region, New York is designated to include counties in New 
Jersey, Connecticut and even Pennsylvania, as well as designated counties in New 
York. Not all New York counties are listed, however. For example, in Manhattan, 
allowed transportation expenses are as follows: 
385 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) (2006) (emphasis added). 
386 In/n re Zak, No. 06-41241, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 88, at *8-17 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Jan. 12, 2007), Judge ~ay 
Woods allowed the full mortgage deduction even though the mortgage lender had obtained a pre-bankruptcy 
judgment of foreclosure. The United States trustee argued that the mortgage agreement "merged" with the 
contract, so there was no longer any secured debt due and owing under a contract. Id. In defense of this ruling, it 
can be pointed out that if the mortgage lender were to accept tender of an installment, the contract would be 
reinstated and the lender would be estopped from foreclosing. Given this possibility, the judgment of foreclosure 
does not mean the mortgage agreement is completely dead. It may also be noted that some courts believe the 
anti-ride-through legislation direcJ!'!d at cars implies that ride-through exists as to real estate. See Chadwick M. 
Werner, Still Applicable: An Examination of BAPCPA 's Perplexing Response to the Ride-Through Debate, 16 J. 
BANKR. L. & PRAC. 49, 68 (2007). 
387 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(i)(V) (2006). In In re Simmons, 357 B.R. 480, 486-87 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2006), 
Judge Marilyn Shea-Stonum allowed extra utility expense even though the debtor intended to Surrender the house 
to mortgagees. 
388 See Form B22A, supra note 32, Line 37. 
389 Wedoff, supra note 26, at 270-71. 
39° Form B22A, supra note 32, Line 22. 
391 See In re Casey, 356 B.R. 519,526 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 2007) (holding motorcycle is a "car"). 
392 Form B22A, supra note 32, Line 22. 








A resident of, say, Chautauqua County (a rural location) must use the generic regional 







This Local Standard arguably benefits persons who, like me, walk to work and own no 
car. In my case, a deduction of $313 per month substantially exceeds the amount I 
spend on subway trips and taxis. 
Separately, the Local Standards permit a deduction for ownership and lease 
expenses. Here there is no regional variation. All debtors are allocated $4 71 for the 
first car and $332 for the second car.394 As with home mortgages, the Local Standard 
for cars is overridden by the admonition in section 707(b )(2)(A)(ii)(I) that, 
"[n]otwithstanding any other provision of this clause, the monthly expenses of the 
debtor shall not include any payment for debts. "395 Accordingly, a deduction must be 
made for scheduled payments on car loans.396 Again, the negative numbers are 
abolished for this purpose. As with home mortgages, the debtor will be able to reclaim 
the full monthly payment on cars under section 707(a)(iii), covering payments on 
secured debts. The net result is that car renters are disfavored. If their actual rental 
payments exceed the Local Standard, they are not permitted the deduction. But car 
owners with secured car loans are permitted the deduction. 
So debtors are entitled to fixed deductions for two cars, but they must deduct actual 
payments on secured debt with regard to the cars. May a debtor allocate the cheap car 
payments to the $471 and the high car payments to $332, thereby maximizing total 
deductions net of secured creditor payments? In In re Casey,397 Judge Patricia 
Williams ruled that the more expensive car must be allocated to the $471 figure; the 
cheaper car must be allocated to the $332 figure.398 But in In re Carlton, 399 Judge Mary 
Gorman found no such restriction on debtor discretion in the statute and permitted an 
allocation favorable to the debtor. 
Perhaps the most important issue for transportation expense is whether a debtor 
393 In a joint case, the two debtors with two cars cannot both claim this higher amount but rather must take the 
lesser combined two-car deduction. In re Lara, 347 B.R. 198, 202-03 (Banlcr. N.D. Tex. 2006). 
394 Form B22A, supra note 32, Lines 23-24 (listing first and second car). 
395 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) (2006). 
396 One court states that a debtor is entitled to the higher of the Local Standard or the actual ownership 
expense, and that "[a]ll of the courts agree .... " In re Hartwick, 352 B.R. 867,868 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2006). This 
mis-describes the statute. All debt payments must be eliminated from the National Standards. Then actual .debt 
service must be added back in. In fact, actual debt service governs, when the debtor owes a secured loan. 
397 356 B.R. 519,526 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 2007). 
398 For this purpose, motorcycles were deemed to be cars. Id. 
399 No. 06-71322, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 545, at *20-22 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. Feb. 28, 2007) (determining debtor's 
allowable deductions in chapter 13). 
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who owes no secured car debt may nevertheless have the deduction allowed for 
ownership expense.400 Two commentators predict that this one issue alone will have a 
huge impact on debtors' ability to survive a means test challenge.401 The Manual 
describes the Local Standards as a cap on actual expenses. But section 
707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) states that "monthly expenses shall be the debtor's applicable 
monthly expense amounts specified under the National Standards and Local Standards 
•••• 11402 No reference to actual expenses is permitted by the statute, and so both these 
notions seem unrelated to actual expenditures.403 "Thus, even hypothetical taxpayers 
living in a Garden of Eden, with cost-free satisfaction of all their basic needs, would 
still be allowed a deduction from income in the total amount set out in the [IRS 
Manual]. 11404 The form supplied by the United States Trustee's office agrees and 
provides a deduction regardless of actual expenses.405 Several courts concur that, even 
if the debtor owes no car payments, she may still have the full deduction for car 
ownership.406 
Other courts disagree. They point out that section 707(b )(2)(A)(ii)(I) states that the 
debtor's monthly expenses shall be "the debtor's applicable monthly expense amounts 
specified under the ... Local Standards .... 11407 Since the debtor owes nothing on cars 
absolutely owned, the Local Standards are not "applicable.11408 Such a holding 
transgresses Form B22A, which seems to permit the full Local Standard deduction 
400 Wedoff, supra note 26, at 255-56. Judge Wedoff does not explain where consumer debt comes from_ in such 
an environment. 
401 Culhane & White, Catching Can-Pay Debtors, supra note 25, at 676; see also In re Ragle, No. 06~30208, 
2007 Bankr. LEXIS 874, at *10-15 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. Mar. 23, 2007); In re Singletary, 354 B.R. 455, 466-67 
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006) (exclusion of truck payments was outcome-determinative). 
402 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) (2006); In re Singletary, 354 B.R. at 466-67. 
403 See In re Grunert, 353 B.R. 591,594 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2006) (stating in chapter 13 case "Local Standard 
deductions for vehicle ownership as fixed allowances rather than caps on actual expenses is supported by thi 
plain meaning of the statute ... the legislative history, and carefully reasoned case law"). 
404 Wedoff, supra note 26, at 255. 
405 See Form B22A, supra note 32, Line 22 ("You are entitled to an expense allowance in this category 
regardless of whether you pay the expenses of operating a vehicle and regardless of whether you use public 
transportation."). 
406 See In re Ragle, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 874, at *10-11; In re Enright, No. 06-10747, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 812, 
at *22-23 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Mar. 6, 2007); In re Zak, No. 06-41241, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 88, at *21 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ohio Jan. 12, 2007); In re Wilson, No. 06-10834, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 3368, at *22 (Bankr. D. Del. Dec. 
11, 2006); In re Haley, 354B.R. 340, 343-44 (Bankr. D.NR 2006); In re Fowler, 349 B.R. 414,419 (Bankr. D. 
Del. 2006). 
407 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I).(2006) (emphasis added). 
408 Accord In re Slusher, No. BK-S-06-10435-BAM, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 127, at *52-54 (Bankr. D. Nev. Jan. 
17, 2007); In re Harris, 353 B.R. 304, 308-10 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 2006); In re Carlin, 348 B.R. 795,798 (Bankr. 
D. Ore. 2006); In re Oliver, 350 B.R. 294, 301 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2006); In re Wiggs, No. 06B70203, 2006 
Bankr. LEXIS 1547, at *9 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Aug. 4, 2006); In re Barraza, 346 B.R. 724, 728-29 (Bankr. N.D. 
Tex .. 2006); cf IRM § 5.15.1.7 ("If a taxpayer has no car payment only the operating cost portion of the 
transportation standard is used to figure the allowable transportation expense."). But see In re Johnson, 346 B.R. 
256, 266 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2006) (Local Standards comprise a floor below which a debtor may not fall). In In re 
Demonica, 345 B.R. 895, 904-05 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2006), Judge Manuel Barbosa permitted the Local Standard 
ownership expense where the non-debtor spouse owed the car debt, but the debtor used the car. He also agreed 
that the deduction cannot be claimed where the debtor owned the car outright. Id. 
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when actual payments on the car are zero.409 
In In re Slusher,410 Judge Bruce Markell asked the question whether Congress 
intended to defer to the IRS's pre-discretion criteria for car expense, or whether 
Congress intended to defer to IRS criteria in the context of the discretion the IRS 
typically uses. He viewed the latter as more likely and so disallowed car ownership 
expense where the debtor owned the car outright. But this is open to a counter-point. If 
the debtor had owed a tiny amount per month on his car-say $50 per month-would 
not that IRS expense be "applicable" to the debtor, allowing for a deduction of $471? 
But if that is so, why should a zero payment cancel the deduction, when a $50 payment 
does not? Since it clearly intended a fixed deduction in the $50 case, Congress showed 
no concern for the actual expense of the debtor, even if the expense is zero. 
Furthermore, the holding in cases like Slusher is open to strategic abuse. Suppose 
the debtor grants a friend an unperfected security interest on a car for $60, amortized at 
one dollar per month. Now the IRS standard is "applicable" and the debtor can deduct 
the full $471, making chapter 7 a more likely option. The fact that _the unperfected 
security interest can be avoided in the chapter 7 case does not seem to affect the 
applicability of the IRS Local Standards. 
One good policy reason to give the debtor the allowance is that, where the debtor 
owns the car free and clear it is probably old, about to fall apart, and in need of 
replacement. The means testing formula is, after all, supposed to be a test going 
forward as to whether a chapter 13 plan would yield substantial dividends for the 
unsecured creditors. If, however, the debtor is likely to need a new car in the next five 
years, the entire Local Standard amount gives a better picture of the future. 
In compensation for these older vehicles, some courts note that the IRM allows an 
extra $200 operating expense when a car has more than 75,000 miles on it and permits 
the enhancement.411 Form B22A, however, does not alert debtors to this allowance.412 
409 See Form B22A, supra note 32, Lines 23( c ), 24( c) (requiring information on "[n ]et ownership/lease expense 
for Vehicle"). Judge Mark Vaughn explains away the statutory word "applicable" as follows: 
Under section 707(b )(2)(A)(ii)(I) what makes an ownership expense "applicable" is 
not whether the debtor is required to make a car payment or whether the deduction would 
be allowed by the IRS. Rather, whether an expense is "applicable" depends on the number 
of vehicles owned or leased by the debtor. Further, in section 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I), the term 
"applicable" modifies the phrase "monthly expense amounts specified under the National 
Standards and Local Standards." With the exception of the ownership expense, all other 
Local Standards vary depending on where the debtor resides. Thus, where a debtor resides 
dictates which Local Standards are "applicable." Section 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) incorporates 
the IRS's figures, but not the IRS's publications and procedures. 
In re Haley, 354 B.R. 340, 343-44 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2006) 
410 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 127, at *45. 
4 Il See IRM § 5.8.5.5.2; see also In re Slusher, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 127, at *55; In re Oliver, 350 B.R. at 301; 
In re McGuire, 342 B.R. 608, 613-14 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2006). 
412 See Form B22A, supra note 32, Line 22. 
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iv. Other Necessary Expenses 
In addition to the National and Local Standards, which are set amounts the debtor 
cannot vary, the debtor is also entitled to deduct "Other Necessary Expenses issued by 
the Internal Revenue Service for the area in which the debtor resides .... "413 Judge 
Wedoff has found three places in the Internal Revenue Manual that list Other 
Necessary Expenses.414 According to the first list, there are (1) accounting and legal 
fees, (2) charitable contributions,415 (3) child care, (4) court-ordered payments (such as 
alimony and child support), (5) dependent care, (6) health care, (7) involuntary wage 
deductions (such as for union dues or uniforms),416 (8) life insurance, (9) secured debts, 
(10) unsecured debts, (11) current taxes,417 (12) optional telephones and telephone 
services (such as cell phones and pagers),418 (13) student loans, (14) internet service, 
and (15) repayment ofloans made for payment of federal taxes.419 Another portion of 
the Manual adds (16) education, (17) disability insurance, and (18) professional 
association dues.420 A third list gives further definition of some of the categories 
already set forth.421 
Form B22A includes several lines for "Other Necessary Expenses,"422 but gives 
scanty hints with regard to the rich array of categories. With regard to Other Necessary 
Expenses, the debtor must confirm under oath that call waiting, caller identification 
and internet services are "necessary for the health and welfare of you and your 
dependents. "423 Of course, it can be argued that a loss of "call waiting" is per sea loss 
413 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) (2006). 
414 Wedoff, supra note 26, at 261-62. 
415 See id. Courts have rejected the idea that voluntary tithing is a Necessary Expense. See In re Tranmer, 355 
B:R. 234, 252-53 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2006); In re Diagostino, 347 B.R. 116, 119 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2006). The 
IRS Manual requires a charitable contribution to be a condition of employment: "Example: a minister is required 
to tithe according to his employment contract." IRM § 5.15.1.10. 
416 See infra text accompanying notes 428-31. 
417 This would include income tax withholding. Over-withholding, however, is not allowed. See In re Lawson, 
No. 06-22766, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 174, at *11-15 (Bankr. D. Utah Jan. 25, 2007); In re Johnson, 346 B.R. 256, 
269 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2006); see also In re Risher, 344 B.R. 833,837 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2006). A difficulty arises 
when a debtor files for bankruptcy in February and is over-withholding; how can the debtor know what may 
happen for the balance of the year that might increase the debtor's taxes? In In re Balcerowski, 353 B.R. 581,582 
(Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2006) (discussing tax refunds in chapter 13), Judge Pamela Pepper ruled that the debtor may 
not over-withhold and must simply use the best estimate available at the time the form is filled out. 
418 Dial-up internet is not allowed, where the debtor also claims an expense for high speed internet access. In re 
Lara, 347 B.R. 198, 203-04 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006). Thus, expense is limited to "the debtor, the dependents of 
the debtor, and the spouse of the debtor in a joint case." 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) (2006). Therefore, cell 
phones for a non-dependent adult child (even if chronically ill) are not permitted. See In re Haley, 354 B.R. 340, 
344-45 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2006). Meanwhile, there is redundancy between this item and the Local Standards for 
housing and utilities (which includes telephone bills). In In re Carlton, No. 06-71322, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 545, 
at *22-23 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. Feb. 28, 2007), Judge Mary Gorman allowed the debtor the full telecommunications 
deduction nevertheless. 
419 IRM § 5.15.1.10 (3). 
420 Wedoff, supra note 26, at 260-61 (interpreting section 5.19.1.4.3.5 of the IRM). 
421 See IRM Exhibit 5.19.1-12. . 
422 Form B22A, supra note 32, Lines 24-31. 
423 Id. Line 31; see also In re Napier, No. 06-02464-JW, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 2248, at *4-5 (Bankr. D.S.C. 
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of "welfare," so perhaps a debtor can hazard an oath on such a proposition. 
These Other Necessary Expenses exclude expenses for housing and transportation, 
which are fully provided for elsewhere.424 Yet they also include optional telephone 
services even though housing expenses include non-mortgage expenses, which is 
conceived of as the cost of "utilities. "425 At least one court has permitted cell phone 
expense as an "Other Necessary Expense" in addition to the non-mortgage utility 
expense as part of housing.426 
To the extent Other Necessary Expenses cover the payment of debts, it must be 
remembered that section 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) provides: "Notwithstanding any other 
provision of this clause, the monthly expenses of the debtor shall not include any 
payments for debts. "427 For this reason, one court has ruled that, even though payments 
of ERISA loans through wage withholding are "mandatory," ERISA loans are not 
debts; they can never be an "Other Necessary Expense."428 But this overlooks another 
portion of BAPCPA. New section 362(b)(19) holds that the automatic stay does not 
prevent wage withholding in favor of the ERIS A plan. Yet new section 362(b )( 19) also 
goes on to say, "nothing in this paragraph may be construed to provide that any loan 
made under [ERISA] . . . constitutes a claim or a debt under this title. "429 So 
presumably an ERISA loan repayment can be an expense under section 
707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I), provided it is a.mandatory wage deduction. 
In In re Barraza,430 Judge Russell Nelms held that the ERISA loan repayments 
from wages are not mandatory. 
Both plans provide that the loans must be repaid via payroll 
deductions .... However, the requirement to repay the 40l(k) loans is 
not a job requirement in the sense that union dues, uniforms, and work 
shoes are. The consequence of a debtor's failure to comply with the 
requirement to pay union dues, wear a -particular uniform, or wear 
certain shoes is, in all likelihood, loss of employment. By contrast, the 
consequences of the debtor defaulting on his 401(k) loans is that the 
loans are treated.as taxable distributions. Consequently, the plan loan 
repayments do not qualify as "involuntary deductions" under the 
Internal Revenue Manual.431 
Judge Nelm's conclusion can certainly be challenged. Nothing in the Manual makes the 
Sept. 18, 2006) (reducing debtor to $175 per month from $330 and stating $90 internet justified by nature of 
debtor's employment). 
424 See In re Demonica, 345 B.R. 895, 903 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2006); In re Lara, 347 B.R. 198, 204 (Bankr. N.D. 
Tex. 2006). 
425 See supra text accompanying notes 378-79. 
426 See In re Stimac, No. 06-25377-svk, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 997, at *6 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. Mar. 29, 2007). 
427 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) (2006). 
428 In re Thompson, 350 B.R. 770, 776-77 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2006). 
429 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(19) (2006). 
430 346 B.R. 724, 730 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006). 
431 Id. 
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manditoriness of the withholding be the sine qua non of continued employment. If 
BRISA withholding constitutes an assignment of wages, then indeed it is mandatory, in 
the sense that the BRISA plan has a fiduciary duty to enforce the assignment 
mechanism. For this reason, Judge Nelms's conclusion should be rejected as based on 
an unnecessary predicate of job retention. 
v. Health and Disability Insurance 
The lack of social health care programs was certainly in the air in 2005, and so 
Congress has permitted deductions for "reasonably necessary health insurance, 
disability insurance, and health savings account expenses for the debtor, the spouse of 
the debtor, or dependents of the debtor. "432 Form B22A does not limit these amounts to 
"reasonably necessary" insurance but simply asks straight out what the debtor pays on 
average per month for these items.433 
Amounts contributed to health savings accounts are deductible from federal 
income tax.434 This deduction was added or at least refined435 by the Medicare 
legislation in 2003.436 It is part of a neo-conservative solution to rising health costs. 
The premise is that Americans (with insurance) are over-insured and so they visit the 
doctor too often. The scheme is to get American taxpayers to buy "high deductible 
health plans"437 in exchange for which the taxpayer may establish a tax-deferred 
savings account to cover the increased personal medical expense that results. 
These new health savings accounts are not to be confused with annual use-it-or-
lose-it flexible spending accounts that are part of a cafeteria plan offered by 
employers.438 Because nothing is "saved" in these plans, Congress could not have 
meant to include these contributions within the scope of section 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I). 
vi. Family Violence 
BAPCPA permits a debtor to deduct whatever is spent to protect the debtor from 
family violence, "as identified under section 309 of the Family Violence Prevention 
432 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) (2006). This amendment was the work of Senator Ted Kennedy. See Ronald 
J. Mann, Bankruptcy Reform and the "Sweat Box" of Credit Card Debt, 2007 U. lLL. L. REV. 375, 383. 
433 Form B22A, supra note 32, Line 34. 
434 See I.R.C. § 223 (West Supp. 2006). 
435 The concept began as a pilot program promulgated in the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936. 
436 Medicare Prescription, Drug Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 1201, 
117 Stat. 2066, 2469. See generally Timothy S. Jost & Mark A. Hall, The Role of State Regulation in Consumer-
Driven Health Care, 31 AM. J. L. & MED. 395, 395 (2005); Edward J. Larson & Marc Dettman, The Impact of 
HSAs on Health Care Reform: Preliminary Results After One Year, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1087, 1097-1100 
(2005). 
437 This is a term of art in the legislation. See Health Savings Accounts (HSAs ), INSTITUTIONAL REV. BOARD. 
NOTICE 2004-2, Jan. 12, 2004, at 269. 
438 See Regina T. Jefferson, Medical Savings Accounts: Windfalls for the Healthy, Wealthy and Wise, 48 CATII. 
U. L. REV. 685, 704 (1999) (distinguishing health savings accounts from flexible spending accounts). 
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and Services Act, or other applicable law."439 The court is enjoined to keep this last 
amount confidential.440 Section 309 of this Act, redesignated as section 320 in 2003, 
defines "family violence" as: 
[A]ny act or threatened act of violence, including any forceful 
detention of an individual, which-
(A) results or threatens to result in physical injury; and 
(B) is committed by a person against another individual 
(including an elderly person) to whom such person is or was 
related by blood or marriage or otherwise legally related or with 
whom such person is or was lawfully residing.441 
The last clause is broad enough to cover expenses to guard against any former 
roommate as well as against family members. It does not, however, cover stalking 
unless preceded by cohabitation. 
What expenses may be deducted in the name of warding off family violence? 
Judge Wedoff thinks the expense of keeping a watchdog might qualify;442 but before 
deducting the expenses of Poopsie, the family's pet poodle, the debtor will presumably 
have to document a violent threat from a relative or roommate. 
vii. The Chronically Ill 
The debtor may add actual expenses for "the continuation of actual expenses paid 
by the debtor that are reasonable and necessary" for the care of an elderly, chronically 
ill, or disabled household member or member of the immediate family who is unable to 
pay such expense.443 The word "continuation" is problematic, suggesting the care for 
the infirm relative somehow precedes the chapter 7 case in some way;444 though, as 
Judge Wedoff points out, it is still possible for a debtor to introduce purely prospective 
care as a "special circumstance" to rebut the appearance of bankruptcy abuse, pursuant 
to Section 707(b)(2)(B)(i).445 Where the aged relative is entitled to welfare payments, 
the phrase "reasonable and necessary" could justify a court in declaring it an abuse if 
439 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) (2006). 
440 See id. Judge Wedoff speculates: "The requirement that the court keep the expenses confidential probably 
refers to the detail of the expenses involved rather than to the amount claimed, and might require closing the 
courtroom to spectators in the event of a § 707(b) motion challenging the reasonableness of the expenses claimed 
for preventing family violence." Wedoff, supra note 26, at 265-66. 
441 42 U.S.C.A. § 10421(1) (West 2003); cf. Keeping Children and Families Safe Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 
108-36, § 415(5), 117 Stat. 800,830. 
442 See Wedoff, supra note 26, at 265. 
443 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(II) (2006). 
444 Tabb, supra note 333, at 29 ("Why should a debtor who is already caring for a disabled relative be allowed 
a deduction while a debtor who needs to start doing so after filing bankruptcy is not?"). 
445 Wedoff, supra note 26, at 266 ("An anticipated need to provide support payments in the future would only 
be relevant as a 'special circumstance' to rebut a presumption of abuse."). Section 707(b)(2)(B)(ii) puts the 
burden on the debtor to itemize, document, and explain under oath any adjustment of income or added expense. 
11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(B)(ii) (2006). 
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the debtor's aged relative fails to seek such relief. 
The infirm recipient of debtor charity must either be a member of the household or 
a member of the debtor's immediate family, which "includes" siblings, parents, etc., but 
does not specifically mention step-children out of the household or parents-in-law. 
Presumably the non-exclusive nature of this definition is broad enough to include these 
more extended relations. Aged servants and loyal retainers out of the household are not 
deductible. Hopefully, these sad figures have followed Adam's advice in As You Like 
It: 
The thrifty hire I saved under your father, 
Which I did store to be my foster-nurse 
When service should in my old limbs lie lame 
And unregarded age in corners thrown .... 446 
viii. Chapter 13 Expenses 
A seemingly curious item is that a debtor eligible for chapter 13 (yet nevertheless 
in chapter 7) may include the "actual" administrative expense of administering a 
chapter 13 plan.447 By "actual," Congress means the hypothetical expenses the debtor 
would have borne in his judicial district had she filed in chapter 13 instead of chapter 
7. The requirement makes sense in that the sixty-month test ultimately aims to see if, in 
the sixty months following the bankruptcy test, the debtor could generate substantial 
payments to the unsecured nonpriority creditors. Since a chapter 13 proceeding is a 
likely mode for achieving these payments, the debtor is permitted to deduct the chapter 
13 administrative expense, even though the debtor may qualify for chapter 7, where no 
such expense will be borne. 
Debtors may not in fact be eligible for chapter 13. For instance, too much debt may 
eliminate such an option.448 In such a case, no chapter 13 expense can be deducted, 
since section 707(a)(2)(A)(ii)(III) requires a debtor to be "eligible for chapter 13." Such 
a debtor might be eligible for chapter 11,449 but there is no provision for any deduction 
of hypothetical chapter 11 expenses. Although chapter 11 expenses would be a priority 
claim under section 507(a)(2), they would be claims against the bankruptcy estate, not 
against the debtor and so not eligible for deduction under the priority concept in section 
707(b )(2)(A)(iv). 
The chapter 13 fee is set by the attorney generaLit may not exceed 10% of plan 
disbursements through the standing chapter 13 trustee. But chapter 13 is embroiled in a 
controversy as to whether such things as mortgage payments must be made through the 
trustee, or whether these payments can be made "outside the plan. "450 Since the debtor 
446 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, AS You LIKE IT act 2, SC. 3. 
447 See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(III) (2006). 
448 See 11 U.S.C. § 109( e) (2006). Currently, these amounts are $307,675 forunsecured debts and $922,975 for 
secured debts. 
449 Chapter 11 cases generate quarterly fees to the United States trustee. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1930 (a)(6) (2006). 
450 See David Gray Carlson, Cars and Homes in Chapter 13 After the 2005 Amendments to the Bankruptcy 
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can write what plan she pleases, it is open for the debtor to hypothesize no payments 
outside the plan, thereby inflating the deductions by 10% of mortgage and car 
payments. 
ix. Tuition 
A debtor may add $1,500 per year per dependent child, to the extent of actual 
expenses to attend a private or public elementary or secondary school.451 The debtor 
must document the expenses and explain why they are reasonable and necessary and 
not already accounted for in the National Standards and Local Standards referred to 
section 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(II). This requirement should embroil the courts in such 
inquiries as whether parochial schools teaching religion is reasonable or necessary.452 
Yet courts were already embroiled in this dispute prior to BAPCPA.453 
In In re Cleary,454 Judge David Duncan permitted a debtor to exceed the limit of 
$1,500 per child on the grounds that tuition was an "Other Necessary Expense." He 
cautioned, however, thatthe holding was limited to the circumstance of a non-debtor 
spouse who was willing to work in order to pay tuition, but was not willing to work for 
the coarser purpose of paying her spouse's credit card debt. The extra deduction was 
permitted because it was not at the expense of the unsecured creditors. 
x. Secured Debts 
A debtor may deduct amounts needed to pay secured creditors. The expense is the 
amounts due under the security agreement.455 Lest the future payments be other than 
equal installments, the debtor must calculate the amount due over sixty months and 
then divide by sixty.456 
With regard to this deduction, there is no limitation on the nature of the collateral. 
"Thus, for purposes of the means test, debt secured even by such items as luxury 
vehicles, pleasure boats, and vacation homes would be deductible. "457 Many find the 
secured credit provision the single biggest opportunity for debtors to manipulate the 
Code, 14 AM. BANKR. lNST. L. REV. 301, 321-26 (2006). 
451 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(IV) (2006). 
452 Tabb, supra note 333, at 29 (considering bankruptcy judge's discretion in determining what expenses are 
reasonable and necessary). 
453 See supra Part III.B.2.a.ii. 
454 357 B.R. 369, 373-74 (Banlcr. D.S.C. 2006). 
455 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii)(I) (2006). 
456 See id. 
457 See Wedoff, supra note 26, at 274; see also Culhane & White, Catching Can-Pay Debtors, supra note 25, at 
676 ("A much bigger impact flows from the decision to let debtors deduct their total average monthly secured 
debt payments, with no express requirement that the collateral be necessary."); Tabb; supra note 333, at 42 
(discussing rich debtor's ability to deduct vehicle payments from income in computing means test). A United 
States trustee's claim that only two cars can be deducted, since the Local Standards only permit two cars, is 
rejected in In re Carlton, No. 06-71322, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 545, at *19-20 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. Feb. 28, 2007). 
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means test.458 
In comparison, prior to BAPCP A, the purchase of new items on secured credit 
(thereby diverting too much income away from the unsecured creditors) was grounds 
to dismiss a chapter 7 case.459 In assessing pre-BAPCPA law, two commentators 
opined: 
For example, if the debtor purchases a new Ro lex on credit just before 
filing for bankruptcy protection, the debtor's disposable income going 
forward has to support a much higher total debt. In such 
circumstances, the court can and will adjust the debtor's ability to pay 
figure, calculating it based on the debtor's total debt without the 
additional Rolex debt.460 
Ironically, this "abuse" is now directly sanctioned by BAPCPA. 
Pre-BAPCP A case law, however, may still apply for "totality of the circumstances" 
dismissals under section 707(b)(3)(B) for debtors who pass the means test.461 This 
depends on whether the means test of section 707(b )(2) is preemptive of prior case law 
or not. And, indeed, this very issue decides the question whether BAPCPA increases 
the opportunity for bankruptcy abuse, or whether it simply has no effect. 
Circumstances may cast doubt on whether the debtor will in fact make all 
scheduled payments.462 For example, the collateral may be subject to a pre-petition 
foreclosure proceeding, which might (but might not) portend loss of the house. The 
secured credit deduction has nevertheless been allowed under these circumstances.463 
Or the debtor may have expressed, per section 52l(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code, 
her intention to surrender the collateral to the secured creditor. Courts have still 
allowed the deduction.464 If debtor equity in a luxury item exists, the item would likely 
458 See In re LaSota, 351 B.R. 56, 62-63 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2006) (describing lines of cases where payments 
on secured debt were made to secure luxury items); Culhane & White, Catching Can-Pay Debtors, supra note 
25, at 67 6 ( describing deduction of average monthly secured debt payments as "gaping hole in the means test"). 
459 See Costello v. Bodenstein, No. 01CV9696, 2002 WL 1821663, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 7, 2002). 
460 Olazabal & Foti, supra note 14, at 339-40. 
461 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(3)(B) (2006); see also Neustadter, supra note 47, at 291, 296 (asserting judicial 
discretion allows bankruptcy judge to dismiss chapter 7 case for abuse based on totality of circumstances of 
debtor's financial situation, even if debtor passes means test). 
462 In In re Sorrell, No. 06-3 I 720, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 161, at *6 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio Jan. 26, 2007), the United 
States trustee argued that "scheduled as contractually due to sheriff creditors" refers to bankruptcy schedules, not 
to contractual schedules. Cf 11 U.~_.,C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(l)(2006). Judge Waldron had no trouble rejecting this 
claim. 
463 See In re Hartwick, 352 B.R. 867, 868 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2006); see also In re Sorrell, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 
161, at *9. 
464 See In re Galyon, No. 06-11985-WV, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 969, at *17-18 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. Mar. 22, 
2007); In re Haar, No. 06-31270, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 544, *23-24 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Feb. 20, 2007) (holding 
debtor may negotiate reaffirmation and therefore never carry out intention); In re Hartwick, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 
476, at *14-15; In re Sorrell, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 161, at *43-55; In re Randle, No. 06B05929, 2006 Bankr. 
LEXIS 3519, at *7-8 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Dec. 19, 2006); In re Simmons, 357 B.R. 480; 483-84 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 
2006);In reWalker,No. 05-15010-whd, 2006Bankr.LEXIS 845, at *10-13 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. May 1, 2006). In 
In re Singletary, 354 B.R. 455, 466-67 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006), Judge Jeff Bohrn ruled that where the surrender 
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be taken from the debtor and liquidated.465 Nevertheless, section 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) 
still seems to authorize the deduction. The debtor is absolutely entitled to "the total of 
all amounts scheduled as contractually due to secured creditors in each month of the 60 
months following the date of the petition .... "466 
When the Local Standards were the issue, courts seized upon the word 
"applicable," in order to deny debtors deductions for expenses they did not actually 
bear.467 In section 707(b)(2)(A)(iii), however, the word "applicable" does not appear. 
A debtor may also deduct the amounts needed to cure arrears on secured claims, 
but here the deduction is limited to "the debtor's primary residence, motor vehicle, or 
other property necessary for the support of the debtor and the debtor's dependents ... 
. " 468 Whatever the arrears are, the debtor may prorate them by dividing the amount by 
sixty and deducting the remainder from current monthly income. This provision 
therefore replicates treatment of arrears in chapter 13 cases.469 The fact that cure is 
limited to these items, incidentally, suggests that the category of secured debts covered 
generally is unlimited.470 
One controversial issue under BAPCPA is whether a debtor's expense in paying 
back a loan from her BRISA plan (through payroll withholding) is a properly 
deductible expense. As we shall see, in chapter 13 a debtor may deduct the expense of 
repaying the BRISA loan.471 Since the point of section 707(b)(2) is to determine 
whether a chapter 13 plan yields a significant dividend to the unsecured creditors, it 
would make sense for section 707(b)(2) to be coordinated with the chapter 13 rule with 
respect to BRISA loans. In In re Thompson,472 Judge Arthur Harris achieved this goal 
by ruling that repayment of the BRISA loan is repayment of a secured debt and so 
had been accomplished by the time of the motion to dismiss, the secured credit deduction could not be had. But if 
surrender is intended but not yet carried out, the debtors may have the full secured credit deduction. This 
solution, besides making everything tum on the arbitrary chronological order between surrender and the motion 
to dismiss, overlooks the point that, just because the car has been surrendered, the secured claim is not yet 
extinguished. The car lender must still hold an Article 9 sale. Until then the debtor owes the money and the 
lender still has a security interest. Judge Bohm assumes surrender is an asset payment to which the debtor has 
consented pursuant to section 9-622 of the Uniform Commercial Code, but that is not necessarily the case. 
465 See In re Parker, 351 B.R. 790, 795 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2006) (discussing chapter 7 trustee's proposal to sell 
debtor's $180,000 fantasy houseboat). 
466 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii)(I) (2006). 
467 See supra text accompanying notes 384-86. 
468 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii)(II) (2006). Judge Wedoff predicts that arrears on the teenage son's car are 
potentially not deductible. Wedoff, supra note 26, at 274-75. 
469 See 1 GRANT GILMORE & DAVID GRAY CARLSON, GILMORE AND CARLSON ON SECURED LENDING: 
CLAIMS IN BANKRUPTCY§ 9.10 (2000). 
47° Culhane & White, Catching Can-Pay Debtors, supra note 25, at 676. 
471 See infra text accompanying notes 509-10. Oddly, this rule is to be found in section 541 (b )(7) of the Code, 
where few chapter 13 practitioners would think to look. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(b)(7) (2006) ("Property of the 
estate does not include ... any amount ... withheld by an employer from the wages of employees for payment 
as contributions ... to an employee benefit plan that is subject to title I of the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974 .... "). 
472 350 B.R. 770, 776 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2006) ("From a policy standpoint, it makes little sense that Congress 
would expressly exclude any amounts required to repay 401(k) loans from the definition of'disposable income' 
under 11 U.S.C. § 1325, yet include such income for purpose of determining abuse under section 707(b)."). 
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deductible under section 707(b )(2)(A)(iii)(I). 
To reach this sensible result, Judge Harris points out that section 408(b)(l)(B) of 
BRISA does indeed require that the loan be" adequately secured. "473 So, by definition, 
an BRISA loan is a secured debt. In practice, this requirement is usually satisfied by the 
idea that the BRISA account itself is collateral for a withdrawal from the BRISA 
account.474 This sounds odd at first, but what the plan's "security" consists of is the 
plan's right to set off payment of benefits against the loan the debtor owes. Under 
section 506(a)( 1 ), a setoff right is directly equated with a security interest in collateral. 
So syllogistic reasoning establishes that BRISA loans are secured debts. Judge Harris 
reaches the same result by a different route. He rejects the idea that "secured creditors" 
in section 707(b )(2)(A)(iii)(I) are the same as "secured claim" under section 506(a)(l). 
Rather "the Court must look to the common, ordinary meaning of the term. "475 In fact, 
a reference to section 506(a) is more helpful to the result. Common sense does not 
always equate set-off rights with security interests.476 
A second justification can be founded on the debtor's pledge of the wage income 
stream to the BRISA plan as the mode of repaying the loan. In other words, the BRISA 
repayment mechanism constitutes the plan's security interest in the wages themselves. 
Such security interests are not covered by Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code.477 Presumably BRISA law governs them, as BRISA is held to create special 
federal property rights not subject to the limitations of state law.478 Yet the very case 
that launched the myth of the fresh start, Local Loan Co. v. Hunt,479 holds that wage 
assignments are automatically dissolved in bankruptcy. To find that the debtor has 
made a wage assignment to the BRISA plan requires, first, that the terms of the plan 
require the withholding and, second, that enactment of BRISA overrules the 
historically previous principle of Local Loan. 
Complicating Judge Harris's ruling is new section 362(b )(19), which holds that the 
automatic stay does not prevent wage withholding in favor of the BRISA plan. Without 
more, this new rule coheres with the idea that the BRISA plan is a secured creditor, but 
new section 362(b )( 19) goes on to say, "nothing in this paragraph may be construed to 
provide that any loan made under [BRISA] constitutes a claim or a debt under this title 
•••• " 480 Yet section 707(b )(2)(A)(iii)(I) exempts payments to "secured creditors." If 
Judge Harris is right, then the BRISA plan is a "secured creditor" with no claim against 
473 In re Thompson, 350 B.R. at 775 (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 1106, 1108 (2000)); see 29 U.S.C.A. § 1108(b)(l)(E) 
(2000). 
474 See Shull v. State Mach. Co., 836 F.2d 306,309 (7th Cir. 1987). 
475 See In re Thompson, 350 B.R:·at 774. 
476 Grant Gilmore memorably, though erroneously, commented, "Of course a right of set-off is not a security 
interest and has never been confused with one: [Article 9] might as appropriately exclude fan dancing." 1 GRANT 
GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY§ 10.8, at 315-16 (1965). 
477 U.C.C. § 9-109(d)(3), 3 U.L.A. 105-06 (2002) ("This article does not apply to ... an assignment of a claim 
for wages, salary, or other compensation of an employee .... "). 
478 See Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 762 (1992) (noting ERlSA self-settling trusts are valid even if state 
law says otherwise). 
479 292 U.S. 234, 244-45 (1934). 
480 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(19)(B) (2006). 
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the debtor or the debtor's property.481 Yet "creditor" is a defined term that requires the 
candidate for creditcirship to have a "claim."482 Judge Harris counters with the point 
that a bankruptcy discharge does not affect "any debt . .. owed to a pension, profit-
sharing, stock bonus, or other plan established under [BRISA] under [ ] a loan 
permitted under section 408(b)(l) of [BRISA] .... " 483 If this language is read in 
isolation, one would have to admit that a debt owed to an BRISA plan is indeed a debt. 
Unfortunately, Congress terminates section 523(a)(l8) with: "nothing in this paragraph 
may be construed to provide that any loan made under [BRISA] constitutes a claim or a 
debt under this title .... "484 So BAPCPA is hopelessly contradictory on whether an 
BRISA debt is a debt. 
It could be that Judge Harris's analysis fails because we are instructed not to regard 
the obligation to the BRISA plan to be a debt or a claim. If there is no debt or claim, 
there can be no secured creditor. Nevertheless, the BRISA loan repayment is still 
deductible because it is an "Other Necessary Expense" under section 
707(b )(2)(A)(ii)(l).485 Ironically, Judge Harris ruled otherwise, because he thought that 
repayment of any debt must be excluded from Other Necessary Expenses.486 This once 
again overlooks the admonition of section 362(b)(l9) and section 523(a)(l8) that 
BRISA loan repayments are not to be considered debts. 
Arguably contrary to Thompson is In re Barraza,487 where Judge Russell Nelms 
holds "[t]he only potential authority for deducting these payments" is mandatory 
withholding under "Other Necessary Expenses. "488 This could be read as a rejection of 
the idea that the BRISA plan is a secured creditor. Furthermore, in rejecting the claim 
that the BRISA loan entails mandatory withholding (as "Other Necessary Expenses" 
requires), Judge Nelms denies that wage withholding is mandatory. If withholding is 
voluntary, not mandatory, then there has been no wage assignment, and the BRISA 
plan is no secured creditor. We have already encountered Judge Nelm's conclusion that 
the wage assignment is not mandatory. We criticized this conclusion for confusing 
manditoriness with the continuation of employment.489 This certainly misconceives the 
inquiry, if the inquiry is whether we have before us a security interest on wages. The 
issue is not whether the debtor might be fired for defaulting on the BRISA loan. Rather, 
the issue is whether the plan constitutes a security agreement assigning wages and 
whether the employer has attomed itself to the plan to execute the wage assignment. As 
these features are both true of the BRISA plans in Barraza, they would appear both to 
be mandatory withholdings for Other Necessary Expense purposes and for the purpose 
of establishing the BRISA plan as a "secured creditor" within the meaning of section 
481 Claims against the debtor's property are deemed claims against the debtor. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(2) (2006). 
482 See 11 U.S.C. § 101(10) (2006) (stating creditor is an entity containing "claim against debtor"). 
483 11 U.S.C. § 523 (a)(18)(A) (2006) (emphasis added). 
484 Id. § 523 (a)(18). 
485 See supra Part III.B.2.a.iv. 
486 In re Thompson, 350 B.R. 770, 776-77 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2006). 
487 346 B.R. 724, 729 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006). 
488 Id. at 730. 
489 See supra text accompanying notes 430-31. 
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707(b )(2)(A)(iii)(I). 
xi. Priority Claims 
U oder section 707 (b )(2)(A)(iv), a debtor may deduct payment of priority claims. 
Taxes will be covered by this concept, if they qualify for priority under section 
507(a)(8). Section 707(b)(2)(A)(iv) specifically mentions child support and alimony. In 
fact, the relevant priority is new section 507(a)(l)(A), which accords priority to 
"domestic support obligations. "490 The idea behind this deduction is to determine 
whether a chapter 13 case can generate a substantial dividend for unsecured 
nonpriority creditors if the debtor is booted from chapter 7. 
BAPCPA newly and expansively defines this term to include any amount owed to 
a spouse or a former spouse of the debtor (presumably including business loans).491 
Also covered is any amount "owed to or recoverable by ... a governmental unit. "492 
Grammatically, these amounts are not tied to a family aspect at all, although courts 
may be tempted to stray from the literal meaning of the statute to link such debts to 
family matters. If they are not so tied, out of a literalist "plain meaning" attitude, then 
all sorts of spousal and government loans can be used to reduce net monthly income. 
Of course, the total debt must be divided by sixty in order to make the amount 
comparable to the monthly standard on which means testing is based. 
Why did Congress make the pro rata amounts of priority claims deductions? In 
chapter 13, priority creditors must be paid in full over the life of the plan.493 This rule is 
an obstacle to ordinary unsecured creditors being paid in chapter 13. It therefore makes 
sense to make these priority claims a deduction in the means test, as these are amounts 
the nonpriority unsecured creditors will not get anyway. 
Perhaps the most important priority expense is the cost of bankruptcy 
administration.494 This is partially provided for in section 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(III), as we 
have seen, but this is limited to the mandatory fee due to the standing chapter 13 
trustee. Another important expense is the debtor's lawyer, who, in chapter 13 cases, is 
an administrative claimant. This is not typically the case in chapter 7 .495 In contrast, 
section 330(a)(4)(B) directly mentions the debtor's attorney in chapter 13 cases. And 
section 503(b )(2) defines as an administrative claim "compensation and reimbursement 
awarded under section 330(a) of this title .... "496 
Can the debtor claim the hypothetical expense of an attorney in a chapter 13 case 
as part of means testing for chapter 7? The answer is probably no.497 According to 
490 11 U.S.C. § 507 (a)(l)(A) (2006). 
491 Id. § 101(14A)(A)(i). 
492 See id. § 101(14A)(A)(ii). 
493 Id. § 1322(a)(2). 
494 See id. § 507(a)(2). 
495 See Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 538-39 (2004). 
496 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(2) (2006). 
497 See In re Amato, No. 06-20612 (MBK), 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 836, at *10-11 (Bankr. D.N.J. Mar. 20, 2007) 
(ruling in chapter 13 case);/n re McDonald, No. 06-31270, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 363, at *9-11 (Bankr. D. Mont. 
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section 707(b)(2)(A)(iv): "The debtor's expenses for payment of all priority claims 
(including priority child support and alimony claims) shall be calculated as the total 
amounts of debts entitled to priority, divided by 60." 498 This language apparently 
requires the priority claim to exist at the time of the bankruptcy proceeding. The 
expense of the chapter 13 attorney is entirely hypothetical. 
To be compared is the standing chapter 13 trustee deduction in section 
707(b )(2)(A)(ii)(III): 
In addition, for a debtor eligible for chapter 13, the debtor's monthly 
expenses ,may include the actual administrative expenses of 
administering a chapter 13 plan for the district in which the debtor 
resides, up to an amount of 10 percent of the projected plan payments, 
as determined under schedules issued by the Executive Office for 
United States Trustees.499 
Here the expense is expressly hypothetical (even though the statute mentions "actual 
administrative expenses"). 
If I am right, it is unfortunate. The idea of the means test is to project the payout 
over the life of a chapter 13 plan. For this reason, section 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(III) makes 
sense. But, because section 707(b )(2)(A)(iv) seems to exclude the hypothetical expense 
of the chapter 13 attorney, the means test is skewed to over-report how much will 
really be available in chapter 13. 
Suppose a debtor owes court-ordered child support, but this obligation lapses a few 
months after the bankruptcy petition. May the debtor list the full amount as if this 
expense will continue throughout the period of a hypothetical chapter 13 plan? If the 
debtor relies on section 707(b )(2)(A)(iv), the answer is apparently no. The debtor must 
estimate the total due over time and divide by sixty. So where a debtor's child support 
obligation is $600 per month, but it ends in twenty-four months, the debtor must take 
the total amount due ($14,400) and divide it by sixty to obtain $240 per month.500 If 
this is so, then suppose the debtor owes child support of $600 per month for seventeen 
years. If we follow section 707(b)(2)(A)(iv) literally, the debtor must take the total 
amount due ($122,400) and divide by sixty to obtain a deduction of $2,040. Notice 
that, unlike the secured debt exemption of section 707(b )(2)(A)(iii), the debtor need not 
limit the total dividend (to be divided by sixty) to amounts due over sixty months. 
Indeed, the dividend is not limited at all, justifying the use of the seventeen-year figure. 
Thus, BAPCP A discriminates in favor of dads who walk out on their infant children, 
compared to dads who walk out when the child is just short of the age of majority. 
Furthermore, we have already seen that court-ordered child support payments is an 
"Other Necessary Expense" within the meaning of section 707(b )(2)(A)(ii)(I). May the 
Feb. 7, 2007) (ruling in chapter 13 case). 
498 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(iv) (2006). 
499 Id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(III); see supra Part III.B.2.a.viii (discussing chapter 13 expenses). 
500 See In re Casey, 356 B.R. 519, 525-26 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 2006) (examining chapter 13 case). 
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debtor who owes $600 a month in court-ordered child support also deduct $600 in 
addition to the above deduction under section 707(b)(2)(A)(iv)? Here the answer is 
assuredly no. According to the third sentence of section 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(l), 
"[n]otwithstanding any other provision of this clause, the monthly expenses of the 
debtor shall not include any payments for debts. "501 If we consider child support a 
"debt," it may not qualify as an "Other Necessary Expense." 
3. Charitable Contributions 
According to section 707(b)(l): 
In making a determination whether to dismiss a case under this 
section, the court may not take into consideration whether a debtor has 
made, or continues to make, charitable contributions (that meet the 
definition of "charitable contribution" under section 548(d)(3)) to any 
qualified religious or charitable entity or organization (as that term is 
defined in section 548(d)(4)).502 
This sentence is unamended by BAPCPA, and many assume that it threatens to 
undermine the means-testing regime.503 
Suppose a debtor is close to passing the means test but faces dismissal. It is feared 
that the debtor could increase his contribution to Jerry Falwell in sufficient sums 'to 
meet the test. Since "the court may not take into consideration" such religious 
donations, the debtor enters into chapter 7 bankruptcy. 504 
Charitable contributions do not appear in the list of allowed expenses in section 
707(b )(2)(A)(ii). Therefore, it is open for a debtor who flunks the test to show that the 
charitable contributions are just high enough to qualify the debtor for chapter 7. Of 
course, the televangelist amendment requires that the debtor "has made, or continues to 
make" the contributions. So presumably some sort of historical record will have to be 
established. If the chapter 7 proceeding is permitted, it will be up to the good 
conscience of the debtor whether he will live up to the representations made to the 
bankruptcy court, though it should be remarked that revoking discharges under section 
727(d) is a possible remedy if the televangelist does not get his monthly fraudulent 
transfer. 
There is, however, a counter-argument. Means testing is in general a mandatory 
presumption of abuse, if the debtor flunks the test. The means test appears within 
501 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) (2006). 
502 Id. § 707(b)(l). 
503 See Culhane & White, Means-Testing Real Chapter 7 Debtors, supra note 22, at 31 (concluding debtors can 
ensure chapter 7 qualification by increasing charitable contributions). 
504 11 U .S.C. § 707 (b )(1) (2006). Judge Wedoff fears the charitable loophole is unlimited and points to the fact 
that section 1325(b) contains a 15% limit to religious contributions. The absence of any limit in section 707(b) 
leads him to suggest that the sky is the limit to use religious contributions to foment,bankruptcy abuse. Wedoff, 
supra note 26, at 271-72. 
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section 707(b)(2). Gross income is defined in subsection (A)(i), and allowable 
expenses are defined in subsections (A)(ii)-(iv). Nowhere in subsections (A)(ii)-(iv) 
are charitable contributions mentioned as an allowable expense. So it is open for the 
bankruptcy court to conduct the test and find the debtor in bad faith, without any 
reference to the charitable contributions. If a court does this, it has conformed to 
section 707(b)(l), which orders the court not to take into consideration the religious 
contribution. 505 A debtor may claim the deduction as an expense, but section 707 (b )( 1) 
bids the court not to consider this. So just as the devil may quote the scriptures to his 
own purposes and o'ersugar the truth to his own end, so may he cite the Bankruptcy 
Code to defeat televangelism in the name of preventing bankruptcy abuse. 
4. Rebuttals 
If the debtor flunks the sixty-month test, she is given a chance to rebut the 
presumption of bad faith abuse of the system. The debtor must demonstrate "special 
circumstances, such as a serious medical condition or a call or order to active duty in 
the Armed Forces .... 11506 These circumstances must generate extra expenses or reduce 
income, which explain away the too-large multiplicand in the sixty-month test.507 The 
debtor is required to itemize each additional expense under oath. 508 
The first case to grant a rebuttal was In re Thompson, 509 which held that repayment 
of an ERISA loan was payment to a secured creditor. As an alternative ground, Judge 
Arthur Harris ruled that the only way to halt wage withholding was for the debtor to 
quit or to pay back the loan. Since either of these unpleasant strategies was 
extraordinary, avoiding them by staying on the job and repaying by mandatory 
withholding was held to be an extraordinary preventative measure. 510 
Because the debtors in In re Batzkiel511 kept running into deer while commuting to 
work, causing higher expenses in auto repair, they were permitted an extra $577 .32 a 
month in car maintenance expenses, which enabled them to squeak past the means test 
with only $96.10 in disposable income. Only venison stood between these debtors and 
bankruptcy abuse. 
On the other hand, a long commute causing extra gas expenses was not considered 
sufficiently extraordinary to justify an extra deduction for the cost of gasoline.512 
505 See In re Diagostino, 347 B.R. 116, 119-20 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2006) (evaluating charitable contributions in 
context of above-median chapter 13 debtors); see also In re Tranmer, 355 B.R. 234, 252-53 (Bankr. D. Mont. 
2006) (disallowing charitable contribution expense for above-median debtor because contribution does not fall 
under IRS guidelines). 
506 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(B)(i) (2006). 
507 Id. § 707(b)(2)(B)(i). 
508 Id. § 707(b)(2)(B)(ii)-(iii); see In re Renicker, 342 B.R. 304,310 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2006) (denying rebuttal 
for want of documentation). 
509 350 B.R. 770, 773 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2006). 
510 Id. at 777-78. 
511 349 B.R. 581, 586-87 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2006). 
512 In re Tranmer, 355 B.R. 234, 250-51 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2006). 
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Unusually high sales commissions just before bankruptcy did not suffice.513 Nor did 
trying but failing to reach a credit management agreement prior to bankruptcy,514 
paying a high rent, 515 or extra housing expense so each child could have his or her own 
room. 5·16 Inability to fund a chapter 13 plan (in light of the need for a new vehicle) may 
not be considered.517 Losing a high-paying job (so that the means test no longer reflects 
the debtor's ability to pay) is not a special circumstance.518 
In finding extraordinary circumstances, courts may have reference to pre-BAPCP A 
law. Therefore, such factors as a pregnant unmarried daughter living at home and a 
terminally ill puppy519 may cause twice-blessed mercy to drop like the gentle rain from 
heaven. Likewise, an organ transplant520 may soften the sclerotic heart of the 
bankruptcy court. 
5. Veterans 
Means-testing does not apply if the debtor is a disabled veteran and the 
indebtedness in question was incurred while the debtor was on active duty or 
performing a homeland defense activity. The patriotic reward for those who have 
served their country is an invitation to commit bankruptcy abuse. 521 
A disabled veteran is "a veteran who is entitled to compensation under laws 
administered by the Secretary for a disability rated at 30 percent or more, or [ ] a 
veteran whose discharge or release from active duty was for a disability incurred or 
aggravated in line of duty. "522 A disability rating is administered by a rating officer of 
the U.S. Department of Veteran Affairs, according to a lengthy regulation.523 A 
discharge on account of disability is also tied to 30% disability, if the veteran has less 
than twenty years of service. In addition to a 30% disability, the veteran must have 
served eight years, or the disability was the proximate result of duty, or the disability 
513 In re Ferando, BK06-81855, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 607, at *3-5 (Bankr. D. Neb. Mar. 1, 2007). 
514 In re Oliver, 350 B.R. 294, 303 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2006). 
515 In re Starkey, No. BK06-81473-TJM, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 155, at *6-7 (Bankr. D. Neb. Jan. 25, 2007). 
516 In re Delunas, No. 06-43133-705, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 803, at *8 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. Mar. 6, 2007). 
517 In re Oliver, 350 B.R. at 303. 
518 In re Hanks, No. 06-22777, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 46, at *22-23 (Bankr. D. Utah Jan. 9, 2007). This holding 
is in the context ofa chapter 13 case, where the relevance of section 707 (b )(2)(B )(i) can be questioned. See infra 
Part IV. 
519 In re Olson, No. 04-23551, 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 395, at *7-8 (Bankr. Utah. Feb. 28, 2005). 
520 In re Boyer, 321 B.R. 457,461 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2004). 
521 In In re Newsom, 69 B.R. 801 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1987), Judge William A. Hill wrote: 
Chapter 7 should not be counted on by military personnel as a means of escaping debt 
where it would not be an appropriate vehicle were they civilians. Persons in the military 
cannot go on a consumer spending spree and later file for Chapter 7 relief expecting a 
bankruptcy court to treat them any differently as a consequence of military service than it 
would anyone else. 
Id. at 805. The veteran in Newsom, however, was not disabled. 
522 38 U.S.C. § 3741(1) (2000). 
523 Pensions, Bonuses, and Veterans' Relief, 38 C.F.R. § 4 (2006). 
2007] THE FAILED BANKRUPTCY REVOLUTION OF 2005 293 
was incurred in time of war or was incurred after September 14, 1978.524 
It is not enough to be a disabled veteran. It must also be the case that the 
"indebtedness [was] occurred primarily during a period in which he or she was [] on 
active duty (as defined in section lOl(d)(l) of title 10 [or] performing a homeland 
defense activity (as defined in section 901(1) of title 32)."525 Active duty is defined as: 
[F]ull-time duty in the active military service of the United States. 
Such term includes full-time training duty, annual training duty, and 
attendance, while in the active military service, at a school designated 
as a service school by law or by the Secretary of the military 
department concerned. Such term does not include full-time National 
Guard duty.526 
A homeland defense activity is an: 
[A]ctivity undertaken for the military protection of the territory or 
domestic population of the United States, or of infrastructure or other 
assets of the United States determined by the Secretary of Defense as 
being critical to national security, from a threat or aggression against 
the United States.527 " 
This provision was added as part of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005,528 which is better known for declaring torture 
to be, however temporarily, contrary to American policy. 529 Another portion of that act 
makes clear that members of the National Guard530 who defend local sites from 
terrorism are engaged in "homeland defense activity" and so are invited to commit 
bankruptcy fraud under section 707(b )(2)(D)(ii). But members of the National Guard 
sent to Iraq are not eligible to be considered on active duty or engaged in homeland 
defense. This means that disabled National Guard members assigned to protect a 
critical potential target for terrorists, such as the Old MacDonald's Petting Zoo near 
Huntsville, Alabama,531 have an invitation to commit bankruptcy abuse, but National 
Guard members disabled in Iraq are not similarly privileged. 
If a disabled veteran is able to claim this immunity from means testing, the form 
524 10 U.S.C. § 1201(b) (2000). 
525 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(D) (2006). 
526 10 U.S.C. § lOl(d)(l) (2000). 
527 32 U.S.C.A. § 901(1) (West Supp. 2006). 
528 Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-375, 118 
Stat. 1811. 
529 Id.§ 1091, 118 Stat. at 2068-69. 
530 National Guard members are considered veterans unless they served between 1955 and 1976. See 5 
U.S.C.A. § 2108(l)(B) (West Supp. 2006). So neither President Bush nor former Vice President Dan Quayle can 
claim to be veterans. 
531 See Petting Zoo and Flea Market Make Nonsense of US Target List, MANCHESTER GUARDIAN, July 13, 
2006, at 23. 
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designed by the Office of the United States Trustee graciously excuses the veteran of 
filling out the rest of the laborious form.532 
6. Sanctions 
BAPCPA includes an ominous provision threatening sanctions under rule 9011 of 
the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure if the trustee makes a motion under section 
707(b) and prevails. The sanction could include the trustee's attorneys' fees and other 
costs.533 The court must find that the lawyer violated rule 9011. -
This sounds worse than it is, however. Under rule 9011, the trustee would have to 
make a separate motion for sanctions and serve it on the bankruptcy lawyer before 
serving it on the court. The lawyer then has the opportunity to correct or withdraw the 
challenged "paper, claim, defense, contention, allegation or denial. "534 If the correction 
is made, the trustee's motion must be denied.535 The court, however, on its own 
initiative may issue an order to show cause as to the sanction.536 If the lawyer has 
corrected the record prior to this order to show cause, the court on its own initiative 
may not give a monetary sanction.537 
To be sure, section 707 (b )( 4 )(A) indicates that the court may, on its own initiative, 
award the trustee attorney's fees as a sanction, but it can only do so "in accordance with 
the procedures described in rule 9011 .... "538 The safe harbor provisions of that rule 
should provide major comfort to bankruptcy lawyers. 539 
Nevertheless, the attorney's signature constitutes a representation that the attorney 
(i) "performed a reasonable investigation into the circumstances that gave rise to the 
petition ... , "540 and (ii) has no knowledge that anything in the bankruptcy petition is 
incorrect. 541 
There is also a provision suggesting that the debtor's lawyer can move for sanctions 
if a party in interest (other than the United States trustee) abusively moves to dismiss 
the bankruptcy under section 707(b).542 The court, however, must find that the motion 
violates rule 9011 and was made "solely for the purpose of coercing a debtor into 
waiving a right guaranteed to the debtor under this title. "543 Once again, the safe harbor 
532 Form B22A, supra note 32, Part I. 
533 See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(4) (2006). 
534 FED. R. BANKR. P. 901 l(c)(l). 
535 Id. 
536 FED. R. BANKR. P. 901 l(c)(l)(B). 
537 FED. R. BANKR. P. 901 l(c)(2)(B). 
538 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(4)(A) (2006). 
539 The 1997 House bill was far worse for bankruptcy lawyers. Regardless of rule 9011's safe harbor 
provisions, the court was authorized to dun the debtor's lawyers if the bankruptcy petition was not substantially 
justified. See Richard E. Coulson, Consumer Abuse of Bankruptcy: An Evolving Philosophy of Debtor 
Qualification for Bankruptcy Discharge, 62 ALB. L. REV. 467, 535 (1998) (noting court may order debtor to 
reimburse trustee for all reasonable costs in prosecuting motion regarding petition not "substantially justified"). 
540 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(4)(C)(i) (2006). 
541 Id. § 707(b)(4)(D). 
542 See id. § 707(b)(5)(A). 
543 Id. § 707(b)(5)(A)(ii)(II). 
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provisions of rule 9011 will be of great comfort to the lawyers moving to dismiss the 
case. In addition, sirice few human acts are motivated "solely" by one consideration, 
debtors will be unlikely to satisfy the "sole purpose" criterion. Even so, unrepresented 
movants seeking to dismiss are immune from counter-sanctions if the movant is a small 
business with a c;laim less than $1,000.544 
C. Means Testing In Excess of Section 707(b)(2) 
According to section 707(b )(3), the court can still dismiss a case even if the income 
of the debtor and her spouse together fall below the state median income. Section 
707(b)(3) provides: 
In considering under paragraph ( 1) whether the granting of relief 
would be an abuse of the provisions of this chapter in a case in which 
the presumption in subparagraph (A)(i) does not ariser545l or is 
rebutted, the court shall consider-
(A) whether the debtor filed the petition in bad faith; or 
(B) the totality of the circumstances (including whether the debtor 
seeks to reject a personal services contract and the financial need 
for such rejection as sought by the debtor) of the debtor's financial 
situation demonstrates abuse. 546 
Suppose a debtor flunks the means test but is entitled to the total immunity of section 
707(b)(7). Or suppose the debtor passes the means test by loading up on secured debt 
but has surplus income according to Schedules I and J. Can a court dismiss the case 
under section 707 (b )(3) because the debtor has sufficient post-petition surplus income 
to pay creditors more? Judge Mary Walrath so decided in/n re Paret.547 In this regard, 
544 See id. § 707(b)(5)(B). A lengthy definition of "small business" is supplied in 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(5)(C) 
(2006). 
545 This is a mis-citation. There is no subparagraph (A)(i) to "such paragraph"-i.e., paragraph (1). Presumably 
Congress meant to refer to subparagraph (A)(i) to paragraph (2). For literalists, no harm is done, since the non-
existent presumption of subparagraph (l)(A)(i) never arises, as it does not exist. The statute works perfectly well 
on this assumption. 
546 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(3) (2006). In empowering the court to dismiss a chapter 7 case on the totality of the 
circumstances, an example is given of the rejection of executory contracts. It is possible that a person who is 
perfectly solvent would become insolvent if the debtor filed for bankruptcy and rejected an unfavorable 
executory contract. Rock stars have apparently used this tactic to break their contracts. See generally Risa 
Letowsky, Note, Broke or Exploited: The Real Reason Behind Artist Bankruptcies, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. 
L.J. 625 (2002) ( examining rejection of recording contracts in bankruptcy). Of course, they would have to give 
up their vacation homes and custom built Rolls Royce automobiles to a chapter 7 trustee, but this loss might be 
more than compensated by the second recording label to sign them. Congress did good work in targeting this 
practice as an abuse. These rock stars would be perfectly solvent if they simply lived up to the word of honor and 
performed the contract as promised. Unfortunately, rock stars are unlikely to be subject to section 707(b), as their 
breach-of-contract debts are not consumer debts. It is_doubtful that a breach of an executory contract will ever 
constitute a consumer debt, or that the amount of consumer debts will exceed the damage claim for breach of the 
executory contract. 
547 347 B.R. 12, 13, 16-17 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006). 
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Judge Walrath goes against the president, who, in signing BAPCP A into law, presumed 
that "[t]hose who fall behind their state's median income will not be required to pay 
back their debts. This practical reform will help ensure that debtors make a good-faith 
effort to repay as much as they can afford. "548 Yet Judge Walrath is perfectly correct. It 
is not the case that below-median debtors are immune from the means test. lt is only 
the case that standing to make the motion is restricted. In Paret, only the United States 
trustee had standing to move for a dismissal, thanks to section 707(b)(6), The debtor 
qualified for the near-total immunity of section 707(b)(7). Nevertheless, the United 
States trustee moved to dismiss on the "totality of the circumstances," which included 
whether surplus income was present.549 
Contrast Judge Walrath's position with Judge William Stocks's opinion in In re 
Barr,550 where a United States trustee tried to claim that a chapter 13 plan was in bad 
faith because a debtor who passed the means test nevertheless had excess disposable 
income. Judge Stocks, citing pre-BAPCPA law, ruled that chapter 13's good faith 
requirement could not be used to strike down plans for not paying enough where all 
disposable income was given into the plan.551 If this is so in chapter 13, perhaps it 
should also be so in chapter 7. Courts, however, have disagreed and have found that 
too much income is bad faith in chapter 13, even if the debtor has technically dedicated 
all his disposable income, as BAPCPA defines it, to the plan.552 
Can surplus income be grounds for dismissal when the debtor has met the means 
test? If section 707(b)(2)'s mechanical means test implies that "totality of the 
circumstances" excludes considerations of surplus income, then how can we explain 
the very choice of the words "totality of the circumstances"? This was a phrase 
introduced to section 707 (b) jurisprudence prior to BAPCP A by Green v. Staples (In re 
Green). 553 Green held that the presence of surplus net income was not enough to justify 
dismissal. 554 Some other bad fact had to be adduced in addition. Since the phrase is 
associated in part with surplus income, it is rather hard to justify the conclusion that 
surplus income may not be considered as part of the "totality of circumstances," 
especially since BAPCPA struck the phrase "substantial abuse" from section 707(b) 
and substituted ordinary, quotidian abuse of a modest nature. 555 In any case, a 
548 Press Release, President Signs BAPCPA, supra note 237. 
549 In re Paret, 347 B.R. at 13-14; accord In re Schoen, No. 06-20864-7, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 633, *5-6 
(Bankr. D. Kan. Mar. 2, 2007); In re Mestamaker, No. 05-76976. 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 78, at *14-22 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ohio Jan. 10, 2007); In re Pak, 343 B.R. 239, 244--45 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2006). 
550 341 B.R. 181, 184-85 (Bankr.J\1.D.N.C. 2006). 
551 Id. at 184 (citing Deans v. O'Donnell (In re Deans), 692 F.2d 968 (4th Cir. 1982)); see also 11 U.S.C. § 
1325(a)(3) (2006) (declaring chapter 13 plans must be proposed in good faith). 
552 See, e.g., In re Edmunds, 350 B.R. 636, 638-39 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2006). 
553 934 F.2d 568,572 (4th Cir. 1991). 
554 Id. 
555 Accord In re Nockerts, 357 B.R. 497, 507--08 & n.6 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2006) ("Given the detailed nature of 
the means test in § 707(b )(2), this Court holds that similar to the old totality of the circumstances test, more than 
an ability to pay (as shown on the debtor's Schedule I and J) must be shown to demonstrate abuse under § 
707(b)(3)(B)."); In re Simmons, 357 B.R. 480, 488-89 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2006); In re Richie, 353 B.R. 569,572 
(Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2006). 
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"totality," by its nature, excludes nothing-not even surplus income.556 
If the statutory means test is preemptive, then the entire enterprise of cracking 
down on high-income debtors is turned on its head. The statutory test invites debtors to 
b:uy luxury cars, boats and vacation homes on secured debt; payment of this secured 
debt is a deductible expense. If section 707(b )(3) does not permit courts to punish this 
sort of behavior, then bankruptcy abuse is enhanced, not prevented.557 Recall that 
BAPCP A is the bankruptcy abuse prevention act. Any other view of section 707 (b )(3) 
is BAFCPA,558 not BAPCPA. 
A broad interpretation of section 707(b)(3) permits courts to punish strategic 
manipulation of the means test. Thus, a striking worker could show a very low current 
monthly income and could still be invited out of chapter 7, because his future earnings 
were expected to be high.559 A case has been dismissed under section 707(b)(3) 
because the debtor had received a pay bonus and spent it on luxuries rather than paying 
off claims.560 As under the prior law, cases can be dismissed because a non-debtor 
spouse has a high income, even if the bankrupt debtor does not. 561 Voluntary 
unemployment can be punished by a (b)(3) dismissal.562 Unlike the section 707(b)(2) 
test, which involves six-month historical averages, a dismissal under (b)(3) may 
consider post-petition developments.563 These cases constitute early evidence that none 
of the old case law under section 707(b) is preempted by BAPCPA. 
Still, counter-arguments can be made. For example, disabled veterans are not 
subject to the statutory means test, if their indebtedness arose during active duty or 
protecting designated terrorist targets in the United States, such as the Old MacDonald 
Petting Zoo.564 Does a court have discretion to find that the presence of a disabled 
veteran's surplus income is an abuse of the bankruptcy process under section 
707(b)(3)? Unless the means test of section 707(b)(2) is completely preemptive for 
everyone, it would appear that disabled veterans can be deprived of their right to 
commit bankruptcy abuse by unpatriotic bankruptcy courts. This imposition on 
disabled veterans may provide weight for the argument that the section 707(b)(2) 
means test is preemptive for everyone. Any other holding betrays the right of disabled 
veterans to commit bankruptcy abuse. 
556 See DAVID GRAY CARLSON, A COMMENTARY TO HEGEL'S SCIENCE OF LOGIC 261 (2007) [hereinafter 
CARLSON, HEGEL'S SCIENCE OF LOGIC]. 
557 See In re Gress, 344 B.R. 919,922 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2006) ("In enacting the means test, Congress intended 
to take away discretion from the courts as to higher income debtors, who were seen as abusers of the system."). 
558 Bankruptcy abuse facilitation. 
559 In re Quintana, No. 4:05-bk-08497-JMM, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 1973, at *1-2, *6 (Bankr. D. Ariz. May 3, 
2006) (converting case to chapter 13 because of debtor's higher future income). 
560 In re James, 345 B.R. 664,668 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2006). 
561 See In re Haney, No. 06-40350, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 2830, at *6 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. Oct. 19, 2006). 
562 See In re Richie, 353 B.R. 569, 577-80 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2006) (utilizing student loan undue hardship 
precedents). 
563 See In re Pennington, 348 B.R. 647, 650-51 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006) (considering post-petition developments 
for dismissal). The totality of the circumstances thus consists of the environment at the time of the hearing, not at 
the time of the bankruptcy petition. See In re Richie, 353 B.R. at 576; In re Pennington, 348 B.R. at 650-51. 
564 See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(D) (2006); see also supra text accompanying note 531. 
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In spite of such arguments, and with due respect to disabled veterans for the 
sacrifices they have made, the better view is that, since the mechanical test is rife with 
opportunity for abuse, Congress must have intended to empower judges to dismiss 
cases of debtors, whether they be veterans or not. Otherwise, the meaning of BAPCPA 
is to increase dramatically the opportunity for bankruptcy abuse. 565 
• One potent reason for this conclusion is this: priorto·BAPCPA a United.States 
trustee could obtain a dismissal if the chapter 7 case constituted a substantial abuse. 
BAPCPA strikes the word "substantial" and permits dismissal for minor or trivial 
abuse. Yet any claim that the means test preempts use of surplus income under (b)(3) 
licenses enormous abuse, where debtors win a bankruptcy discharge through the 
purchase of yachts and luxury cars on secured credit. Surely, this is not what Congress 
intended. 
IV. DISPOSABLE INCOME IN CHAPTER 13 
Means testing takes a different form in chapter 13. Whereas, after BAPCPA, means 
testing yields the dismissal of a chapter 7 case (or conversion to chapter 13, at the 
debtor's option), chapter 13 uses the BAPCPA test to determine "disposal income," all 
of which must be dedicated to payment of creditors under the chapter 13 plan. That is 
to say, in order to obtain confirmation of a plan and ultimate discharge,566 a debtor 
must dedicate all "disposable income" to the execution of the plan for the requisite 
period. Thanks to BAPCPA, the definition of disposable income is tied to the section 
707(b)(2) means test--,-although there is linguistic ground to dispute this conclusion. 
By way of background, when chapter 13 was first enacted, debtors were only 
565 Two consumer bankruptcy experts, Marianne B. Culhane and MichaelaM. White .. have argued, in contrast, 
that where a debtor passes the means test, surplus income can never be the basis of a dismissal. Contra In re Hill, 
328 B.R. 490, 506. (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005) (noting pre-BAPCPA dictum). Their major point is that, if (b)(3) 
enables dismissal for surplus income even if the debtor passes the means test, the means test is rendered 
superfluous-an interpretative faux pas. Culhane & White, Catching Can-Pay Debtors, supra note 25, at 690 
(noting examples where means test is irrelevant). Yet Culhane and White also concede that a dismissal of a 
debtor for gaming the means test by, say, incurring secured debt for luxury items on the eve of bankruptcy for the 
sole purpose of passing the means test is grounds for dismissal under section 707(b)(3)(B). But once this is 
conceded, cannot anything sanctioned by the means test be used as grounds to get rid of a debtor under the 
"totality of the circumstances"? For these reasons, Culhane and White are contradictory on the question whether 
there exists any immunity against (b)(3) dismissals based on the content of the (b)(2) test. 
While we are at it, Culhane and White also protest the notion that debtor retention of excessive exempt 
property could be grounds to dismiss the chapter 7 case. Id. at 690-91. But isn't the whole exercise of section 
707(b) designed to punish debtors for seeking to retain too much post-petition wage income, which, like exempt 
property, the creditors cannot get in chapter 7? Given the premise of section 707(b) in this regard, it is hard to see 
why a court should not use dismissal to coerce a debtor to surrender exemptions. See generally Eugene R. 
Wedoff, Judicial Discretion to Find Abuse Under Section 707(b)(3), 71 Mo. L. REV. 1035 (2006) (arguing 
bankruptcy judge has duty to consider debtor's financial situation even though means test presumption is 
inapplicable). 
566 Discharge in chapter 13 is deferred until the plan is completed. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (2006). Where the plan 
is not completed, a bankruptcy court still has discretion to grant a discharge if the debtor has paid more than the 
creditors would have received in chapter 7, if modification of the plan is not feasible, and if plan default was not 
the debtor's fault. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(b) (2006). 
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required to pay every creditor what he or she would have received in chapter 7 .567 
Since a great many debtors had no non-exempt assets, this implied zero payment plans 
in chapter 13 could be routinely confirmed.568 In 1984, Congress added the further 
requirement that, unless every unsecured creditor and the chapter 13 trustee consented 
otherwise,569 debtors would have to dedicate all disposable income to the chapter 13 
plan.510 
Under former 1322(d), and prior to 1984, there wc1s no required duration of a 
chapter 13 plan. 
[P]lan payments could extend anywhere from 30 days to five years. 
There was no minimum length required nor any minimum amount that 
must be dedicated to the plan other than the requirement under § 
1325(a)(4) that the plan pay unsecured creditors at least as much as 
they would receive in a Chapter 7 liquidation.571 
In those days, courts used the good faith requirement of section 1325(a)(3) to prevent 
the debtor from writing a plan of too short duration.572 
In 1984, however, Congress added section 1325(b) which required (unless all 
creditors consented otherwise) debtors to dedicate "disposable income" to the plan for a 
minimum of three years (unless, of course, unsecured creditors were entirely paid in a 
shorter period). 573 
The definition of disposable income was relatively simple. It meant income not 
reasonably necessary for maintenance or support of the debtor or a dependent of the 
debtor.574 If the debtor ran a business, disposable income was defined as that income 
which was not necessary for "the continuation, preservation, and operation of such 
business. "575 In order to adjudicate disposable income, a debtor was required to file 
Schedule I, showing income, and Schedule J, showing expenses. In 1998, Congress 
added a televangelist amendment making religious and charitable contributions the 
equivalent of maintenance and support of the debtor.576 
567 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4), (5) (1978). 
568 E.g., In re Sheets, 26 B.R. 523,526 (Bank:r. D.N.M. 1983) (confirming zero payment plan). 
569 If no creditor objects, the court must approve a plan even if not all disposable income is dedicated to the 
plan. See In re Benson, 352 B.R. 740, 742 (Banlcr. E.D.N.C. 2006). 
570 See generally James Rodenberg, Comment, Reasonably Necessary Expenses or Life of Riley?: The 
Disposable Income Test and a Chapter 13 Debtor's Lifestyle, 56 Mo. L. REV. 617, 622 (1991) (recounting 
legislative history for chapter 13 legislation). 
511 In re Davis, 348 B.R. 449, 452 (Banlcr. E.D. Mich. 2006). 
572 See, e.g., id. 
573 See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federa!Judgeship Act of1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 317, 98 Stat. 333, 
356. 
574 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2)(A) (1986). 
575 Id. § 1325(b)(2)(B). 
576 Since tithing still must be "reasonably necessary to be expended," courts after 1998 still found cause to 
question whether tithing could be subtracted from disposable income. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b )(2) (2006); see Anne 
McLaughlin, Tithing in a Chapter 13 Plan: The Requirement of Reasonableness Under the Religious Liberty and 
Charitable Donation Protection Act, 47 B.C. L. REV. 375, 391-93 (2006) (analyzing cases where courts 
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Courts came to confirm very different chapter 13 plans. One version was a "pot 
plan." According to such a plan, the debtor had to pay a fixed amount defined by the 
amount of disposable income over the three-year period.577 Alternatively, courts 
confirmed percentage plans; the debtor would continue to pay until the unsecured 
creditors were paid a stipulated percentage of their claim. 578 At stake was: who benefits 
when unsecured creditors do not file proofs of claim by the bar date? In a pot plan, the 
other unsecured creditors get a higher percentage when one of their fellows forgets 
about the proof of claim. In a percentage plan the debtor benefits because, once the 
filing creditors get their percentage, the debtor can stop contributing disposable income 
to the plan. 
BAPCPA now more rigorously regulates the length of a chapter 13 plan. BAPCPA 
requires chapter 13 plans to run for five years, if the debtor and any spouse have 
incomes above the state median income. Otherwise, plans are to run for three years. 
Section 1322(d)(2) still permits the extension of the three-year period (now applicable 
to below-median debtors only). Prior to BAPCPA, many courts held that the debtor 
must voluntarily agree to this extension.579 In either case, lesser time is possible if the 
plan provides for payment in full of all creditors.580 
Courts have generally rejected the premise that the three-or-five year period can be 
used to calculate a total payment, which can then be paid over a shorter period. 581 This 
is a blow to debtors with no disposable income, who hope to stay with the plan only 
until the administrative creditors and car lender are paid.582 But it can be defended on 
struggled to determine whether tithing could be subtracted from disposable income). BAPCPA does nothing to 
rescue televangelism from this dilemma. See McLaughlin, supra, at 397 ("Giving religious donations similar 
treatment would require a distinct, automatic exemption."). 
577 See In re Golek, 308 B.R. 332, 335 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2004) ("[A] pot plan ... fixes the amount a debtor 
must pay into the plan, leaving the question of percentage each general unsecured creditor will receive in 
payment until all claims are approved."). 
578 See id. ("A percentage plan designates what percentage of its claim each general unsecured creditor will 
receive without stating an exact dollar amount the debtor must pay into the plan .... "); see also Richard I. 
Aaron, Hooray for Gibberish: A Glossary OJ Bankruptcy Slang for the Occasional Practitioner or Bewildered 
Judge, 3 DEPAUL Bus. & COMM. L.J. 141, 162 (2005) (designating significance of percentage plans and how 
they pay creditors "a percentage of their claims"). 
579 See In re Nevitt, No. 05-77798, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 1763, at *14 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Aug. 18, 2006) (citing In 
re Villanueva, 274 B.R. 836,842 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2002)). 
580 See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(4)(B) (2006). 
581 Accord In re Luton, No. 6:06-bk-70629M, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 717, at *8 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. Mar. 8, 2007); 
In re Slusher, No. BK-S-06-10435-BAM, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 127, at *5 (Bankr. D. Nev. Jan. 17, 2007); In re 
Casey, 356 B.R. 519, 526-27 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 2006); In re Girodes, 350 B.R. 31, 34 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 
2006); In re Davis, 348 B.R. 449,457 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2006); In re Nevitt, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 1763, at *11-
12; In re Schanuth, 342 B.R. 601, 606-08 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2006); see also In re Wayman, 351 B.R. 808,812 
(Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2006) (granting payment in full of all allowed unsecured claims over shorter period of time so 
long as projected disposable income requirement is imposed). 
582 In re Girodes, 350 B.R. at 37 ("Debtor contends that if there is no disposable income and the debtor pays 
priority and secured debt in a shorter period of time, the debtor should receive a discharge."); see also In re Dew, 
344 B.R. 655, 662-63 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2006); In re Schanuth, 342 B.R. at 605. Where the debtor has negative 
disposable income and is nevertheless paying enough to pay the administrative expenses, the plan is not feasible 
within the meaning of section 1325(a)(6). However, where the debtors have social security income excludable 
from "current monthly income" as defined in section lOl(lOA)(B), and where they volunteer to contribute this 
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the policy ground that the minimum term permits monitoring the debtor over time and 
modification of the plan if the debtor's income increases over that time. 583 A few 
courts, however, disagree and allow a debtor with no disposable income to end the plan 
early.584 On the other hand, section 1325(b) is triggered only if the trustee or a creditor 
objects;585 Therefore, in the absence of an objection, a court must confirm a plan of 
shorter duration than indicated by the applicable commitment period. 586 
In addition, it has been suggested that modification under section 1329 is not 
subject to these time periods.587 If so, debtors can confirm a plan with the mandatory 
time period and then promptly modify for the period they really prefer. According to 
section 1329(b )(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, only sections 1322( a) and (b ), 1323( c ), and 
1325(a) apply to modifications. The minimum "applicable commitment period" is 
established in section 1325(b ). 588 Therefore, modification becomes a means to subvert 
the commitment period. It remains to be seen whether courts will permit this to happen. 
For example, section 1325(a)(3), which does apply to modifications, requires that a 
plan be in good faith. This wildcard may be enough to prevent the subversion of the 
commitment period. But, once again, the question arises whether it is bad faith to take 
advantage of opportunities created in the Bankruptcy Code itself. Use of the good faith 
requirement to prevent actions consistent with the statute is tantamount to legislation, a 
function properly allocated to Congress alone. 
A. Gross Income 
Disposable income for both above- and below-median debtors involves "current 
monthly income," a new term defined by BAPCP A. As we have seen, this involves 
average monthly income over the six months prior to bankruptcy.589 
BAPCPA provides several income exclu.sions for chapter 13. To the extent chapter 
13 adds these deductions from income, the chapter 7 means test does not accurately 
amount to the plan? the implication can be overcome. See In re Schanuth, 342 B.R. at 605. 
583 See In re Slusher, 2007 Banl<r. LEXIS 127, at *36 ("With an ongoing obligation by the debtor to remain in 
banl<ruptcy for the plan term, interested parties can monitor the debtor and capture any increases in the debtor's 
income during that time."). 
584 See In re Brady, No. 06-18922/JHW, 2007 Banl<r. LEXIS 501, at *6 (Banl<r. D.N.J. Feb. 13, 2007); In re 
Fuger, 347 B.R. 94, 102 (Bankr. D. Utah 2006); see also In re Alexander, 344 B.R. 742, 751 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 
2006) ("Because applicable commitment period is a term the statute makes relevant only with regard to the 
required payment of projected disposable income to unsecured creditors and not to any other plan payments or 
requirements, it simply does not come into play where no projected disposable income must be taken into 
account.") (dictum). 
585 II U.S.C. § 1325(b)(I) (2006) ("If the trustee or the holder of an allowed unsheriff claim objects .... "). 
586 See In re Jackson, 353 B.R. 849, 852 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2006). 
587 See Sunahara v. Burchard (In re Sunahara) 326B.R. 768, 781-82 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005); In re Girodes, 350 
B.R. at 38 ("While pre-confirmation modifications must comply with all of the requirements of§ 1322, post-
confirmation modifications only require compliance with§§ 1322(a), 1322(b), 1323(c) and 1325(a)."). 
588 See II U.S.C. § 1325(b)(4) (2006). A maximum is also set in section 1322(d). See id.§ 1322(d)(2) (noting 
"the plan may not provide for payments over a period that is longer than 3 years, unless the court, for cause, 
approves a longer period, but the court may not approve a period that is longer than 5 years" if certain factors are 
met). 
589 See supra text accompanying notes 259-61. 
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foretell the chapter 13 payout. For example, section 1325(b)(2) requires deductions 
from this gross income amount: "child support payments, foster care payments, or 
disability payments for a dependent child made in accordance with applicable 
nonbankruptcy law to the extent reasonably necessary to be expended for such child .. 
• • " 590 In chapter 7, these amounts are included within "current monthly income," for 
purposes of the means test.591 And, according to new section 1322(f): 
A plan may not materially alter the terms of a loan described in 
section 362(b )( 19) and any amounts required to repay such loan shall 
not constitute 'disposable income' under section 1325.592 
We learn in section 362(b)(l9) that the automatic stay cannot prevent the 
withholding of income from a debtor's wages and collection of 
amounts withheld, under the debtor's agreement authorizing that 
withholding and collection for the benefit of a pension, profit-sharing, 
stock bonus, or other plan established under section 401, 403, 408, ,· 
408A, 414, 457 or 501 ( c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 that is 
sponsored by the employer of the debtor .... 
(A) to the extent that the amounts withheld and collected are used 
solely for payments relating to a loan from a plan under section 
408(b )( 1) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 
197 4 or is subject to section 72(p) of the Internal Revenue. Code 
of 1986; or 
(B) a loan from a thrift savings plan permitted under subchapter 
III of chapter 84 of title 5, that satisfies the requirements of 
section 8433(g) of such title .... 593 
Here we see a requirement that chapter 13 reinstate the repayment of an BRISA loan. 
So, it inust be the case that the amounts needed to fund the reinstatement are not to be 
includ~d within the concept of disposable income. 594 
Although the concept nowhere appears in section 1325(b ), which defines 
590 11 U.S.C § 1325(b)(2) (2006). 
591 See supra Part III.A.6.b. 
592 11 u.s.c § 1322(f) (2006) .. 
593 Id. § 362(b)(l9). 
594 In In re Haley, 354 B.R. 340, 343--44 (Banlcr. D.N.H. 2006), the debtors were committed to a sixty-month 
plan. Yet their ERISA loan would be paid in only twenty-eight months. The United States trustee insisted that 
Judge Mark Vaughn borrow from the rule of section 707(b )(2)(A)(iii), pertaining to secured loan expenses. That 
rule requires that total payments due be divided by sixty to determine average monthly expense. Judge Vaughn 
refused to prorate. The debtors were permitted to deduct the full amount of the ERISA loan repayment, even 
though these payments would end in twenty-eight months. See id. at 344; accord In re Wiggs, No. 06B70203, 
2006 Bankr. LEXIS 1547, at *3 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Aug. 4, 2006). According to Judge Vaughn, "The Trustee and 
unsecured creditors are not without remedy ... as plan modification under section 1329 would be available at or 
about the time that the loan obligation is satisfied." See In re Haley, 354 B.R. at 344. 
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disposable income, section 541(b)(7) provides that BRISA withholding "shall not 
constitute disposable income as defined in section 1325(b )(2). "595 So, once again,596 we 
see the phenomenon of, not incorporation by reference, but a kind of reflexive 
Hegelian self-incorporation of section 54l(b)(7) into section 1325(a)(5). 
The upshot of this is that any such amounts must be excluded from disposable 
income from chapter 13. 597 This legislation therefore overrules cases which held that a 
debtor could not deduct from disposable income the amounts needed to repay such 
loans.598 Yet such withheld amounts would not be valid expenses for the purpose of 
section 707(b )(2), at least according to some courts. 599 To this extent, section 707(b )(2) 
gives an inaccurate prediction of the chapter 13 alternative to chapter 7 liquidation.600 
The means test therefore kicks out debtors from chapter 7 who may have no disposable 
income in chapter 13.601 
For some debtors, the definition of disposable income may make the plan 
infeasible and not confirmable.602 Job loss tends to cause this anomaly, and, after all, 
job loss is typically the reason why a debtor needs bankruptcy relief. 603 To bar debtors 
595 Id. § 541(b)(7). 
596 See supra text accompanying notes 56--58. Hegel would call this "return-into-self' (Riickkehr in sich). 
CARLSON, HEGEL'S SCIENCE OF LOGIC, supra note 556, at 262-63. 
597 See In re Wiggs, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 1547, at *3. 
598 See In re Anes, 195 F)d 177, 180 (3d Cir. 1999); In re Harshbarger, 66 F.3d 775, 777 (6th Cir. 1995). 
599 See In re Barraza, 346 B.R. 724, 726, 731 (Banlcr. N.D. Tex. 2006). But see In re Thompson, 350 B.R. 770, 
776--77 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2006) (holding repayment of ERISA loans is a deductible secured debt expense). 
Thompson is discussed supra at notes 470-86. 
600 See In re Walker, 05-15010-whd, 2006 Banlcr. LEXIS 845, at *18 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. May 1, 2006) ("Section 
707(b)'s presumption of abuse was not intended to and does not produce the most accurate prediction of debtor's 
actual ability to fund Chapter 13 plan.") 
601 See In re Johns, 342 B.R. 626, 627-28 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 2006). 
602 See In re Hanks, 06-22777, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 46, at *3 (Banlcr. D. Utah Jan. 9, 2007); In re Clemons, 05-
85163, 2006 Banlcr. LEXIS 1366, at *1, *15...:16 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. June 1, 2006). 
603 See In re Slusher, BK-S-06-10435, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 127, at *5-6, *17-19 (Bankr. D. Nev. Jan. 17, 
2007) (" [T]his court holds that line 58 of Form B22C is a presumptive, but not an exclusive, basis for calculating 
'projected disposable income' as used in 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(l)(A)."); In re Grady, 343 B.R. 747, 753 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ga. 2006); In re Jass, 340 B.R. 411, 417-18 (Banlcr. D. Utah 2006). In In re Hanks, Judge Judith Boulden 
specifically rejected this argument and held that B22C governs disposable income: 
It is not at all clear that Congress did not actually intend to keep people out of bankruptcy 
altogether if possible or perhaps to push them into individual chapter 11 cases, nor is it 
clear that a "fresh start" is still the overriding policy of the portions of the Bankruptcy Code 
at issue in this case. Perhaps the concept of current monthly income is an expression of 
Congress' intent that debtors should attempt to resolve their financial difficulties outside of 
bankruptcy for a period of time before filing. Indeed, this view would jibe with the new 
prepetition briefing requirement in § 109(h)(l) that contemplates meaningful credit 
counseling and the performance of budget analyses within six months of filing as well as 
the requirement in § 52l(b)(2) that the debtor file a copy of any debt repayment plan 
developed during the prepetition counseling session. 
2007 Bankr. LEXIS 46, *17-18 (footnote omitted). A congressional intent to push chapter 13 debtors whose 
incomes have fallen into chapter 11 must be discounted, as chapter 11 requires the commitment of disposable 
income to the plan, per the definition in section 1325(b). See.I I U.S.C. § 1129(a)(15) (2006). 
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from chapter 13 because they have lost high-paying jobs is perverse indeed.604 
The opposite is also possible. Net current monthly income on Form B22C may be 
lower than actual net income. In such cases there is an incentive to rush into 
bankruptcy on the basis of the low historical average. 605 
According to section 1325(b)(l), a plan must provide that "all of the debtor's 
'projected disposable income' received in the 'applicable commitment period"' must be 
dedicated to the plan.606 Yet Form B22C asks for historic income, which may not 
accord with projected income. According to Judge Bruce Markell: 
[H]istorical figures [must not be] the exclusive determinants of those 
finances. Otherwise, projecting static historical figures over a future 
period would be like attempting to ascertain the future value of a 
company's stock based solely on the average of its stock price over the 
previous six months, without taking into account currently 
anticipating market trends. Using just the foreclosure's static historical 
income average and nothing else could lead to a projection unhinged 
from reality.607 
Because of these anomalies, and because section 1325(b)(l)(B) refers to projected 
disposable income, many courts have rejected exclusive use of the historic average and 
required the use of future projections based on facts not appearing on the face of Form 
604 In In re Hanks, Judge Judith Boulden held that, in cases where Form B22C made chapter 13 plans 
infeasible, a court might lighten up on the disposable income requirement under the authority of section 
707(b)(2)(B)(i): 
[In any proceeding brought under this subsection, the presumption of abuse may only be 
rebutted by demonstrating] "special circumstances, such as a serious medical condition or a 
call or order to active duty in the Armed Forces, to the extent such special circumstances 
that [sic] justify additional expenses or adjustments of current monthly income for which 
there is no reasonable alternative." 
2007 Bankr. LEXIS 46, at *22 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(B)(i) (2006)). In Hanks, the debtor had lost a 
high-paying computer programming job and was reduced to reviewing bad movies for objectionable content at 
20 cents a minute. Judge Boulden ruled that job degradation was not an extraordinary circumstance, but the 
question arises whether the debtor's submission of a plan in chapter 13 constitutes a "proceeding brought under 
this subsection"-that is, under section 707(b). Id. at *22-24. The argument in favor of Judge Boulden's 
reference to section 707(b )(2)(B)(i) is that, according to section 1325(b )(3), "amounts reasonably necessary to be 
expended under[§ 1325(b)(2)] shall be determined in accordance with subparagraphs (A) and (B) of section 
707(b)(2)," if the debtor is above-median. Id. at *7 (emphasis added). Judge Boulden therefore proposes to use 
section 707(b)(2)(B)(i) to adjust income, whereas section 1325(b)(3) references section 707(b)(2) only with 
regard to expenses. In chapter 13, income is defined in section 1325(a)(2) to be "current monthly income," a term 
defined by section lOl(I0A). In section lOl(lOA), one finds no invitation to make adjustments of the smt 
extended by section 707 (b )(2)(B )(i) in chapter 7 cases. Therefore, Judge Boulden overreaches by borrowing the 
discretion of section 707(b)(2)(B)(i) for use in chapter 13 cases. 
605 See In re Hardacre, 338 B.R. 718, 722 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006). 
606 In re Slusher, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 127, at *7 (emphasis added). 
607 Id. at *16. 
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B22C.608 Schedule I contains this information. Form B22C has been called the "rear 
view mirror" approach; Schedule I, which asks the debtor to project income going 
forward, is the "crystal ball" approach.609 In addition, section 1325(b)(l) refers to "as of 
the effective date of the plan .... "610 This also points away from "current monthly 
income" and toward Schedule I.611 
Does this not make the definition of "current monthly income" irrelevant? Not 
quite. Form B22C must still be used to determine whether a debtor is above or below 
the median income. 612 The definition was still relevant to define the sources of income, 
even if its concept of historic average is rejected.613 And in In re Jass,614 Judge William 
Thurman ruled that current monthly income created a presumption of projected 
income, unless the debtor came forward with contrary evidence.615 
The definition is also relevant to establish the rule that social security income must 
608 Accord In re Riggs, No. 06-20826, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 542, at *9 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. Feb. 27, 2007); In re 
LaPlana, No. 06:05-bk-17635-KSJ, 2007 Barikr. LEXIS 329, at *16-17 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Feb. 9, 2007); In re 
Zimmerman, No. 06-31086, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 410, at *18 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Jan. 29, 2007); In re Pak, No. 
05-49326, 2006Bankr. LEXIS 3437, at *5-10 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2006);In re Edmunds, 350B.R. 636, 
639-44, 646-47 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2006); In re Demonica, 345 B.R. 895, 900-01, 905 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2006); In 
re Fuller, 346 B.R. 472,475 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2006); In re Grady, 343 B.R. 747, 752 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2006); In 
re Kibbe, 342 B.R. 411, 413-15 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2006); In te Jass, 340 B.R. at415; In re Hardacre, 338 B.R. at 
722. But see In re Tranmer, 355 B.R. 234, 236-52 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2006); In re Barr, 341 B.R. 181, 183-84 
(Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2006) (finding debtor with no net income under Form B22C and positive net income under 
Schedule I and J could not be found in bad faith). 
609 See In re Renicker, 342 B.R. 304,309 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2006). 
610 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(l) (2006). 
611 See In re Hardacre, 338 B.R. 718, 722 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006) (exploring the consequences of 
misinterpreting "current monthly income"). 
612 See In re Nevitt, No. 05-77798, 20b6 Bankr. LEXIS 1763, *7 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Aug. 18, 2006) ("The 
remaining portion of Form B22C is used to calculate 'projected disposable income' in accordance with § 
707(b)(2)(A) and (B)."). 
613 See In re Hardacre, 338 B.R. at 723. 
614 340 B.R. at 418. 
615 Accord In re Zimmerman, No. 06-31086, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 410, at *25 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Jan. 29, 
2007); In re Slusher, BK-S-06-10435, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 127, at *22 n.15 (Bankr. D. Nev. Jan. 17, 2007); In re 
Devilliers, No. 06-10415, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 75, at *14-19 (Bankr. E.D. La. Jan. 9, 2007). According to Judge 
Markell in Slusher: 
The Court acknowledges that its result is not what every person reading Section 
1325(b) might reach, considering the general view that BAPCPA sought to limit 
bankruptcy judges' discretion in various areas. Regardless of what this court may write, 
there remains a common sense argument to the effect that if Congress had meant 
"disposable income" to be a presumptive guide for "projected disposable income" it could 
have said so in explicit terms. But it didn't, and also didn't amend Section 1325(b) so that 
there is but one, unambiguous, canonical reading. In this vacuum, courts must puzzle over 
the intended differences, if any, between "projected" disposable income and "disposable 
income" without a modifier. This court's result, then, can perhaps best be characterized as 
the least flawed of all possible interpretations, each of which is in some way unsatisfactory 
in its own right. 
2007 Bankr. LEXIS 127, at *22 n.15. 
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be excluded from projected income, according to In re Ward. 616 This doesn't niake 
much sense. If Schedule I rules instead of current monthly income, then all of current 
monthly income should be thrown out and social security income therefore can be 
considered. 617 
Meanwhile, even if courts throw out Form B22C in favor of Schedule I, it is still 
the case that Form B22C is the sole means of determining whether the three- or five-
year term is the applicable commitment. It is not the source for determining actual 
projected disposable income.618 
Some courts, however, have ruled that "projected" means nothing; the court can 
only consider the history-based "current monthly income."619 On this assumption, 
debtors with social security income ( excluded from current monthly in.come) can write 
plans that do not in fact dedicate all disposable income to the plan.620 
Even if disposable income must be defined pursuant to Form B22C, there is still 
the possibility that post-confirmation plan modification can occur without any regard to 
section 1325(b). As stated earlier, section 1329(b) insists that, for example, section 
1325(a) apply to modifications, but there is no requirement that section 1325(b) must 
be satisfied. 621 Therefore, it is open for courts wedded to Form B22C to chuck the form 
entirely if the debtor mdves to modify the plan.622 In fact, since the entire idea of 
dedicating disposable income to the plan stems from section 1325(b ), there is no 
statutory reason why modifications could not permit a debtor meeting the minimal 
requirement of section 1325(a)(4)-all creditors must receive what they would have 
received in a hypothetical chapter 7 case-to keep much disposable income that the 
original plan gave to the creditors. Congress simply forgot to address the point that 
section 1329 modifications allow for the complete subversion, not only of the 
BAPCPA reforms, but of the anti-consumer reforms of 1984 that imposed the 
disposable income requirement of section 1325(b) in the first place. 
B. Below-Median Debtors 
The new definition of disposable income adopts by reference section 
616 No. 06-42411, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 58, at *8-9 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. Jan. 7, 2007). 
617 Judge Arthur Federman also suggested that "manipulating the Code" could be grounds to deny confirmation 
because the chapter 13 plan was not proposed in good faith. Id. at *9; cf 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) (2006). Other 
courts, however, have ruled that disposable income issues can never be re-visited under section 1325(a)(3). See 
supra text accompanying note 551. 
618 In re Beasley, 342 B.R. 280; 0284 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2006) ("[T]he statutory formulas and Form B22C do lead 
to a fully-dispositive calculation of the applicable commitment period."). 
619 See In re Kolb, No. 06-32036, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 993, at *27 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio Mar. 30, 2007); In re 
Brady, No. 06-18922/JHW, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 501, at *18-19 (Bankr. D.N.J. Feb. 13, 2007); In re Tranmer, 
355 B.R. 234, 238 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2006); In re Girodes, 350 B.R. 31, 36 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2006); In re 
Alexander, 344 B.R. 742, 748-50 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2006). 
620 See In re Rotunda, 349 B.R. 324,330, 332-33 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2006) (adhereing to Congress' exclusion 
of social security benefits from payment to unsecured creditors in chapter 13 context). 
621 See supra text accompanying notes 587-88. 
622 See In re Ireland, No. 6:06-bk-70571M, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 996, at *17-19 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. Apr. 2, 
2007). 
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707(b)(2)(A)'s lengthy definition of expenses for maintenance and support of the 
debtor.623 But the cross-reference only applies for above-median debtors.624 Where the 
debtor is below the median, section 707(b)(2)(A) governance of expenses has no bite. 
Rather, expenses are defined as: 
[A]mounts reasonably necessary to be expended-
(A)(i) for the maintenance or support of the debtor or a dependent 
of the debtor or for a domestic support obligation, that first 
becomes payable after the date the petition is filed; and 
(ii) for charitable contributions . . . in an amount not to 
exceed 15 percent of gross income of the debtor for the year 
in which the contributions are made; and 
(B) if the debtor is engaged in business, for the payment of 
expenditures necessary for the continuation, preservation, and 
operation of such business.625 
So, in below-median cases, expenses are determined according to Schedule J, not 
Schedule B22C. 626 According to Form B22C, a below-median debtor is not required to 
fill out Part IV of the Form, which sets forth the means-testing criteria.627 For this 
reason, a debtor was not permitted to claim the IRS deduction for car ownership 
expense (where he owned the cars outright and really had no expense), though the 
debtor was invited to schedule an anticipated vehicle replacement. 628 
C. Above-Median Debtors 
1. The Unfairness of It All 
Above-median debtors have the same definition of gross income as do their 
antipodean fellows, but, unlike below-median debtors, expenses are arguably to be 
defined by section 707(b)(2).629 We have seen that the section 707(b)(2) test permits 
623 See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(3) (2006). 
624 See In re Wiggs, No. 06-70203, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 1547 at *7, *9 (Banlcr. N.D. Ill. Aug. 4, 2006) ("Thus, 
[below-median] family income debtors may not be allowed expenses as great as [above-median] family income 
debtors."). 
625 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2) (2006). 
626 See In re Hanks, 06-22777, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 46, at *3 n.2 (Banlcr. D. Utah Jan. 9, 2007) (stating above-
median debtors use Form B22C); In re Fuller, 346 B.R. 472,474 (Banlcr. S.D. Ill. 2006). Schedule J does not 
reflect payment to secured creditors, so this must be subtracted to determine how much disposable income is 
available to unsecured creditors. See In re Nevitt, No. 05-77798, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 1763, at* 10 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ill. Aug. 18, 2006). 
627 Form B22C, supra note 33, Part IV. 
628 See In re Thieklin, 355 B.R. 856, 859 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 2006). 
629 See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(3) (2006). For the view that above-median debtors have the right to section 
707(b)(2)(A)(ii) expenses, see generally In re Miller, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 201, at *l (Bankr. N.D. Ala. Jan. 18, 
2007); In re Hanks, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 46, at *1; In re Farrar-Johnson, 353 B.R. 244 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2006); 
In re Alexander, 344 B.R. 742 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2006); and In re Barr, 341 B.R. 181 (Banlcr. M.D.N.C. 2006). 
308 ABILA W REVIEW [Vol. 15:223 
gross manipulation by above-median debtors, particularly by allowing such debtors to 
count all secured debt as a deductible expense.630 Below-median debtors may feel 
cheated that they are stuck with Schedule J, whereas above-median debtors can use the 
much more manipulable standard of section 707(b ), but, as Judge Catharine Carruthers 
has pointed out, that's politics! 631 Congress has decided to provide high-income 
debtors with an increased opportunity to abuse the system and have left below-median 
debtors to the harsh regime of Schedule J (which is based on actual expenses). 
Courts have not hesitated to vent their feelings about the unfairness of allowing 
debtors the shelter of the means test of section 707(b )(2). According to Judge Russell 
Nelms, 
The means test does not distinguish those who have tried hard from 
those who have hardly tried. It is a blind legislative formula that 
attempts to direct debtors to a chapter that provides for at least some 
measure of repayment to unsecured creditors over a period of years. 632 
And Judge Susan Kelley has remarked: 
While this provision of the new statute does not perform as 
advertised, perhaps prompting trustees, unsecured creditors and even 
some bankruptcy judges to long for the "good old days" of reviewing 
Schedules I and J and determining whether private school, high speed 
internet access, and a pack-a-day habit were reasonable and necessary 
for the debtor's maintenance and support, the mandate of new § 
1325(b)(3) is clear. The court must decide the "amounts reasonably 
necessary to be expended" for above-median debtors based solely on 
§ 707(b)(2)(A) and (B), i.e., Form B22C, not on excess income over 
expenses from Schedule J.633 
Nevertheless, courts have exploited the fact that section 1325(b)(l) requires the debtor 
to dedicate "projected disposable income" to the plan.634 Just as the word "projected" 
has led courts to abandon Form B22C for Schedule I on the income side, courts have 
likewise abandoned Form B22C for Schedule J on the expense side. 635 Judge Michael 
Kaplan, in In re LaSota,636 in particular waxed indignant that a debtor could pad his 
630 See supra Part III.B.2.x. 
631 See In re Girodes, 350 B.R. 31, 37 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2006). 
632 In re Barraza, 346 B.R. 724, 729 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006). 
633 In re Guzman, 345 B.R. 640, 646 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2006). 
634 See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(l)(B) (2006) (Emphasis added). 
635 See In re Edmunds, 350 B.R. 636, 645 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2006); In re McPherson, 350 B.R. 38, 47 (Bankr. 
W.D. Va. 2006) ("Form B22C is only a form. It carries the weight of neither the Bankruptcy Code nor the 
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure."); In re Fuger, 347 B.R. 94, 101 (Bankr. D. Utah 2006); In re Renicker, 
342 B.R. 304, 308 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2006). 
636 351 B.R. 56, 60 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2006) (discussing projected disposable income). 
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bank account because his actual expenses were less than the expenses provided in 
section 707(b). He insisted that the savings be dedicated to paying creditors. In In re 
Love,637 Judge William Sawyer noted that the test in chapter 13 is projected disposable 
income, which justified departing from Form B22C on the expense side (but not on the 
income side). 
This Court acknowledges that its approach results in a violation of 
a fundamental accounting principle, that expenses should be matched 
with income. One may argue that it is illogical to define disposable 
income using income based upon historical data and expenses on 
projections of future expenses. The mismatching of historical income 
figures with future expenses violates the matching principle which 
underlies accrual accounting. Moreover, one may reasonably argue 
that it is neither logical or [sic] fair to impose this mismatch in 
performing the means test under§ 707(b).638 
This approach can be criticized for one-sidedness. If we are to throw out B22C 
expenses because they are not projections, should we not also throw out B22C income 
on the same grounds? 
In re Fuller639 is the mirror opposite. There, Judge Pamela Pepper ruled that Form 
B22C is subject to override by Schedule I as to gross income, but these debtors are 
entitled to follow Form B22C as to expenses. 640 This one-sided approach doesn't make 
sense. If "projected" allows the definition of "current monthly income" to be ignored, 
why doesn't it authorize the override of expenses as well? 
Courts have disagreed over whether the above-median debtor may deduct the 
amount due on a secured claim where the debtor intends to surrender the collateral in 
question. Surrender of the collateral is an approved cram-down technique, and many 
debtors will avail themselves of it, 641 especially since BAPCPA increases the price of 
cramming down cars.642 In In re Walker,643 Judge Homer Drake ruled that the debtor 
could have the deduction, as expenses are defined by section 707(b)(2),. which 
authorizes a fixed deduction for transportation ownership and maintenance as a Local 
Standard. But other courts have disagreed on the ground, previously alluded to, that a 
transportation ownership deduction is not "applicable" if the debtor owns the vehicle 
outright.644 
Judge William Anderson tried a different justification for preventing an above-
637 350 B.R. 611,613 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 2006). 
638 Id. at 614-15. 
639 346 B.R. 472 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2006). 
640 Id. at 482-85; accord In re Carlton, No. 06-71322, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 545, at *22-24 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 
Feb. 28, 2007). 
641 See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(C) (2006). 
642 See generally Carlson, supra note 450. 
643 No. 05-15010-whd, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 845, at *10-13 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. May 1, 2006). 
644 See, e.g., In re Harris, 353 B.R. 304, 308 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 2006); cf In re McPherson, 350 B.R. 38, 47-
48 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2006); see also supra text accompanying notes 400-09. 
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median debtor from claiming the full secured debt deduction permitted in Form B22C. 
In In re McPherson,645 the debtors had bought a computer on secured credit. The 
debtors valued the computer at $100 but tried to deduct $2,116 as the total amount due 
on the computer. Meanwhile, the debtors wrote a plan cramming down the secured 
creditor at $100, so that the debtors sought a monthly deduction of $67.60 (total 
amount owed divided by sixty) but would pay the secured creditor only $18.20 a 
month.646 Judge Anderson conceded that section 707(b)(2)(A)(iii) entitled the debtors 
to deduct "average monthly payments on account of secured debts ... calculated as ... 
the total of all amounts scheduled as contractually due to secured creditors in each 
month of the 60 months following the date of the petition ... divided by 60." 647 But, 
reasoned Judge Anderson, "contractually due" meant due under the chapter 13 plan, 
not due under the original security agreement. This is because courts analogize a 
chapter 13 plan to a new agreement between the parties. 648 But just because a chapter 
13 is like a contract does not mean it is a contract. On the contrary, it is' a coercive court 
order usually imposed on the creditor over its opposition. The metaphor to a contract, 
common enough in chapter 13 cases, only expresses the idea that plans, like contracts, 
are binding. A better claim-one that Judge Anderson invokes-is the idea that, since 
section 1325(b )( 1 )(B) requires projected disposable income to be dedicated to the plan, 
the court is free to ignore Form B22C, which entails the deductions authorized by 
section 707(b)(2). 
2. Who Receives Disposable Income? 
Certainly one of the oddest moments in Form B22C is its invitation for above-
median debtors to deduct the cost of the chapter 13 trustee's fee in a chapter 13 plan.649 
This entry is required by the notion that section 707(b) expenses (arguably) govern 
above-median debtors. And section 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(III) permits the deduction of the 
chapter 13 trustee's fee. Absurdly, if we follow BAPCPA literally, the deduction means 
that above-median debtors may keep disposable income to the extent of the deduction 
and pay the chapter 13 trustee out of the disposable income actually surrendered to the 
trustee under the plan. So, for example, if disposable income is $500 per month (net of 
every other expense) and if the chapter 13 trustee's fee is 10%, the debtor's disposable 
income is lowered to $450 by this deduction. The debtor gets to keep the $50 trustee's 
fee. Meanwhile, the trustee must take the fee out of the $450 actually surrendered, 
thereby impoverishing the unsecured creditors! To counteract this absurdity, the United 
States trustee, in In re Wilber, 650 argued that the debtor should pay the $450 (in the 
645 350 B.R. at 40-42. 
646 Id. at 41. 
647 Id. at 46 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii) (2006)). 
648 See id. at 47 ("In other words, the plan itself has the effect of making a new agreement between the debtor 
and the creditor with a new obligation to be paid in the manner provided for by the terms of the plan." (quoting 
In re Nicholson, 70 B.R. 398,400 (Banla. D. Colo. 1987))) (emphasis added). 
649 Form B22C, supra note 33, Line 50. 
650 344 B.R. 650, 652-53 (Bankr. D. Utah 2006). 
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above example) to the unsecured non-priority creditors only. Separately, the debtor 
should pay $50 for the chapter 13 trustee's fee. In other words, the trustee sought to 
erase the deduction for the chapter 13 trustee's fee to be found in Form B22C, even 
though B22C is a straightforward literal interpretation of BAPCPA. 
Ruling that the plain meaning of BAPCPA would yield an absurd result, Judge 
William Thurman ruled that disposable income had to be paid entirely to the non-
priority unsecured creditors.651 Although he never quite said so explicitly, his ruling 
required that the debtor pay the $50 referred to above in addition to disposable income. 
In short, the meaning of section 1325(b)(l) is, not that the debtor must pay disposable 
income, but rather that the debtor must pay more than disposable income, because there 
is an inherent requirement that disposable income can only be paid to non-priority 
creditors. This move is wise, legislatively. The deduction described in section 
707(b )(2)(A)(ii)(III) should not apply in chapter 13 cases, even though it makes good 
sense in a chapter 7 case. 652 
Form B22C also contains a deduction for payment to priority claimants.653 This 
reflects the rule of section 707(b)(2)(A)(iv). So, for example, a debtor can deduct 
alimony payments from income to the same effect as deducting the chapter 13 trustee's 
fee. To continue the numerical example above, suppose, in addition to the $50 trustee's 
fee, the debtor owes $100 a month in alimony expenses. Form B22C authorizes the 
$100 deduction from the definition of disposable income.654 The debtor's income, 
formerly $450, is now reduced to $350. This means that, if BAPCPA is literally 
applied, the debtor gets to keep $100 a month in income and write a plan that allows 
the ex-spouse to recover his $100 a month from the $350 in income payable to the 
plan. Once again, the unsecured non-priority creditors are impoverished. The Wilbur 
holding implies that the debtor must pay $350 in disposable income to the plan, 
another $50 separately to the chapter 13 trustee and $100 separately for the alimony 
claim. The extra payments of $150 are financed by the unwise deductions against 
disposable income permitted by Form B22C. 
The Wilbur holding legislatively corrects an absurdity, but its premise cannot be 
limited to above-median debtors. Wilbur re-writes section 1325(b )(1) to require that all 
of the debtor's projected disposable income be applied to unsecured non-priority 
creditors. In effect, Judge Thurman adds the word "non-priority" to the statute. But if 
this is so for above-median debtors, is it not also the rule for below-median debtors, 
who are equally governed by section 1325(b)(l)? If it is, then below-median debtors 
must always pay all their disposable income ( without deductions for the chapter 13 fee 
and priority creditors) and an additional amount to the chapter 13 trustee and any 
priority creditor. Such a rule would make virtually every below-median case 
unfeasible, unless the debtor has sources of income not reportable under the definition 
651 Id. at 564--65 (considering pre-BAPCPA law in interpreting '"unsecured creditors' in§ 1325(b)(l)(b) to 
mean non-priority unsecured creditors only"). 
652 See supra text accompanying notes 447-50. 
653 Form B22C, supra note 33, Line 44. 
654 See id. Line 49. 
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of current monthly income. 
The short answer to the dilemma is that, if Wilbur allows for the free-form 
rewriting of BAPCPA, we might as well rewrite section 1325(b) as follows: in above-
median cases, non-priority creditors are to get all the disposable income, but in below-
median cases, both priority and non-priority creditors must share disposable income. 
A further aspect of the absurdity is revealed in In re Amato, 655 where the chapter 13 
trustee moved to block confirmation because the plan allowed disposable income (as 
defined by Form B22C) to be paid to the chapter 13 trustee and the debtor's attorney, 
as well as to non-priority creditors. Wilbur, at least, stood for the legislative erasure of 
the section 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(III) and section 707(b)(2)(A)(iv) deductions of priority 
claims. Judge Michael Kaplan agreed, implying that the debtor's attorney could not 
share in disposable income.656 Rather, the debtor would have to pay a supplement to 
take care of the bankruptcy lawyer, as well as the chapter 13 trustee. In other words, 
Amato goes well beyond the Wilbur result of erasing the deduction of sections 
707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(III) 707(b)(2)(A)(iv). It requires the debtor to pay more than the 
debtor's real disposable income by allocating all disposable income to non-priority 
creditors only. 
Had Form B22C allowed for a deduction for the debtor's attorney, Amato would 
have comprised a legislative correction in the nature of Wilbur. But Amato is more than 
just a correction of an absurdity. It introduces a new absurdity that not even Congress 
managed to think up. In justifying this extension, Judge Kaplan engages in some 
delicious irony. He writes: "That the Form B22C fails to make any reference to 
attorneys fees is an unfortunate omission and continues an apparent knowing disregard 
for the need to compensate attorneys representing debtors' interests. "657 Of course, 
Form B22C only follows BAPCPA, which permits the deduction of the chapter 13 
trustee's fee. What is unfortunate, then, is that the drafters of Form B22C did not 
choose to exceed the statute by extending a deduction to the debtor's lawyer, which 
Judge Kaplan could then have erased Wilbur-style. Judge Kaplan ends the Greek 
tragicomedy by blaming the Supreme Court. In Lamie v. United States Trustee,658 a 
debtor's lawyer in a chapter 7 case sought an administrative priority, even though 
Congress, in 1994, deleted "or to the debtor's attorney" from section 330(a)(l).659 
Congress, the debtor's lawyer said, had omitted these words by accident. Judge Kaplan 
then quotes the following passage from Lamie: 
Petitioner's argument stumbles on still harder ground in the face 
of another canon of interpretation. His interpretation of the Act-
reading the word "attorney" in § 330(a)(l)(A) to refer to "debtors' 
attorneys" in § 330( a)( 1 )-would have us read an absent word into the 
655 No. 06-20612 (MBK), 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 836, at *3 (Bankr. D.N.J. Mar. 20, 2007). 
656 Id. at *10. 
657 Id. at *11; see In re McDonald, No. 06-60788-13, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 363, at *10-11 (Bankr. D. Mont. Feb. 7, 
(disallowing attempt to deduct debtor's attorney expense by means of Form B22C Line 50). 
658 540 U.S. 526 (2004). 
659 Id. at 533. 
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statute. That is, his argument would result "not [in] a construction of 
[the] statute, but, in effect, an enlargement of it by the court, so that 
what was omitted, presumably by inadvertence, may be included 
within its scope." With a plain, nonabsurd meaning in view, we need 
not proceed in this way. "There is a basic difference between filling a 
gap left by Congress' silence and rewriting rules that Congress has 
affirmatively and specifically enacted." 
Our unwillingness to soften the import of Congress' chosen words 
even if we believe the words lead to a harsh outcome is longstanding. 
It results from "deference to the supremacy of the Legislature, as well 
as recognition that Congressmen typically vote on the language of a 
bill. 11660 
313 
So what we have is a plain-meaning case (Lamie) cited to justify a complete 
rewriting of BAPCPA to remove one absurdity and to create a new, quite unnecessary 
one. 
3. Charitable Contributions 
The televangelists outfoxed themselves in chapter 13. According to section 
1325(b)(2)(A)(i), as originally promulgated by BAPCPA, below-median debtors can 
deduct their charitable contributions as part of the "maintenance or support of the 
debtor or of a dependent of the debtor."661 But section 1325(b)(3) insists that expenses 
for above-median debtors are to be defined "in accordance with subparagraphs (A) and 
(B) of section 707(b)."662 Yet charitable gifts are nowhere mentioned in section 
707(b )(2). Rather they are mentioned in section 707(b )(1 ). On this basis, Judge Robert 
Littlefield, in In re Diagostino,663 refused to confirm a plan that included an intended 
$100 a month charitable contribution. Only below-median debtors were permitted by 
Congress to endow their favorite televangelist with fraudulent conveyances.664 
Needless to say, Congress did not intend to subordinate televangelism to the rights 
of creditors. Informed by Diagostino, Congress was obliged to add the words "other 
than subparagraph (A)(ii) of paragraph (2)" to section 1325(b)(3).665 The import of 
these words is that section 1325(b )(2) still governs above-median debtors with regard 
to charitable contributions. Beyond this carve-out, section 1325(b)(2) does not apply to 
660 Id. at 538 (citations omitted). 
661 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (b )(2)(A)(ii) (2006). 
662 Id. § 1325(b)(3). 
663 347 B.R. 116, 118 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2006). 
664 Accord In re Meyer, No. 13-06-11376, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 3383, *13 (Bankr. D.N.M. Dec. 4, 2006) 
("Debtors, because of their over-median income, are not entitled to claim charitable contributions as necessary 
expenses in calculating their disposable income for their plan."); In re Tranmer, 355 B.R. 234, 252 (Bankr. D. 
Mont. 2006). 
665 See Religious Liberty and Charitable Donation Clarification Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-439, § 2, 120 
Stat. 3285, 3285. 
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the expenses of above-median debtors. Only section 707(b)(2) does. 
V. CONVERSION BACK TO CHAPTER 7 
Notoriously, chapter 13 plans usually fail, as the Supreme Court has noticed.666 
This is no surprise, since chapter 13 plans require dedication of all disposable income 
to the plan. 667 Unless the debtor has taken care to pad expenses in proving that the plan 
gets all disposable income, the plan will fail at the slightest unforeseen downside 
event.668 
Does section 707(b) apply to cases converted from chapter 13? Apparently not. 
According to that provision, "After notice and a hearing, the court ... may dismiss a 
case filed by an individual debtor under this chapter whose debts are primarily 
consumer debts .... "669 The italicized language makes section 707 (b )( 1) depend on the 
debtor's filing initially in chapter 7. In a converted case, the debtor typically will have 
filed initially in chapter 13. Therefore, the means test does not apply in converted 
cases.670 
Following the plain meaning of section 707(b)(l), then, we find another huge 
loophole in the system. The test is entirely avoided if the debtor starts in chapter 13 and 
then converts to chapter 7. Conversion to chapter 7 under Bankruptcy Code se<::tion 
1307(a) is usually considered to be the debtor's absolute right.671 At least one court, 
666 See Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 493 n.l (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing failure rate 
between 37% and 60% for chapter 13 plans); Scott F. Norberg, Consumer B~nkruptcy's New Clothes: An 
Empirical Study of Discharge and Debt Collection in Chapter 13, 7 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 415,440 & n.85 
(1999) (noting approximately one-third completion rate in empirical study); William C. Whitford, The Ideal of 
Individualized Justice: Consumer Bankruptcy as Consumer Protection, and Consumer Protection in Consumer 
Bankruptcy, 68 AM. BANKR. L.J. 397,411 (1994) (referring to 31 % completion of chapter 13 plans). 
667 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(l)(B) (2006). 
668 Judge Cohen thought this point mitigated against quick dismissal of chapter 7 cases, just because some 
disposable income was discovered: 
The high failure rate of Chapter 13 cases mitigates against hasty decisions to require 
debtors with budgets based on bare bone living expenses to file Chapter 13 cases. And, in 
light of the frequent, and almost predictable failure of many Chapter 13 cases, placing 
emphasis on a theoretical ability to pay that stretches a debtor so thin that it leaves no extra 
money to meet the unplanned expenses that will inevitably and frequently arise during the 
course of a repayment effort, only assures the inevitable, which is why a debtor "should not 
be pushed to the edge of financial survival because a plan looks feasible on a cold financial 
statement." 
In re Attanasio, 218 B.R. 180, 195 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1998) (footnote omitted) (quoting In re Martin, 107 B.R. 
247,249 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1989)). 
669 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(l) (2006) (emphasis added). 
670 I owe this point to Judge Bruce Markel. 
671 See 11 U.S.C. § 1307(a) (2006) ("The debtor may convert a case under this chapter to a case under chapter 
7 of this title at any time."); see also Laughlin v. United States, 912 F.2d 197,203 (8th Cir. 1990) ("At any time 
after confirmation, a Chapter 13 debtor has an absolute right ... to convert to Chapter. 7 .... "); In re Fonke, 310 
B.R. 809,814 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2004) (espousing since section 1307(b) requires a debtor's request to dismiss, 
debtor's right to convert under section 1307(a) must be absolute); In re Parrish, 275 B.R. 424,425 n.l (Bankr. 
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however, suggests that the debtor's right is conditioned upon the debtor's good faith. In 
In re Donovan,672 a debtor converted a pre-BAPCPAchapter 13 case to chapter 7. A 
creditor moved to dismiss under section 707(b). Judge Arthur Briskman ruled that the 
pre-BAPCPA version of section 707(b) applied to the converted case, and only the 
United States trustee had standing under the old version. 673 Judge Briskman, however, 
treated the creditor's motion as an objection to conversion from chapter 13. He found 
the debtor was in good faith and allowed the conversion. But the fact that he thought 
the case was still a chapter 13 case and that he had discretion to prevent conversion 
gives reason to think that a United States trustee can insist that a chapter 13 case be 
dismissed because it was commenced in bad faith as an attempt to avoid means testing 
in chapter 7.674 
Also to be considered is the Supreme Court's recent five-to-four holding in 
Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Massachusetts,615 where a debtor, wishing to shake a 
chapter 7 trustee from the scent of fraudulent conveyances, exercised his apparently 
absolute right to convert a chapter 7 case to chapter 13.676 The Supreme Court ruled 
that this right was conditioned by the requirement that the debtor be in good faith. 
Since section 1307 is similarly worded, it too is presumably conditioned by a silent 
good faith requirement. 
Whether section 707(b) applies in converted cases was answered obliquely by 
Judge Arthur Votolato in In re Peifetto, 677 where a United States trustee in a converted 
case sought to compel a debtor to file Form B22A. Since Form B22A emanates from 
section 707(b )(2)(C), the debtor need file the form only if section 707(b) applies in the 
first place. In ruling for the United States trustee, Judge Votolato relied on section 
348(a), which provides: 
Conversion of a case from a case under one chapter of this title to a 
case under another chapter of this title constitutes an order for relief 
under the chapter to which the case is converted, but . . . does not 
effect a change in the date of the filing of the petition, the 
commencement of the case, or the order for relief. 678 
D.D.C. 2002). 
672 No. 6:04-bk-01564-ABB, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 3728, at *1 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Nov. 28, 2006). 
673 Id. at *4 ("This case was commenced prior to the BAPCPA effective date and The BAPCPA amendments 
do not govern."). 
674 Cf In re Vincente, 260B.R. 354, 361-62 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2001) (denying debtor's conversion to chapter? 
for lack of reason). 
675 127 S. Ct. 1105, 1107 (2007). 
676 Cf 11 U.S.C. § !307(a) (2006) ("The debtor may convert a case under this chapterto a case under chapter 7 
of this title at any time, if the case has not been converted under section 1112, 1208, or 1307 .... ") 
677 No. 06-106509, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 194, at *11 (Bankr. D.R.!. Jan. 19, 2007) ("Under BAPCPA, the starting 
point for determining whether substantial abuse exists is the Chapter 7 means test, and regardless of the low 
esteem in which this Court holds BAPCPA in general, it was clearly the intent of the drafters that the Form B22A 
be required upon conversion ... ;"). 
678 11 U.S.C. § 348(a) (2006); see also In re Pe,fetto, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 194, at *8-10. 
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Does this provision actually say that a case filed under chapter 13 is deemed to have 
been filed under chapter 7 in case of a conversion? Technically it says only that the 
conversion order itself is an "order for relief," in analogy to an adjudication that an 
involuntary debtor is not paying debts as they fall due, 679 or by analogy to a voluntary 
petition, which "constitutes an order for relief under" whatever chapter the debtor 
chooses to file under.680 It then indicates that the date of the conversion order is 
deemed to be the date of the commencement of the case. This does not exactly prove 
that a converting chapter 13 debtor filed under chapter 7, as section 707(b)(l) requires. 
Judge Votolato, however, was able to rely on In re Grydzuk,681 which interpreted 
new section 1328(f)(l). This section provides that, in chapter 13 cases, "the court shall 
not grant a discharge of all debts ... if the debtor has received a discharge [ ] in a case 
filed under chapter 7, 11, or 12 ... during the 4-year period preceding the date of the 
order for relief under [ chapter 13]. "682 The debtors had indeed received a discharge but 
in a case commenced in chapter 13 and then converted to chapter 7. According to the 
debtors, since they had not "filed under chapter 7, 11, or 12," section 1328(f)(l) was no 
impediment to a discharge. 683 
In Grydzuk, Judge John Squires, comparing BAPCP A (invidiously) to the works of 
Shakespeare,684 complained that section 1328(f)(l) "presents anotherin along string of 
incredible poorly drafted statutory provisions under the BAPCPA. "685 Nevertheless, 
Judge Squires denied the discharge. "Thus, in a very strict and literal sense,"~he 
observed, "the debtors' prior case was 'filed' under chapter 13."686 But section 348(a) 
compelled him to conclude that a case "filed under" chapter 13 and converted to 
chapter 7 was to be deemed "filed under chapter 7. "687 This holding therefore supports 
Judge Votolato and certainly comports with common sense, even if it pushes the 
meaning of section 348(a) beyond its precise grammar. It seems fair to predict that 
courts will find section 707(b)(l) applicable in chapter 7 cases. But as Judge Votolato 
679 See 11 U.S.C. § 303(h)(l) (2006). 
680 See id. § 301(b). 
681 353 B.R. 564, 567-69 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2006); see also In re Perfetto, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 194, at *6, *9. 
682 11 u.s.c. § 1328(t)(1)(2006). 
683 See In re Grydzuk, 353 B.R. at 565. 
684 Judge Squires notes that there is an attempt to deny Shakespeare the authorship of his plays on the grounds he 
had no education. Unlike Shakespeare, who came forth to claim authorship, however falsely: 
Id. at 566. 
[N]o one has come forward to claim authorship of the newly minted provisions of the 
BAPCP A. This is understandable, for unlike the rapture which arises from reading the most 
eloquent prose and poetry ever written in the English language, no such elevated state of 
consciousness derives from the reading of the BAPCPA. 
685 Id. at 567. In defense of the 109th Congress, the ambiguity in section 707(b) was promulgated in 1984, 
though Judge Squires is arguably right about section 1328(t)(l). 
686 Id. at 568. 
687 Accord In re Capers, 347 B.R. 169, 171 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2006) ( opposing debtor's interpretation that the words 
"filed under" in section 1328(t)(l) are controlling for purposes of determining whether discharge under chapter 
7-after conversion from chapter 13-would bar debtor's subsequent discharge under chapter 13). 
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recognizes, an absurdity arises. 688 Form B22A investigates current monthly income for 
six months prior to the bankruptcy petition. Years may have gone by before a chapter 
13 case is converted to chapter 7. Therefore, whether the debtor is a bankruptcy abuser 
will be governed by reports of income that are many years out of date. 
Suppose, however, that the case started in chapter 7, was converted to chapter 13 
because of a United States trustee's successful challenge under section 707(b), and is 
now back in chapter 7 because the debtor was unable to meet plan payments. May the 
debtor resist dismissal under section 707(b)? 
One harsh answer is that, where the first of the chapter 7 cases was dismissed for 
failure of the debtor to meet the means test, the debtor cannot go back to chapter 7. 
True it may be that the debtor's circumstance has changed-a loss of wages or health 
expenses unforeseen at first. But section 707(b)(2)(A)(i) requires the use of "current 
monthly income," which is the weighted average income six months prior to the 
original bankruptcy petition. In converted cases, conversion 
constitutes an order for relief under the chapter to which the case is 
converted, but, except as provided in subsections (b) and ( c) of this 
section, does not effect a change in the date of the filing of the 
petition, the commencement of the case, or the order for relief.689 
Since neither section lOl(lOA) nor section 707(b) appears in the long list of exceptions 
to this principle, the debtor will have no power to show a lower income as the cause of 
chapter 13~default. On the expense side, however, there is reason to suppose that 
expenses might be adjusted. So far, amendments to Schedule J, at least, have been 
freely allowed. Presumably there is no reason why Form B22A could not be amended 
as well, on the expense side, to reflect post-petition developments.690 Insofar as 
expenses are concerned, debtors should get a second chance to beat the means test in 
chapter 7. 
Those who beat the means test but were dismissed anyway on the "totality of the 
circumstances" have an interesting argument that, since the "totality of the 
circumstances" test of section 707(b)(3) turns on the ability to finance a chapter 13 
plan, having shown that chapter 13 did not work, the debtor should now be entitled to a 
chapter 7 case.691 At least one court, albeit not in a converted case, has ruled that 
inability to finance a chapter 13 case is never grounds to rebut the means test. 692 
. Also countering this argument is the fact that the debtor had a free opportunity in 
chapter 13 to modify the plan for changed circumstances. Section 1329(a) gives the 
debtor ( or others) the right to move for modification to "reduce the amount of 
688 See In re Perfetto, No. 06-106509, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 194, at *11 (Bankr. D.R.I. Jan. 19, 2007). 
689 11 U.S.C. § 348(a) (2006). 
690 See In re Wilson, No. 06-10834 (BLS), 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 3368, at *1 (Bankr. D. Del. Dec. 11, 2006). 
691 See 4 KEITH M. LUNDIN, CHAPTER 13 BANKRUPTCY § 311.1 (3d ed. 2000) (suggesting absolute right to 
convert may not survive dismissal based on "substantial abuse"). 
692 See In re Oliver, 350 B.R. 294, 303 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2006). 
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payments on claims of a particular class provided for by the plan .... "693 Presumably 
this means a reduction of wages paid to the chapter 13 trustee (who then reduces the 
amounts paid to the creditors). The question arises why the debtor did not modify in 
light of plan defaults. If the answer is apathy or indifference, then the debtor has not 
shown that chapter 13 is infeasible; the continued feasibility suggests that either the 
chapter 7 case should be dismissed or, at the option of the debtor, converted back to 
chapter 13 yet again for modification. 
CONCLUSION 
The means test in BAPCP A is either counter-productive or meaningless, depending 
on whether courts think that the means test preempts prior case law on chapter 7 
consumer debtors with surplus income. 694 This is ironic, in that the very motive of the 
mechanical means test was frustration with the way the discretionary version of section 
707(b) was administered.695 
This raises the question why the consumerfinance industry, which worked so hard 
for this particular bankruptcy reform, promulgated a regulation that either increased 
bankruptcy abuse or had no effect. 
One reason can be discounted. This reform is not about increasing the payout 
creditors receive in consumer bankruptcies. It is estimated that actual recoveries via the 
bankruptcy process were less than $1 billion annually in the 1990s.696 It is probably 
true that the number of cases shifted from chapter 7 to chapter 13 is unlikely to be 
great. Furthermore, once these cases reach chapter 13, a very major amount of 
disposable income will go to car lenders, not to credit card issuers.697 We must look 
elsewhere for the motive of the consumer credit industry. 
Borrowing from Professor Robert Mann,698 I would like make a different 
suggestion.699 Recent data show that from September 2005 to September 2006 the 
number of bankruptcy filings fell from about 1.7 million the prior year to 1 million.700 
This 2005-06 number also reports filings in anticipation of October 17, 2005-the 
effective date of BAPCP A.701 So the decrease in filings is perhaps even more dramatic, 
693 11 U.S.C. § 1329(a)(l) (2006). 
694 See Ivy, supra note 171, at 249 (predicting decisions under BAPCPA will continue to be ad hoc). 
695 See Jack F. Williams, Distrust: The Rhetoric and Reality of Means-Testing, 7 AM. BANKR. lNST. L. REV. 
105, 128-29 (1999) (suggesting "Congress [moved] to enact heightened means-testing" because bankruptcy 
judges are failing to "implement the intent of Congress regarding debtor abuse"). 
696 Culhane & White, Means-Testing Real Chapter 7 Debtors, supra note 22, at 31. 
697 See Scott F. Norberg, supra note 666, at 462 (noting increased rights of car lenders comes right out of the 
pocket ofunsecureds). Of course, there is assuredly an overlap between credit card issuers and car lenders; many 
banks are in both businesses. 
698 Mann; supra note 432, at 401-06. 
699 Something similar is suggested by Ronald J. Mann, supra note 432, at 399-403 ("The purpose of the means 
test ... is to force borrowers into chapter 13. But the provisions of the Act that relate to chapter 13 provide strong 
countervailing influence."). 
700 Bankruptcy Filings Plummet, PALM BEACH POST, Dec. 6, 2006, at 1D. 
701 Mann, supra note 432, at 397-400 (noting increase in filings in October 2005). 
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as the surge inbankruptcy filings in early October 2005 was dramatic. 
Why did fewer· people file for bankruptcy? It is surely not the case that the 
discrepancy can be explained by high-income "can pay" debtors who have gotten the 
message and are now committed to paying their debts in lieu of filing for bankruptcy. 
Studies estimate that only three to eleven percent of chapter 7 cases involved such 
debtors, prior to BAPCPA.702 They are insufficiently numerous to account for the 
decline in bankruptcy filings. Nor is it likely to be the case that the financial 
fundamentals of the typical middle-class family have changed. The debt overhang of 
credit card obligation still looms very large and is undoubtedly growing.703 Rather, I 
suggest that the foul publicity that BAPCPA received has convinced consumers 
(wrongly) thatbankruptcy is no longer an option. 
Suppose this is so. Suppose that the 700,000 consumers who did not file for 
bankruptcy out of fear and misunderstanding pay $500 per month in credit card 
carrying costs. Suppose, instead of filing for bankruptcy, these debtors make just six 
more interest payments than they would have, had they known that BAPCPA is 
basically meaningless. That means cred,it card issuers will have received $2.1 billion 
that they otherwise would not have received.704 This financial surmise, which is by no 
means unrealistic, explains why the consumer credit industry invested so heavily in 
lobbying Congress. Although the amount of campaign contributions and lobbying fees 
were considerable, they were undoubtedly far to the south of the gains won by scaring 
the lower middle class away from bankruptcy. 
If this is right, it explains the ugliness and absurdity of BAPCP A that this Article 
has attempted to describe. If the point is to scare the public off the bankruptcy option, 
ugliness and incoherence is a positive virtue. The more difficult BAPCPA is to 
understand, the better the result for the consumer finance industry. 
But these are strictly temporary gains. Once the public discovers that bankruptcy is 
still a viable option for above- and below-median debtors alike, and that BAPCPA's 
sole impact is to increase the paperwork and hence the expense of bankruptcy, the 
debtors will return to the bankruptcy courts in numbers comparable to pre-BAPCPA 
days, simply because the financial fundamentals of the middle class have not changed a 
whit as a result of BAPCP A. By the time the public wises up, however, the consumer 
credit industry will have reaped a windfall from its campaign of fear and confusion. 
702 See Culhane & White, Means-Testing Real Chapter 7 Debtors, supra note 22, at 34 (indicating sample size 
of group included 3.6% and 11 % ). 
703 In 2005, the total outstanding exceeded $2 trillion. See Susan Block-Lieb & Edward J. Janger, The Myth of 
the Rational Borrower: Rationality, Behavioralism, and the Misguided "Reform" of Bankruptcy Law, 84 TEX. L. 
REV. 1481, 1534 (2006). 
704 See Windfall for Capital One, and for Fairbank, CAROLINE, Dec. 22, 2006, at 1 ("The slowdown in 
bankruptcy filings this year has been longer and more dramatic than anticipated and so contributed to favorable 
credit cards earnings at Capital One Financial Corp .... "). 
